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Abstract
The Financial Crisis of 2008, also known as the Great Recession of 2008, marked a time
of severe economic downturn in the United States and the global community. The magnitude of
the crisis is often compared to that of the Great Depression. Oftentimes after a crisis, questions
arise on whether accurate and relevant information was made available to the public in a timely
manner because of the widespread consequences of failing to do so. The Financial Crisis of
2008 provides a unique opportunity to examine the communication of financial information to
the public by evaluating information gaps in this process.
The research questions in this study were formulated to identify the types of gaps that
exist in the communication of financial information from publicly held corporations to the
public, the causes of such gaps, as well as measures that can be taken to close those gaps.
Content analysis is the methodology chosen for data analysis. Three kinds of sources were used
for collecting data: newspaper articles from The Wall Street Journal and The New York Times
during the years 2006 to 2009, books written by financial experts, and congressional documents
from hearings that produced an evaluation on the Financial Crisis of 2008. Answers to the
research questions present what has been documented in the data sources used in this study.
Findings show that 1) types of gaps include misleading financial information, unreliable
valuation of assets, and the interconnectedness of the financial system; 2) causes of gaps include
subprime mortgages, securitization, derivatives, and financial leverage; and 3) findings suggest
that decreasing financial leverage, increasing regulations, and increasing transparency in
reporting can mitigate the potential for gaps in communicating financial information.
Keywords: Financial Crisis of 2008, publicly held corporations, interconnectedness, subprime
mortgages, securitization, derivatives, and financial leverage
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Chapter 1: Introduction
“The ability to acquire and disseminate information, to control the flow of information,
has often been described as a source of power” (Mayer-Schonberger & Lazer 2007, 6). Most
organizations have structures in place to control the flow of information by limiting access to
certain individuals (Needles, Anderson, Caldwell 1993, 255). The process of transferring
information to the public differs based on the source of the information and the various
information systems in place. Accurate and relevant information, in general terms, is essential to
any decision-making process. Accurate financial information, in particular, is needed for making
timely economic decisions (Needles, Anderson, and Caldwell 1993, 297). Broadly, this study
seeks to examine the process of delivering accurate financial information to the public in a
timely manner because of the real-life consequences when there is a breach in this process.
Accountability and transparency are concepts that communicate levels of confidence in
financial reports (Wild, Shaw, and Chiapetta 2013, 13). In this context, accountability refers to
taking responsibility for the information reported on the daily operations of the corporation and
disclosure of the corporation’s performance (Anand 2006, 26). Transparency speaks to openness
and honesty in disclosing financial reports (Norris 1999). In addition, transparency describes “the
extent to which outsiders have knowledge regarding a company’s financial performance and
financial position” (Kimmel, Weygandt, and Mitchell 2022, 47). Timeliness forms the third
cornerstone of sound financial reporting. To meet the timeliness threshold “requires distribution
of financial reports in time to influence a user’s decision” (Warren and Jones 2019, 9). The
International Accounting Standards Board refers to timeliness as an important factor in financial
reporting (McGee and Igoe 2009). Timeliness in financial reporting is a “measure of
transparency and quality … The lapse of time between a company’s year-end and the date when
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financial information is released to the public is related to the quality of the information
reported” (McGee and Igoe 2009, 190). In other words, timeliness is “having information
available to decision-makers before it loses its capacity to influence decisions” (Kieso,
Weygandt, and Warfield 2016, 47).
A publicly held corporation, also referred to as a public company or publicly traded
company, is a corporation whose shares of stock are sold to the public in a securities market such
as the New York Stock Exchange (Miller and Cross 2013, 698). Publicly held corporations in the
United States file financial reports with the Securities and Exchange Commission on a quarterly
and annual basis and the financial statements must be personally certified by the corporation’s
chief executive officer and the chief financial officer (Beatty and Samuelson 2010, 355). The
Securities and Exchange Commission is a government agency that “has authority over the
accounting and financial disclosures for companies whose shares of ownership (stocks) are
traded and sold to the public” (Warren and Jones 2019, 9).
The laws that regulate the sale of securities to the public signal the importance of
protecting the rights of investors and promoting economic activity. In 2002, Congress enacted
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act “to protect investors by improving accuracy and reliability of corporate
disclosures …” (Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Public Law 107-204). This act established the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board and strengthened internal controls of corporations
(Anand 2006, 1-2). Financial reporting must be credible by conveying “business activity as
faithfully as possible without coloring the picture being presented in order to influence anyone in
a certain direction” (Needles, Anderson, and Caldwell 1993, 297-298). In 2010, Congress passed
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act “to promote the financial
stability of the United States by improving accountability and transparency in the financial
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system … to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices …” (H. R. 4173 –
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 111th Congress 2009-2010, par.
1).
1.1 The Financial Crisis of 2008
This study proposes to look at the Financial Crisis of 2008, also known as the Great
Recession of 2008, to examine the flow of financial information from publicly held corporations
to the general public. The Financial Crisis of 2008 was the largest economic downturn since the
Great Depression (Hilsenrath, Ng, and Paletta 2008). This period lasted from December 2007 to
June 2009 and triggered a global recession in 2009 (Rich 2013). There were significant
economic consequences to this crisis. The Financial Crisis of 2008 involved an estimated $300
billion in government bailouts of failing banks and securities firms (Enrich et al. 2008). In
addition, in October 2008, Congress passed the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP)
authorizing “a $700 billion intervention for the entire financial system (Geithner 2014, 3).
The collapse of Bear Stearns, an investment bank in business since 1923, marked the
beginning of the period known as the Financial Crisis of 2008: “The bank would become the first
domino to fall in the financial crisis, the worst panic to grip Wall Street since 1929” (Egan 2018,
par. 3). During 2007, the price of a share of Bear Stearns’s stock peaked at $173 (Egan 2018).
However, by March 16, 2008, Bear Stearns was sold to J.P. Morgan for $2. per share along with
the government covering $30 billion dollars of the bank’s securities (Egan 2018; Moyer 2018).
In September 2008, The Wall Street Journal reported that the United States government
was going to take over American International Group, Inc. (AIG), one of the biggest insurance
companies, in an $85 billion government bailout (Karnitschnig, Solomon, Pleven, and Hilsenrath
2008). Also, in September 2008, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., an investment bank and
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securities firm, with $639 billion in assets, filed for bankruptcy (Lioudis 2019; Mollenkamp et al.
2008). Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. had 25,000 employees throughout the world and was the
largest bankruptcy filing in U.S history (Lioudis 2019). Ben Bernanke, former chairman of the
Federal Reserve Board from 2006 to 2014, recalled the magnitude of this crisis: “September and
October of 2008 was the worst financial crisis in global history, including the Great Depression”
(Da Costa 2014).
In many ways, looking back briefly at the Great Depression offers some perspective in
understanding the events leading up to the Great Recession. In 1929, the historic stock market
crash led to the closure of 9,000 banks between 1929 and 1933 with depositors losing an
estimated $400 million dollars (Mishkin 1998, 266). In addition, the 1930s marked a time of
severe economic downturn in the United States with loss of wealth and unemployment of up to
25% (McConnell and Brue 1996; Mishkin 1998, 220). After the crash, the lack of information
provided to the public became evident and President Roosevelt took steps to correct this. In
March 1933, President Roosevelt started his famous fireside chats – a series of radio broadcasts
to explain the banking system to the public: “I want to talk for a few minutes with the people of
the United States about banking – with the comparatively few who understand the mechanics of
banking but more particularly with the overwhelming majority who use banks …” (Peters and
Wolley 2018, par. 1).
President Roosevelt’s message showcases three main points: first, the public’s need to be
informed of the workings in the banking system; second, the role the government plays in
informing the public; and third, the widespread effects of major economic downturns on people’s
everyday lives. The banking crisis in the 1930s led to the passage of legislation with the purpose
of protecting the rights of investors and greater transparency of financial information (Mishkin
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1998, 266-267). Congress passed the Banking Act of 1933 which separated the activities of
commercial banks and investment banks (Irwin 2015). In addition, Congress passed the
Securities Act of 1933 – with the main objectives requiring that “investors receive financial and
other significant information concerning the securities being offered to the public and prohibit
deceit, misrepresentations, and other fraud in the sale of securities” (U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission 2015, par. 6).
There are three sources of information that apply to this study: publicly held corporations,
the government, and the news media. Some types of information need to be analyzed or filtered
before it is communicated to the general public. Examples that come to mind are medical
information, academic information, and financial information -- that is information or knowledge
that originate with experts in their respective fields -- and may not be easily understood by
everyone. Financial information, for instance, can be filtered by the government, as in the case of
President Roosevelt during the 1930s, or by the media, in the form of news reports or broadcasts.
In this way, the government and the media act as intermediaries between the original source of
information and the public.
By the turn of the twenty-first century, the structures for communicating information had
undergone radical changes with the advent of the Internet. Today financial reports can be
accessed freely from the Securities and Exchange Commission but the format is similar to
financial statements published by corporations. This study analyzes three data sources related to
the dissemination of financial information to the public: two major newspapers (The New York
Times and The Wall Street Journal), books published by financial experts, and congressional
hearings conducted by the U.S. government. Justification for the selection of The New York
Times, The Wall Street Journal, and the other data sources will be provided in the Methodology
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chapter. This study looks at information surrounding the time period of the Financial Crisis of
2008, with emphasis being placed on a selected period preceding the financial crisis.
There are laws and governing bodies that regulate financial information for publicly held
corporations. However, the Financial Crisis of 2008 shows that there were significant
discrepancies in the information reported to the public. For example, why was the housing
market overpriced by $600 billion and when was this information made available? Why was
Bear Stearns’s stock offered for sale at $2 per share in 2008 when it was worth $173 per share
months earlier? Why did the government spend $85 billion to bailout AIG? How did Lehman
Brothers, with $639 billion in assets, file for bankruptcy in September 2008 when in 2006,
Lehman Brothers was “one of the fastest-growing” investment banks? (Sraders 2018, par. 9). In
2007, Lehman Brothers was reporting $19.3 billion in revenues and $4.2 billion in net income”
(Sraders 2018, par. 9). These discrepancies are significant considering that the Securities and
Exchange Commission, an independent federal agency, oversees the reporting of financial
information by publicly held corporations.
1.2 Significance of the Study
The problem this study seeks to examine centers around information gaps in the transfer
of financial information from publicly traded corporations to the public. The seismic changes in
the financial markets during the Financial Crisis of 2008 presents an opportunity to examine this
process. By looking at the Financial Crisis of 2008 as a sample, this study can shed light on
possible fractures in the information channel that functions to communicate financial information
to the public.
The multidisciplinary nature of Information Studies allows for the analysis of information
through various lenses. This problem will be studied by analyzing published business articles
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from two major newspapers (The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal) focusing on a
selected number of years surrounding the crisis. The analysis also includes congressional
hearings and books written by financial experts after the crisis. More than a decade after this
event, there is a vast amount of information explaining the causes of the crash and the details of
it. The perspective here is to trace original reporting during the years surrounding the crisis in
order to present a clear picture of what has been documented in the data sources. Research can
highlight whether the public was informed in a timely manner or not – was there a lack of
information or misinformation about the financial positions of major corporations during this
time? Could a collapse of such proportions be overlooked in reporting periods leading up to the
event?
Financial information on businesses is useful to the government, creditors, vendors,
investors, and consumers. Even though many people know about the events we describe as major
economic downturns, such as the Great Depression and the Great Recession, many may still not
fully understand the details of what happened or the cost. Why dredge up bank failures and a
stock market crash from more than a decade ago? Why is it still relevant today? It may be that
some analysts surmise that such an event can happen again (Larsen 2015).
In 2020, concerns of another financial crisis grew with the onset of the COVID-19
pandemic: “For the second time in 12 years, the U. S economy and financial markets are facing
an unexpected crisis of uncertain proportions” (Osterland 2020, par. 1). Frequent references to
the Financial Crisis of 2008 during the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic serve to
underscore two important points: first, the Financial Crisis of 2008 is considered the point of
reference for comparing other economic downturns, and second, there are linkages that exist
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among reliable information, public confidence, and volatility in the financial system (Irwin 2020;
Osterland 2020; Sorkin 2020).
Major economic downturns do not only affect Wall Street and financial investors. The
effects trickle down in a chain reaction to the public as well. Even though many people may not
be investors, many employees have 401k plans or pension plans. If the market crashes, it takes
down retirement earnings as well. In the case of the Financial Crisis of 2008, the effects were
widespread: “At its depths, $15 trillion in household wealth had disappeared, ravaging the
pensions and college funds of Americans who had thought their money was in good hands.
Nearly 9 million workers lost their jobs; 9 million people slipped below poverty line; 5 million
homeowners lost homes” (Geithner 2014, 16).
In addition, “assumed knowledge” in this context describes knowledge that is taken for
granted. For example, there can be an implicit assumption among the public that the laws
enacted by Congress are reliable and the knowledge disseminated through expert financial
analysts are correct. The public then does not have to figure out what terms on financial
statements mean or whether the calculation of revenues is questionable. The problem here is that
it took a crisis situation to draw attention to what the current researcher calls our “assumed
knowledge” – calling into question the producers of the information and the intermediaries that
function as filters for the public. The effects of a financial crisis such as the Great Recession
show that when the economy is in decline at the macro level, it trickles down to the micro level
and to everyday life. Conclusions drawn from this research can lead to important findings and
improvements in the process of communicating financial information from publicly traded
corporations to the public.
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1.3 Financial Reporting
Publicly held corporations are an important part of the complex financial system in the
United States. The ownership of a corporation is divided into shares of stock with each share of
stock representing one unit of ownership (Miller and Cross 2013, 709). For publicly held
corporations, shares of stock are sold to the public in a securities market, such as the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE) or the NASDAQ – the National Association of Securities Dealers
Automated Quotations (Miller and Cross 2013, 698). This section attempts to explain how
financial information from corporations are collected, processed, and communicated to the
public.
Accounting is called the “language of business,” and it is the methodology used for
processing and reporting financial information (Warren, Reeve, and Duchac 2016, 3).
Accounting is defined as an information system that “identifies, records, and communicates
information about an organization’s business activities” (Wild, Shaw, and Chiapetta 2017, 4).
Financial data is generated from monetary transactions and is measured and recorded in dollars
and cents as the common unit of measurement (Warren, Reeve, and Duchac 2016, 8).
Information technology, including computers, networks, and other devices, is widely
used in accounting information systems to “store, retrieve, transmit, and manipulate data
(Romney and Steinbart 2018, 30). Accounting principles provide the structure that allows for the
control of vast amounts of data. Accuracy is essential in this process since “even the slightest
hint of accounting irregularity at a company leads to a subsequent pounding of the company’s
stock price” (Kieso, Weygandt, and Warfield, 2016, p. 5).
Financial information for corporations is summarized and communicated through
accounting reports, commonly referred to as financial statements (Warren, Reeve, and Duchac
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2016, 15). The four main financial statements are the Income Statement, the Statement of
Stockholders Equity, the Balance Sheet, and the Statement of Cash Flows. Financial statements
hold important information for investors, creditors, and other decision-makers because a
company’s viability can be determined through analysis of its financial reports. This information
is used for many purposes, but of major importance, it is used by millions of people who invest
money in publicly held companies.
“For information to be useful, it must be trusted” (Wild, Shaw, and Chiapetta 2017, 7).
Someone who wants to invest in a company or extend a loan to a company needs information
that is reliable. As such, two main characteristics of financial information are relevance and
faithful representation. Relevance simply means that the information “has the potential to impact
decision-making” and faithful representation refers to information that “accurately reflects an
entity’s economic activity or condition,” -- that is, the accounting entries correspond with what
actually happened (Kieso, Weygandt, and Warfield 2016, 42-45; Warren, Reeve, and Duchac
2016, 9).
Who prepares the financial statements of a corporation? How are financial statements
prepared? How is this information made available to the public? Who are “users” of accounting
information? These questions will be addressed in this section to provide the necessary
background information for this proposed research.
1.3.1 Preparers of Financial Statements
According to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), “A company’s
management has the responsibility for preparing the company’s financial statements and related
disclosures (U.S Securities and Exchange Commission, sec.gov., par. 4). Since management is
responsible for preparing documents that the public relies on to make financial decisions, steps
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must be taken to give the public confidence that management has not falsified or misrepresented
information for the benefit of the corporation (Needles and Powers 2012, 23). To this end, if a
corporation sells shares of stock to the public, certain conditions must be in place to monitor this
process.
First, financial statements of publicly held corporations must be subjected to audits by
independent certified public accountants – individuals who are not employed by the corporation
or have any compromising associations with the corporation (Needles and Powers 2012, 23). A
certified public accountant must meet state requirements for education and experience. During an
audit, the independent certified public accountant examines the financial statements as well as
the system in place for recording, storing, and retrieving data that produces those financial
statements, to ensure that generally accepted accounting principles have been followed. The
independent certified public accountant then “provides an opinion as to how accurately the
financial statements present the company’s results” (Weygandt, Kimmel, and Kieso 2020, 1-27).
In addition, the Securities and Exchange Commission has authority over the accounting
and financial disclosures for any company trading shares of stock to the public (Warren and
Jones 2019, 9). The Securities and Exchange Commission requires companies to file annual
reports on Form 10-K, quarterly reports on Form 10-Q, and current reports on Form 8-K. The
annual reports are considered the most important and are subjected to closer scrutiny by the SEC.
The annual report is a comprehensive report that includes the company’s financial statements,
notes to the financial statements, and the report from independent auditors (Kenton 2019, par. 2).
A company’s chief executive officer and chief financial officer “must certify the financial
and certain other information contained in annual reports on Form 10-K and quarterly reports on
Form 10-Q” (U.S Securities and Exchange Commission, sec.gov. par 1). This process is from the
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Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, section 302, that requires the chief executive officer and the chief
financial officer of any publicly traded corporation to certify that financial statements and
disclosures “fairly present, in all material respects, the operations and financial condition of the
company” (Marden, Edwards, and Stout 2006, par. 1). This certification statement in made under
oath.
The process in its totality shows the layers involved in preparing financial reports for public
access:
▪

Reports are prepared by management

▪

Reports are audited by an Independent Public Accountant/Independent Public
Accounting Firm

▪

Reports are certified by the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of the
Corporation

▪

Reports are filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission

1.3.2 Preparing Financial Reports
Business transactions, also referred to as business activities, are the starting point of
financial reports (Wild, Shaw, and Chiapetta 2017, 54). A business transaction is “an economic
event or condition that directly changes an entity’s financial condition or its results of
operations” (Warren and Jones 2019, 12). The process to get from business transactions to
financial reports begins with source documents. Every transaction is identified from a source
document and entered into the accounting system. Common examples of source documents are
sales receipts, bills from suppliers or vendors, employee earnings records, purchase orders,
checks, tape or electronic files from cash registrars, and bank statements. Source documents can
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be electronic documents or hard copies. “Source documents are objective and reliable evidence
about transactions and events and their amounts” (Wild, Shaw, and Chiapetta 2017, 54).
Corporations can have thousands of business transactions daily. For example, in 2017,
Starbucks reported sales of $22.4 billion and Amazon reported sales of $177.87 billion (BBC
News 2018, par. 1; Starbucks Investor Relations 2017, par. 4). Such high volume of transactions
can result in an overwhelming amount of information but technology has helped to reduce the
time, cost, and accuracy of recording transactions (Wild and Shaw 2019, 4). “To understand
accounting information, we need to know how the accounting system captures relevant data
about transactions, and then classifies, records, and reports data (Wild, Shaw, and Chiapetta
2013, 15). The following illustration shows a breakdown of the process that starts with business
transactions and ends with financial reports.

INPUT

Data from business transactions

Data is analyzed and recorded

Information is stored and retrieved
periodically to prepare reports

OUTPUT

Information is communicated in
financial statements

Figure 1.1: The Accounting Process
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The accounting equation is the basic foundation for accounting systems in all companies:
“from the smallest business, such as the local convenience store, to the largest business such as
the Coca-Cola Company” (Warren, Reeve, and Duchac 2016, 9). The equation is written as
follows:
ASSETS = LIABILITES + STOCKHOLDERS’ EQUITY
Assets, liabilities, and stockholders’ equity are called elements of the accounting
equation. Simply stated, assets are economic resources owned by the business; liabilities are
debts of the business or what the business owes; and stockholders’ equity represent the net worth
or residual value of the business (Warren, Reeve, and Duchac 2016, 9). The equation shows that
economic resources (assets) that belong to the business are equal to the claims against those
resources. (Needles, Caldwell, and Anderson 1993, 15). Liabilities represent claims by creditors
and stockholders’ equity represent claims by the owners (investors). In other words, everything
the business owes to creditors subtracted from everything the business owns will result in the net
worth of the business.
Each element of the accounting equation can be thought of as a main category that is
further classified into subgroups related to that category. For example, a listing of everything a
business owns is classified as assets and a listing of everything a business owes is classified as
liabilities. “The whole process of accounting is one of classification by stages so that
significantly classified information may be prepared and presented” (Briloff 1952, 386).
Formal definitions of the elements of the above accounting equation are defined by Kieso,
Weygandt, and Warfield (2019, 2-13):
▪

ASSETS: “Probable future economic benefits obtained or controlled by a particular entity
as a result of past transactions or events”
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▪

LIABILITIES: “Probable future sacrifices of economic benefits arising from present
obligations of a particular entity to transfer assets or provide services to other entities in
the future as a result of past transactions or events”

▪

STOCKHOLDERS’ EQUITY: “Residual interest in the assets of an entity that remains
after deducting its liabilities. In a business enterprise, the equity is the ownership interest”

Business transactions are analyzed using the accounting equation to determine the effect of
the transaction on the financial position of the company: “All business transactions can be stated
in terms of the change in one or more of the three elements of the accounting equation” (Warren
and Jones 2019, 27). For example, when a corporation issues stocks to investors, this will result
in changes to two elements of the equation: an increase in assets and an increase in stockholders’
equity.
The accounting equation represents the basis of double-entry bookkeeping founded in the
15th century and still used today to analyze simple and complex financial transactions (VictorSchonberger and Cukier 2013, 80). The double-entry system represents the principle of duality,
and using this principle keeps the accounting equation in balance after analyzing any business
transaction.
In accounting terminology, an account is a storage unit for data where increases and
decreases from business transactions are recorded and stored (Needles and Powers 2014, 42).
Each account has a descriptive title and an identification number (Needles, Powers, and Crosson
2012, 54). There is a separate account for each asset, liability, and each component of
stockholders’ equity (Needles and Powers 2014, 42). Records of all accounts are collected in the
General Ledger, also called the Ledger. To facilitate easy retrieval of information, every account
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in a company’s accounting system, along with its unique identification number, is listed in a
Chart of Accounts (Wild, Shaw, and Chiapetta 2013, 54).
The first recording of a business transaction in the accounting records takes place with a
Journal entry (Needles and Powers 2014, 47). The Journal is also called the book of original
entry. The Journal is important in a business because it contains complete records of all
transactions, in one location, listed in chronological order. This data includes the date of the
transaction, the accounts affected by the transaction, the dollar amount, and an explanation of the
transaction (Needles, Powers, and Crosson 2012, 60-61).
The following steps summarize the accounting process from analyzing business transactions
to the preparation of financial statements (Wild, Shaw, and Chiapetta 2017):
▪

Each business transaction is identified from a source document

▪

Each transaction is analyzed using the accounting equation

▪

The first records of transactions are made in the Journal

▪

Data is then transferred or “posted” from the Journal to the General Ledger or the Ledger

▪

Account balances in the Ledger are checked periodically to test the accuracy of the
accounting process and necessary adjustments are made

▪

Financial Statements are prepared periodically with the help of customized worksheets
(also called the accountants’ working papers)

▪

Closing entries in the Journal and the Ledger mark the end of the reporting period and
prepare the accounts for the following accounting period

1.3.3 Communicating Financial Information
The purpose of the financial accounting process is to prepare financial reports (Keiso,
Weygandt, and Warfield 2019, 3). The objective of financial reports is “to provide financial
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information on the reporting entity that is useful to present and potential equity investors,
lenders, and other creditors in decisions about providing resources to the entity” (Keiso,
Weygandt, and Warfield 2019, 3-5). An important characteristic of usefulness in accounting
information is reliability. Users must be able to depend that the information is “credible and
verifiable by independent parties” (Needles, Anderson, and Caldwell 1993, 297).
The Securities and Exchange Commission’s website provides a guide for beginners to
gain a basic understanding of financial statements and financial reports. According to the SEC,
the purpose of financial statements is to “show you the money. They show you where a
company’s money came from, where it went, and where it is now” (U.S Securities and Exchange
Commission 2007, par. 3).
The four financial statements are prepared in the following order: (1) Income Statement,
(2) Statement of Stockholders’ Equity, (3) Balance Sheet, and (4) Statement of Cash Flows.
These statements provide a summary of the financial activities for a business during a specified
period of time, for example, a month, a quarter, or a year.
The Income Statement summarizes revenues and expenses of the business for a specified
period of time. Revenues are defined as “sales of products or services to customers” (Wild,
Shaw, and Chiapetta 2013, 15). Expenses are the necessary costs incurred to earn revenues
(Wild, Shaw, and Chiapetta 2013, 15). In addition, the Income Statement shows whether the
business has a net profit or a net loss during that accounting period. Another term for net profit is
net income or earnings.
The Statement of Stockholders’ Equity shows any changes, increase or decrease, in the
value of shareholders’ ownership for a specified period of time. This statement also shows the
beginning and ending balances of stocks for the specified period and the issuance of any
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additional stocks. In addition, the Statement of Stockholders’ Equity shows payment of
dividends to stockholders. Dividends are distributions made by a corporation to its stockholders
and the distributions are usually made in cash from the corporation’s past earnings (Needles and
Powers 2014, 790).
The Balance Sheet mirrors the accounting equation in that it lists in summarized format
the assets, liabilities, and stockholders’ equity of the business at a specified date. On the Balance
Sheet, the total amount of assets is equal to the combined totals of liabilities and equity –
illustrating the principle that the accounting equation stays in balance after each business
transaction has been analyzed. The format of the Balance Sheet is designed to show the financial
position of a business in terms of what the business owns and what the business owes.
The Statement of Cash Flows summarizes all cash receipts and cash payments for a
specified period of time. The inflows and outflows of cash in the business are classified under
three categories: cash from operating activities, cash from investing activities, and cash from
financing activities.
Financial reports of a publicly held corporation contain more than financial statements.
The following is a list of the information available in the corporate financial reports (Kieso,
Weygandt, and Warfield 2019, 1-3):
▪

Financial Statements

▪

President’s letter or supplementary schedules

▪

Prospectuses (details on investment offerings to the public)

▪

Reports filed with government agencies

▪

News releases

▪

Management’s forecasts
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▪

Statements on corporations social and environmental impact

Information on publicly held corporations is available from several sources, including the
following: (date of last access for the URLs provided below is 03/05/2022)
(i) Reports published by the corporation, for example, on the corporation’s website. Publicly
held corporations publish annual reports to explain the financial position and operations
of their business (Kenton 2019, par. 1). Many publicly held corporations also publish
interim financial statements – quarterly or monthly (Needles and Powers 2014, 662).
Interim financial reports can show “early signs of change in a company’s earnings
trends” (Needles and Powers 2014, 662)
(ii) Reports are filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission and are available to the
public free of charge at https://www.sec.gov/ under Filings. They include annual reports
(Form 10-K), quarterly reports (Form 10-Q), and current reports (Form 8-K). If the
corporation has “more than $10 million in assets and more than 500 shareholders, they
must file these reports electronically at the Securities and Exchange Commission’s
EDGAR database at: http://www.sec.gov/edgar/search/webusers.htm. (Needles and
Powers 2014, 662).
(iii) The EDGAR database is a special feature of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s
website. EDGAR is an acronym for Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval
system that provides public access to information on corporations
▪

The EDGAR advanced search allows access to full-text of electronic filings since
2001 at the following site: https://www.sec.gov/edgar/search/

▪

The historical archive search “allows you to enter complex queries to retrieve all
but the most recent day’s EDGAR filings (from 1994 through 2021)” (U. S.
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Securities and Exchange Commission 2012, par. 1). The historical archive can be
accessed at https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/srch-edgar
(iv) Financial reports are available on financial websites such as Yahoo Finance, Google
Finance, and Bloomberg.com at the following websites: https://finance.yahoo.com/;
https://www.google.com/finance/; and https://www.bloomberg.com/
(v) Credit and Investment Advisory Services, for example, Moody’s Investors Service, Dun
and Bradstreet and Standard & Poor’s provide financial reports and industry data at the
following websites: https://www.moodys.com/; https://www.dnb.com/ca-en/; and
https://www.spglobal.com/ratings/en/; (Needles and Powers 2014, 663).
Even though financial information is available from various sources, users of financial reports
may still have difficulty finding the information they need. In addition, it is assumed that users of
financial reports “have a reasonable knowledge of business and economic activities” (Kieso,
Weygandt and Warfield 2019, 48). Some financial reports can be too complex to analyze without
assistance (Kieso, Weygandt, and Warfield 2019, 48). Finding information on the EDGAR
database among the various filings requires practice on using the website and understanding the
information.
As noted by Keiso, Weygandt, and Warfield (2019, 1-2), “Companies also express
concerns with the complexity of the financial reporting system.” Within this complex system,
there is a need to target and deliver the information investors need for informed decision-making
(Keiso, Weygandt, and Warfield 2019, 1-2). The complexity can be seen in the following
example of the Table of Contents for Form 10-K for Apple, Inc. retrieved from the EDGAR
database: (https://www.sec.gov/edgar/search-and-access):
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Table 1.1 Table of Contents of Apple Inc.’s Form 10 K for the fiscal year ended September 28,
2013.
Apple Inc.
Form 10-K
For the Fiscal Year Ended September 28, 2013
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

Part I
Item 1.
Item 1A.
Item 1B.
Item 2.
Item 3.
Item 4.

Business
Risk Factors
Unresolved Staff Comments
Properties
Legal Proceedings
Mine Safety Disclosures

1
9
20
20
21
21
Part II

Market for Registrant’s Common Equity, Related Stockholder Matters and Issuer Purchases of
Equity Securities
Item 6. Selected Financial Data
Item 7. Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations
Item 7A. Quantitative and Qualitative Disclosures About Market Risk
Item 8. Financial Statements and Supplementary Data
Item 9. Changes in and Disagreements With Accountants on Accounting and Financial Disclosure
Item 9A. Controls and Procedures
Item 9B. Other Information
Item 5.

22
24
25
42
44
81
81
82

Part III
Item 10. Directors, Executive Officers and Corporate Governance
Item 11. Executive Compensation
Item 12. Security Ownership of Certain Beneficial Owners and Management and Related Stockholder
Matters
Item 13. Certain Relationships and Related Transactions and Director Independence
Item 14. Principal Accounting Fees and Services

83
83
83
83
83

Part IV
Item 15. Exhibits, Financial Statement Schedules

1.3.4 Users of Accounting Information
Decision-makers or users of accounting information are typically people who own and/or
manage a business as well as people who have direct or indirect interest in a business. Users of
accounting information can be classified into two groups: internal users and external users.
External users are people outside the corporation and have “limited access” to a
corporation’s accounting information – they access information from financial reports (Wild and
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Shaw 2019, 4). The purpose of financial accounting is to “provide relevant and timely
information for the decision-making needs of users outside of the business” (Warren, Reeve, and
Duchac 2016, 4). Examples of external users include:
▪

Investors/Shareholders: owners of the corporation

▪

Creditors/Lenders: examples are banks, mortgage companies, savings and loans

▪

Potential Investors and Creditors

▪

Government: for example, the IRS and regulators

▪

Suppliers: need information before extending credit

▪

Customers
Internal users are people inside the corporation, and more specifically, executives, and

employees in management positions within the corporation (Wild and Shaw 2019, 4). Internal
users benefit from additional information provided by a branch of accounting called managerial
accounting or cost accounting. Examples of internal users include:
▪

Chief Executive Officer

▪

Chief Financial Officer

▪

Managers for Research and Development, Production, Purchasing, Marketing, Human
Resources
Users
Internal

Managerial Accounting

External

Financial Accounting

Figure 1.2 Users of Accounting Information
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The accounting system is designed with the user in mind in both areas of accounting: financial
and managerial (Warren, Reeve, and Duchac 2012, 3). Financial accounting is concerned with
the preparation of financial statements whereas managerial accounting is geared towards
preparing management reports (Warren, Reeve, and Duchac 2012, 829). One important
difference is that financial accounting must be prepared using generally accepted accounting
principles (GAAP), but this is not a strict requirement for managerial accounting since this
information is only used by the management of the company (Warren, Reeve, and Duchac 2012,
829). This study will look at financial information available to external users in the Financial
Crisis of 2008.
The ability for financial information to reach the public is dependent on reliable channels
of communication. In the case of financial reports, communication starts with the preparation of
financial statements as outlined in this section. Tracing this process that starts with business
transactions and ends with financial reports provide the basic framework for understanding the
possibility for gaps or breaches within such a system, for example, gaps such as improper
classification of transactions or omission of significant data. Even though the accounting
information system is designed to process and report on vast amounts of information, financial
innovation and a global financial system have contributed to a challenging environment in which
information changes at a rapid pace leading to further gaps in communication.
It is important to consider the accounting information system within the context of a
global financial system because of the potential impact on financial reporting. Thus, in order to
fully evaluate gaps in communicating financial information, it is necessary to understand what is
characteristic of a global financial system and the dynamic information that flows through it. The
following literature review in Chapter 2 provides insight into these processes that influence the
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communication of financial information to the public as evidenced by the Financial Crisis of
2008.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
This study seeks to address a fundamental problem as seen in the intersection of two
areas that organize everyday life: financial information that governs economic decision making
and the systems in place that communicate such information. The Great Recession of 2008
presents a unique opportunity to examine how these two areas intersect and to identify possible
ruptures in this process. This study looks to evaluate an underexplored facet of the crisis since
much of the literature around the 2008 financial crisis explains technically what it means to have
a housing bubble and how that bubble is procedurally formed (Geithner 2014; Paulson Jr. 2011;
Wolf 2014,). Subsequently, the literature reflects the widespread effects of the housing bubble
and what was done at the policy level to address the crisis (Bernanke, Geithner and Paulson Jr.
2019; Geithner 2014; Wessel 2009). The purpose of this review is twofold: to evaluate the gap
that exists between the experts in financial information and the laymen who depend on such
information for economic decision-making; and to analyze media as a channel for
communicating timely and accurate financial information between financial experts and the
public.
This chapter will examine the afore-stated issue from the following three interrelated
perspectives by reviewing relevant publications: 1) the complexity of the financial system in the
United States, 2) media as a communication channel for financial information, and 3)
communicating financial information to the public.
2.1 Understanding a Complex Financial System
Financial information is processed in complex financial systems, that is, systems with
complex processes involving many variables. Jackson (2003, xiii) writes: “Complexity stems
from the nature of problems. They rarely present themselves individually, but come related to
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other problems, in richly interconnected problem situations that are appropriately described by
Russ Ackoff as ‘messes.’” Analyzing what makes the financial system complex is important in
understanding the scope of the problem should such a system fail. This section attempts to
explore such complexity by looking at research on the system itself as well as the information
that flows through the system.
The literature around financial information and financial systems uses consistent
indicators to characterize complexity. These indicators include the sheer size of the system and
the number of interconnected or interrelated parts (Arinaminpathy, Kapadia, and May 2012; Ba
2021; Blundell-Wignall 2017; Paulson, Jr. 2010; Sau 2013; Wen and Yang 2019), the dynamic
nature of financial information and risk in financial instruments (Mishkin 2019, Sau 2013;
Schwarcz 2009, Sorkin 2009, Wang et al. 2019). These indicators are themselves interrelated and
are discussed within larger contexts of economic complexity.
2.1.1 Size and Interconnectedness
The financial system as a whole can be seen as a vast network of interconnected systems,
the size of which is difficult to conceive in a tangible way. This network of systems is extensive
because of the structures that facilitate an interdependent global economy (Ba 2021). The
financial system in the United States is made up of the banking system, nonbank financial
institutions, and the financial markets, with each one of these sectors further subdividing into
other systems (Lee 2001).
In describing the breadth and depth of the system, Mishkin (2018, 6) writes: “The
financial system is complex, comprising many different types of private sector financial
institutions, including banks, insurance companies, mutual funds, finance companies, and
investment banks ….” Mishkin’s (2018) work emphasizes not only the magnitude of the system,
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but also underscores the broad radius where people are impacted. Jackson (2003, 3) defines a
system in general as “a complex whole the functioning of which depends on its parts and the
interactions between those part.” Similar to Mishkin (2018), The Organization for Economic
Development (2005) defines a financial system based on what makes up the system:
“A financial system consists of institutional units and markets that interact, typically in a
complex manner, for the purpose of mobilizing funds for investments, and providing facilities,
including payment systems, for the financing of commercial activity.”
In a discussion of the economic roots of national power and influence, Ba (2021) looks at
complex interdependencies and instability of financial systems in a global economic setting.
Noting that the United States banking system is “the largest and most interconnected banks in the
world,” Ba (2021, 375, 403) argues that this interconnectedness in hierarchical systems creates
conditions of instability and volatility, since a larger system within this network will affect the
other economic systems.
Hierarchy within a system is indicative of complexity because a hierarchical system is
one that has subsystems and the subsystems have their own subsystems (Simon 1962). Ba (2021,
401) argues that “the size, interconnectedness, and scale of the US banking industry is the
fundamental source of America’s financial autonomy and influence, and this influence prevails
system-wide.” By this she means that the influence of a large financial system within this
structure can be felt throughout the system and all its subsystems. This argument is used to
understand the widespread effects of the financial crisis in 2008 where the influence of the
United States in terms of global financing “means that it disproportionately affects the stability
of the international economy, and by extension the welfare of billions of people” (Ba 2021, 402).
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Ba (2021) points out that over the past four decades, the complexity of interdependence
has grown significantly. She explains “complex interdependence” in terms of investments,
production, trade, consumption, and international banking that takes place across national
borders in a global economy. This interactivity involves households, businesses, and
governments on an international level. Ba (2021, 371) asserts that because of this, “changes
among actors’ interactions in one part of the system can quickly spread to actors in other parts of
the system through real and financial linkages.” Additionally, Ba (2021, 403) argues that “the
hierarchical organization of the financial system and American centrality in it critically affects its
stability.” In this context, the financial relationship of the United States with other countries can
lead to instability and crisis as changes in the financial cycle in the United States is not contained
within a single system.
Ba (2021) provides important aspects of complex interdependence, a factor that
significantly contributes to the complexity of the financial system. This is because economic
systems are linked through globalization and as capital flows through such a system,
interdependence allows for the spread of financial contagion. In addition, by identifying
hierarchical organization as a feature of complex interdependence, linkages of economic systems
within a global economy further expands the complexity of the system. Last, by emphasizing the
scale and the interconnectedness of the U.S. banking system within the global financial system,
changes in one part of the system are seen to have system-wide effects.
Blundell-Wignall (2017, 62) writes: “Global finance is the perfect example of a complex
system, consisting as it does of a highly interconnected system of subsystems ….” He points out
that this complexity is a product of international trade, investments, and swift advances in digital
technology and networks. These developments led to financial products with greater complexity
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designed to hedge risk and stock exchanges, to facilitate mergers and acquisitions among
businesses, to manage new technological innovations for trading of volatile or unstable products,
and to promote international banking (Blundell-Wignall 2017). This perspective is reflected by
the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2011, xvii) in describing the changes that have
occurred over the past three decades: “The financial markets have become increasingly
globalized. Technology has transformed the efficiency, speed, and complexity of financial
instruments and transactions.”
Blundell-Wignall (2017) explains that the banking system became the epicenter of the
global financial crisis in 2008 because risk was underpriced and offers some insight into why this
was the case. First, there were businesses in the banking system that had poor regulation at the
institutional level as well as excessive debt, and became too big to fail. Too-big-to-fail banks and
financial institutions that wield the most influence are American organizations that are
problematic because they increase system risk (Ba 2021). Paulson, Jr. (2010, 441) offers further
insight into the “too-big-to fail” institutions: “The largest financial institutions are so big and
complex that they pose a dangerously large risk … This dramatic concentration, coupled with
much greater interconnectedness, means that the failure of any of a few large institutions can
take down a big part of the system.”
Additionally, Blundell-Wignall (2017) links the failures in the banking system with
increased risk because of a surge of institutional investors in the financial markets along with the
growth of leverage and derivatives. Between the years of 1978 and 2007 debt held by the
financial sector increased from $3 trillion to $36 trillion (The Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission 2011, xvii). This is supported by Paulson, Jr. (2010, 440) who also draws attention
to the significant increase of leverage in the financial system and writes: “Much of the leverage
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was embedded in largely opaque and highly complex financial products.” As Blundell-Wignall
(2017) explains, technological innovations in financial markets led to new financial products and
new ways of trading securities, including high frequency trading.
Blundell-Wignall (2017, 63) identifies examples of this increase in complexity using
terms that are complicated as well: “The increasing separation of owners from the governance of
companies also added a new layer of complexity compounding some of these issues (passive
funds, exchange-traded funds, or ETFs, lending agent’s custody, re-hypothecation, advisors and
consultants are all in the mix).” He also makes a distinction between a financial system that is by
its nature big and complex, and the reformulation of a system due to advances in information
technology and reforms in regulation. Factors associated with this environment include
fragmentation that has resulted in growing numbers of stock trading venues and “dark-trading
pools,” issues of transparency in the stock market, and financial securities that favor speed and
complexity over long-term investments (Blundell-Wignall 2017, 64-65).
Arinaminpathy, Kapadia, and May (2012) use a theoretical approach in developing a
model to analyze size, interdependency, and complexity in financial systems. The authors point
out that in recent decades, the increased changes in financial systems can be observed in terms of
size, dynamic behavior, and complexity. The implementation of models when working with
mass amounts of data is supported by White (2012, 1): “When defining a complex problem,
systems engineers create abstractions to reduce complexity and increase understanding.”
Arinaminpathy, Kapadia, and May’s (2012) model constructs a system of 200 interconnected
banks allowing them to draw parallels with other large and complex systems. The banks in this
model were connected through the interbank market in a system that shared the same group of
external assets.
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In asking the question: “What role do large banks play in systemic risk?” Arinaminpathy,
Kapadia, and May (2012, 18338) establish a link between the financial system and channeling
contagion from one bank to another. Besides looking at size and interconnectedness, the model
also incorporates the effect of confidence within the system. As noted by Geithner (2014, 7),
“Financial systems, after all, are built on belief.” A crisis of confidence that disrupted the entire
financial system occurred during the Great Depression and again during the Great Recession of
2008 (Bernanke, Geithner, and Paulson Jr. 2019, 3). Arinaminpathy, Kapadia, and May (2012)
further point out that policy discussions on the size and interconnectedness of some banks, and
their impact on the financial system have not been well-received by the financial industry.
Arinaminpathy, Kapadia, and May (2012) highlight some important points in their
findings. First, because of the presence of nonlinear relationships, stability within the system is
disproportionately affected by large and well-connected banks. Second, large banks can be
stabilizing if they remain healthy but the failure of large banks can negatively affect the entire
system and the effects of confidence can be seen to increase dynamics in the financial system.
The authors then conclude that market confidence and unparalleled interconnectivity result in
widespread complex dynamics within modern financial systems.
2.1.2 Dynamic Nature of Financial Information and Risk in Financial Instruments
Sau (2013) argues that financial markets are complex systems. What makes the systems
complex? According to Sau (2013), the system is complex because the nature of the economy is
complex and this complexity can be explained through factors such as a capitalist system,
instability, and uncertainty. He looks at complexity in the financial system by analyzing the
differences in two hypotheses: the Efficient Markets Hypothesis and Hyman Minsky’s Financial
Instability Hypothesis.
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The Efficient Market Hypothesis is a theoretical approach that emphasizes efficiency in
the financial markets (Sau 2013). This approach may be better suited to ideal economic
conditions. Here, financial markets are thought of as “self-regulating and self-stabilizing,” so that
crisis and unstable conditions are short-term events (Sau 2013, 497). Securities markets are seen
as “extremely efficient in reflecting information about individual stocks and about the stock
market as a whole” (Malkiel 2003, 59). This means that new information is reflected promptly in
stock prices (Sau 2013). In this way, uncertainty is reduced since the market as a whole adjusts
based on market news and “the probability of financial crisis is ruled out” (Sau 2013, 499).
Hyman Minsky’s (1992) work on the Financial Instability Hypothesis has both
theoretical and empirical aspects. The theoretical aspect looks at the economy “as a capitalist
economy with expensive capital assets and a complex, sophisticated financial system” (Minsky
1992, 2). Capital development in such an economy, argues Minsky (1992), involves the
exchange of present money for future money: present money pays for resources that produce
investment output and future money is characterized by earned profits. The empirical perspective
deals with the potential for inflations and debt inflations in capitalist economies, and the
probability of losing control during these periods (Minsky 1992).
The capitalist economic structure has financial systems that are increasingly complex
because of the way the system operates (Sau 2013; Whalen 2001). There are components within
the system that are constantly changing (Whalen 2001). Sau (2013, 501) describes the resulting
instability, uncertainty, and risk as complex dynamics and argues that probability models are
insufficient in analyzing this level of risk and uncertainty: “Under conditions of fundamental
uncertainty the behavior of economic agents is so complex that formal probabilistic treatment of
expectations is not feasible.” Interdependence in this context means decision-making for one
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person depends on decisions made by other people on a large scale, contributing to uncertainty
(Sau 2013).
Sau (2013) identifies the role of institutional investors and money managers that
contribute to the internal dynamics of financial markets and makes two important points. First, a
trend that started in the 1980s and 1990s shows that money managers now have a principal role
in the economy instead of great numbers of individual investors who used to be the primary
drivers of the financial markets. Factors contributing to the development of money managers
include deregulation and reduced oversight over a 30-year period. Second, financial decisionmaking by corporate executives is heavily influenced by money managers “to drive up the shortterm stock market valuation of their firms” (Sau, 2013, 505). The reason for this is “Money
managers exert this pressure through their control of pension and mutual funds, venture capital
funds, private equity funds, and, of course, hedge funds” (Sau 2013, 505).
Sau (2013) argues that structural changes within the financial system resulted in problems
in the system as well as excessive risk. These changes took place in two ways: securitization and
globalization. Sau (2013) writes: “Securitization involves a pooling of illiquid assets (mortgages,
car loans, student loans) and issuing securities representing an interest in the pool. Financial
globalization is the process of internationalization of both the funds and the assets of the funds
….” This restructuring in the financial markets through securitization was a disadvantage to
traditional banks because business activities were moving away from banks into more innovative
and complex financial instruments.
Mishkin (2019, 243) describes securitization as “one of the most important financial
innovations of the past two decades, arising from improvements in information technology.”
This refers to a process that bundles illiquid financial assets into market securities, for example,
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residential mortgages, auto loans, and credit card receivables can be bundled together. The
following example demonstrates the link between the housing market and the financial system:
“Securities whose income and value came from a pool of residential mortgages were being
amalgamated, sliced up, and reconfigured again, and soon became the underpinnings of new
investment products marketed as collateralized debt obligations.” (Sorkin 2009, 89).
Sorkin (2009) also supports the argument that the reason for the process of securitization
is to spread and reduce risk. This means that banks did not have to keep loans on their balance
sheets. The risk of the loans can be spread over thousands of parties, meaning that “many
institutions and investors were interconnected … A municipal pension fund in Norway might
have subprime mortgages from California in its portfolio and not even realize it (Sorkin 2009,
90).
Complexity is “the greatest financial market challenge of the future” (Schwarcz 2009,
213). This author argues that one source of complexity in financial markets arises from risky
ventures because of investors who are looking for higher yields. This objective leads to offerings
of more complex securities and new types of assets that allow for the hedging or offsetting of
risk. As a result, these securities can carry a higher price than the value of their underlying assets.
Understanding the complexities of some of the underlying assets would require an individualized
modeling approach to estimate risk factors involved – risk factors such as default risk, interest
rate risk, and prepayment risk: “When multiple asset classes underlie a given class of securities,
modeling can become exponentially complicated” (Schwarcz 2009, 216-217).
Cognizant complexity refers to processes involved in the valuation of investment
securities that are “too complex to understand” (Schwarcz 2009, 214). This can be seen in the
terms and conditions attached to financial assets such as mortgage-loans that include “low-to-
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zero down payment requirements, interest-only payment options, and negative amortization”
(Schwarcz 2019, 217). Adding another layer to this process, government agencies and
investment banks bought these loans and further created a securitization process by bundling
them into what is known as mortgage-backed securities (Schwarcz 2009).
Schwarcz’s (2009) work on the subprime financial crisis takes a close look at different
perspectives of complexity in modern financial markets. The subprime financial crisis played a
significant role in leading up to the Great Recession, as explained by the Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission (2011, xxiii): “Many mortgage lenders set the bar so low that lenders simply took
eager borrowers’ qualifications on faith, often with a willful disregard for a borrower’s ability to
pay.” In an environment of high risk and leverage, these practices threatened the stability of a
system that was too big and interconnected (Bernanke, Geithner, and Paulson Jr. 2019, 112). In
October 2008, the United States Congress passed the Troubled Asset Relief Program that
authorized the spending of $700 billion to repurchase subprime mortgage assets from failing
institutions and to stabilize the entire financial system (Mishkin 2019, 283).
In addition, Schwarcz (2019, 221) shows how the operations of modern finance in the
United States and around the world involve “complex issuance by SPVs (special purpose
vehicles) of securities backed by a wide range of financial assets. An SPV is used by companies
to limit the spread of financial risk (Na’im 2006). One of the ways companies use SPVs is to
create these vehicles that are off-balance-sheet transactions as a technique to absorb the
companies’ debt: “This mechanism provides the instrument for the firms to hide their loan or
potential material liabilities from appearing explicitly in their financial statements” (Na’im 2006,
7).
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Expanding and understanding some of the processes and complex financial assets
discussed in Schwarcz (2019) requires a closer look at some specific changes in financial
institutions such as the rise of the shadow banking system and financial derivatives. Some of the
traditional operations of banks evolved due to financial innovation and this led to significant
changes in the financial system (Mishkin 2019, 239; Wolf 2014, 127-128). One such change is
known as the development of the shadow banking system, where loans made by traditional banks
and funded by deposits were replaced by loans through securities markets (Bernanke, Geithner,
and Paulson Jr. 2019, 112; Mishkin 2019, 239).
The shadow banking system included institutions such as mutual funds, investment
banks, and hedge funds. These institutions were not subjected to the same regulation
requirements as commercial banks (Bernanke, Geithner, and Paulson Jr. 2019, 112; The
Financial Crisis Inquiry Report 2011, 455). The shadow banking system increased in growth
during the early 2000s with total assets reaching around $13 trillion in 2007 making the shadow
banking system larger than the traditional banking system (Wolf 2014, 130). Geithner (2014,
504) writes: “Shadow banking is a term often used to describe entities with bank-like risk that
are not regulated as banks … many of the largest firms and markets described as ‘shadow’
activity were operating in broad daylight, as public companies ….”
In making a comparison between the Great Depression in 1929 and the Great Recession
in 2008, Geithner (2014, 8, 78) writes: “Of course, the banking system that FDR inherited didn’t
have ‘collateralized debt obligations,’ ‘asset-backed commercial paper,’ or other complexities of
twenty-first-century finance, for example, derivatives used for hedging and distributing risks.”
Derivatives, also referred to as financial derivatives, are known as highly complex financial
instruments. Financial derivatives were developed as a product to “hedge” or protect financial
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institutions and investors from interest rate risk (Mishkin 2019, 241). As noted by the Financial
Crisis Inquiry Report (2011, 45), “During the financial crisis, leverage and complexity became
closely identified with one element of the story: derivatives.” The prices of these financial
contracts are ‘derived’ from “the value of some underlying asset, rate, index, or event” and are
available in various forms such as over-the-counter-swaps and exchange-traded futures and
options (The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report 2011, 46). The consequences of financial
derivatives and other complex financial instruments enhanced risk and a lack of transparency to a
degree far greater than the Great Depression.
The measurement of dynamics and complexity in financial systems by Wang et al. (2019)
is complex in itself as their model is designed to look at the dynamics and complexity in a
financial system with time delays. This method allows for precise measures of the features of
financial systems. Time delays are included in the process as well to take into account the
amount of time that elapsed beginning from the time that a policy or decision is made to the time
that the policy or decision takes effect (Wang et al. 2019).
Wang et al. (2019) highlight some important aspects of measuring chaos and complexity
in financial systems. First, the measurement of dynamics refers to the level of chaos within the
financial system. Second, measuring complexity with varying parameters shows that chaos in the
system result in higher complexity measures. Third, the presence of chaos means there is
instability and unpredictability in the financial system. As noted by Wang et al. (2019, 7): “If
high complexity measure result is observed, it means that the system has complex dynamical
behavior and some necessary control policies should be considered.” Additionally, the findings
show that the financial system has a “wide region of high complexity” and time delay is “one of
the important reasons for generating chaos in the system” (Wang et al. 2019, 7-8).
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Similar to the study done by Wang et al (2019), Wen and Yang (2019) examine
complexity and chaos in financial systems. Describing the financial system as “an open complex
giant system that exchanges energy, such as material, capital, and information, with the outside
of the system,” Wen and Yang (2019, 242) note that the financial system is even more complex
because of subjective perceptions of the people that engage with the system. They develop a
model to analyze the stability of the system with variables such as interest rates, investment
demand, price index, and the demand elasticity of the commercial market.
The findings from Wen and Yang (2019) offer insight into the internal complexity of the
financial system. Complex dynamic behaviors and chaos are products of nonlinear financial
systems. The authors recognize that a combination of factors contribute to the formation of
financial chaos such as the behavior of investors, non-equilibrium fluctuation in financial
markets, excessive financial innovation, and lack of financial supervision. The results show that
an overly active system leads to chaos and makes it difficult to predict and control outcomes:
“Instability and complexity make accurate economic forecasting very limited and reasonable
expected behavior becomes complicated” (Wen and Yang 2019, 250).
Explaining complexity from the perspective of the system and the information that flows
through the system reveals various issues and changes that have occurred mainly over the past
four decades with the rapid growth of technology, and a financial structure that developed to
facilitate globalization. Studying the Financial Crisis of 2008 further shows the role complexity
plays in hampering communication to the public by providing alternative ways of banking, and
by extension, unmonitored ways of engaging with and disseminating financial information.
When an alternative system stemming from traditional banking emerges, the heightened lack of
communication affects not only alternative systems, but the original system as well. Emphasizing
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complexity underscores how the Financial Crisis of 2008 was able to reverberate throughout
economies and markets across the globe.
2.2 Media as a Communication Channel for Financial Information
This section seeks to review the literature on the use of media as a communication
channel for the purpose of informing the public about financial information. The role of the
media is an important one because the nature of financial information, as seen in the previous
section, is inherently complex. The media, then, acts as an intermediary between the experts in
financial information and laymen who need this information for investing and other everyday
economic decision-making. Communication of financial information through media is reviewed
from the following perspectives: 1) the tone of media reports (Ahmad, Han, Hutson, Kearney,
and Liu 2016; Behr 2002; Roush 2008), 2) effects of macroeconomic news reports (Birz and Lott
Jr. 2011; Kalogeropoulous 2018), and 3) media reports on future earnings and market
fluctuations (Pena-Martel, Perez-Aleman, and Santana-Martin 2018; Strycharz, Strauss, and
Trilling 2018).
2.2.1 Tone of Media Reports
Tone is an important concept in communication. Tone potentially could have had an
impact on the communication of financial information in the 2008 Financial Crisis. Ahmad et al.
(2016) analyze the effects of negative media reports on firms’ stock returns over a ten-year
period using 5.5 million news articles. The study looks at twenty large firms in the United States
from January 2001 to December 2010 to show how “media-expressed negative tone impacts
firm-level returns episodically in ways that vary across firms and over time” (Ahmad et al. 2015,
152-153). News articles comprising of daily data were drawn from several sources including
newspapers, web-based publications, trade magazines, and financial blogs.
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The emphasis on examining media content in this context is on the tone of the reports and
any relationship this may have on financial market results at the firm level (Ahmad et al. 2016).
Studies at the firm level are sparse and the reason for that, notes Ahmad et al. (2016, 153) is
because most firms are not frequently reported on in the media, so researchers are unable to
develop trends in “firm-specific tone.” The firms examined in this study were taken from the
2011 Fortune 500 list that includes high profile companies such as Apple, Dell, General Electric,
ExxonMobil, Cisco, Home Depot, IBM, Microsoft, Pfizer, Verizon, and Walmart.
Journalists play an important role in “providing background, conducting in-depth
analysis, and sometimes undertaking further investigations – provide the ‘processing’ that assists
market participants to evaluate the implications of news stories for fundamental firm value”
(Ahmad et al. 2016, 171). In some instances, the tone of media reports over long periods of time
had no effect on a firm’s returns, but there were also infrequent episodes where media reports
showed significant effects (Ahmad et al. 2016). According to Ahmad et al. (2016), it can be
inferred that media reports in some instances can be noise and in other instances media analysis
carry valuable and relevant news and information.
Can tone in the media be influenced by public opinion? Roush (2008) offers insight into
the possible impact of public opinion on news coverage that preceded the Financial Crisis of
2008. He views tone in news reports as one of the challenges faced by financial journalists
because of public sentiment towards negative news reports during this period of time. The public
was reluctant to read negative news when the stock market, and by extension, people’s 401(k)
plans were doing well (Roush 2008). In this way, the public did not pay attention to reporting
that was important in signaling the growing risks involved with credit derivatives stemming from
faulty loans in the housing market (Roush 2008).
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Roush (2008, 35) also addresses criticism of the business press for failing to report on
“the murky financial underpinnings of the real-estate bubble” that precipitated the collapse of the
economy in 2008. He claims that this criticism arises from the perception that journalists showed
a deferential attitude towards chief executive officers from firms with high profit margins,
instead of closer scrutiny of financial statements and reporting those findings to the public. The
press, argues Roush (2008), should not be blamed for failing to anticipate the crisis because
government regulators and the public were not attentive to current reporting.
2.2.2 Macroeconomic News Reports
How does macroeconomic news affect the financial markets? Birz and Lott Jr. (2011,
2791) look at news of financial markets based on macroeconomic variables, instead of firmspecific news, to see the effects on stock returns. More specifically, their study utilizes
newspaper articles from 1991 to 2004 to measure the effect of macroeconomic news on stock
prices. Macroeconomic factors include unemployment, industrial production, retails sales,
durable goods, and generally, components of gross domestic product (GDP) and gross national
product (GNP). Gross domestic product and gross national product represent measures of
“aggregate economic activity” (Birz and Lott Jr. 2011, 2791). The gross domestic product is “the
market value of all final goods and services produced in a country during the course of a year”
(Mishkin 2019, 19). The gross national product is also a measure of aggregate economic output,
but for American companies at home and abroad.
Stock prices are affected by news on money growth and changes in interest rates (Birz
and Lott Jr. 2011). However, the authors point out that the effects of macroeconomic news on
stock prices are mixed. They explain that the effects of real sector news on stock prices may
depend on the prevailing economic conditions at the time of the news release, indicating that “the
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same economic surprises can mean different things in different economic environments” (Birz
and Lott Jr. 2011, 2792). In further explaining “mixed results” of macroeconomic news, the
authors expand on “market participants’ earlier expectations of statistics” – that is, when news
releases validate what investors already expect, there is less effect on stock prices than news
releases “with an unexpected value of a statistic” (Birz and Lott Jr. 2011. 2792).
Emphasis is placed on the effect of the same news in different economic conditions to
show the role of business cycles on stock prices (Birz and Lott Jr. 2011). Business cycles refer to
the constantly changing levels of economic activity. These upward and downward changes “vary
in length, in how high or low the economy moves, and in how much the economy is affected
(Gitman and McDaniel 2008, 69). For example, in 1998, growth in gross domestic product was
1.2% higher than market expectations and the subsequent financial news from the New York
Times reported market activities as sluggish, while the same results in gross domestic product in
1997 had corresponding news reports from the New York Times of significant improvement in
economic activities (Birz and Lott Jr. 2011).
In addition to providing statistical facts, Birz and Lott Jr. (2011) demonstrate three
important functions of newspapers. First newspapers are as a source for providing explanations
for statistical data. Second, newspaper articles “indicate whether the news media perceives
something as important ….” (2792), and third, newspaper articles report on whether the
economic performance met investors’ expectations. The same authors argue that in looking at
whether stock returns are affected by real sector economic news, it is essential to consider that
providing statistical information as economic announcements is not the only relevant factor; it is
important to look at the way this information is “interpreted by the public.” Newspaper coverage
was chosen for their study as a way to analyze how investors interpret macroeconomic news.
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After looking at factors such as GDP growth, retail sales, unemployment, and durable
goods, (Birz and Lott Jr. (2011, 2799) show that news about unemployment and GDP growth
“significantly affects stock returns,” but “correlations between stock returns and news about
durable goods and retail sales are statistically insignificant.” These results indicate that durable
goods and retail sales are not as important to investors’ assessment of the future economic
environment.
Kalogeropoulos (2018) examines the effects of economic news reports from a different
perspective: the relationship between economic news and individuals’ decision-making
behaviors. The author looks at how the exposure to different types of mass-mediated news
reports affects personal economic expectations on an individual level. This study was conducted
in Denmark during a period of economic recovery after the downturn from the Great Recession
of 2008. It was designed to capture the reactions of the public on an individual basis on
economic news from various media outlets, including newspapers and their websites. Denmark is
known for its high circulation of newspapers and Kalogeropoulos’ (2018) study identified that
newspapers in Denmark showed a strong presence of economic news in their reporting.
News articles were analyzed based on the tone and topics covered in economic news
(Kalogeropoulos 2018). Topics included unemployment, inflation, financial crisis, financial
profits, interest rates, stock market, GDP, GNP, and investment. Kalogeropoulos (2018) raises
the issue of whether citizens access to economic information from the media can be used to bring
about national economic changes. Besides holding businesses and political actors accountable for
the nation’s economic conditions, business news have another important function. The author
writes: “Citizens, apart from voting decisions, need to make every day financial decisions
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concerning their household and some media stories might affect their decisions”
(Kalogeropoulos 2018, 262).
The visibility of economic news was examined in printed and online articles from
traditional news outlets, tabloids, and television (Kalogeropoulos 2018). The findings from
Kalogeropoulos (2018) provide information that is useful to understanding the conditions under
which media affects personal expectations. Similar to Birz and Lott Jr. (2011) the topic of
unemployment news was a strong predictor of personal economic expectations. Even though the
study shows that the tone of economic news was not a strong predictor of individual economic
expectation, the content of the news on unemployment was negative. Kalogeropoulos (2018,
261) writes: “the more time individuals spent watching and reading unemployment news in the
media, the lower their economic expectations for the next year became over time.”
The results also show that the effect of unemployment news on individuals were
observed on those with exposure to tabloid news stories (Kalogeropoulos 2018). There are
important aspects to consider in these findings. Kalogeropoulos (2018,261) states: “Our
expectation would be that the perceived credibility of tabloid-style journalism would make
citizens less susceptible to media effects from them.” In addition, because economic news is not
highly visible in tabloid news, the reaction from individuals is stronger when it is present. The
result can also be explained by the personalized style of reporting by tabloids making economic
news, in this instance, relatable to the public (Kalogeropoulos 2018).
2.2.3 Future Earnings and Market Fluctuations
Pena-Martel et al. (2018) look at the media’s role in informing investors about accounting
earnings. The authors note media’s role as an important channel for communicating information
to investors and point out that the media can be viewed as an information intermediary between
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external investors and companies, as well as in helping to increase transparency. Pena-Martel et
al. (2018, 168-169) write: “The media select, analyze, communicate and can influence the
informativeness of earnings reported by firms” adding that the media can play a part as a
“governance mechanism” since it collects, compiles, and communicates information.
The findings reported by Pena-Martel et al. (2018) highlight important aspects of the
relationship between the media and informed investors in Europe. First, information reported
through the media affected earnings informativeness in a positive way. Second, the results show
that if there are negative reports about a firm in the media, these reports impact the firms’
performance: “negative news items increase dominant owner incentives to offer quality
accounting information in order to enhance their reputation, thereby increasing earnings
informativeness” (Pena-Martel et al. 2018, 177). Third, this study shows that the media also
functions effectively in terms of corporate governance. Pena-Martel et al. (2018, 177) argue that
insight into media coverage has benefits for investors, analysts, and auditors because the media is
seen as a mechanism for corporate governance, and they point out that “high quality financial
press may enhance the transparency of accounting earnings disclosed by companies.
There are other indicators besides earnings that are of interest to investors and future
investors. Strycharz, Strauss, and Trilling’s (2018) study looks at the relationship between
changes in stock prices and news media coverage for three companies over a period of two years.
The authors focus at ING, Philips, and Shell, companies listed on Amsterdam Exchange Index,
using frequency counts, sentiment analysis, and topic modeling to examine the media’s effect on
stock market prices.
By taking a comprehensive approach in analyzing how news media, in particular,
financial news, influence movements in the stock market, Strycharz, Strauss, and Trilling (2018)
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argue that the prediction of changes in stock prices increases when reporting includes relevant
discussions on corporate sentiments, as well as corporate topics, and expert opinions. Based on
their analysis of the Efficient Market Hypothesis, Strycharz, Strauss, and Trilling (2018, 68)
write: “the financial markets are not efficient in a way that all available information is
instantaneously integrated in prices as assumed by proponents of EMH … not all investors can
be assumed to be equally well informed, having enough time and attention to process and
evaluate information.” This is supported by Sau (2013) who argues that the Efficient Market
Hypothesis is suited to economic conditions that are ideal.
According to Strycharz, Strauss, and Trilling (2018), news media plays a role in both
disseminating and interpreting financial information. Additionally, investors most likely wait for
the financial market to react to news and they follow the direction of the market’s movement.
The news media can also influence investors’ decision-making when media coverage increases
for a particular stock or company which then leads to investors showing more interest in the
stock (Strycharz, Strauss, and Trilling 2018).
Strycharz, Strauss, and Trilling (2018, 79-80) raise some important questions in their
study, for example, “How media coverage of companies triggers share price reactions?” and
“What kind of coverage impacts the evaluation of the company on the stock market the most?”
The relationship between media coverage and stock market fluctuations show that the amount of
media attention matters when looking at its relation to stock prices. In addition, when testing for
sentiment, emotionality, and corporate topics, their findings show positive relationships between
emotionality and the prediction of stock market fluctuations. Corporate topics influenced stock
market fluctuations with topics such as “market relevant news for investors.” Examples include
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news about the products of a company and news on corporate social responsibility – both
relevant to stock price.
The review above shows how financial information’s content and complexity shape what
is communicated through the media. In many ways, the relationship between financial indicators
and positive or negative news coverage is reciprocal: companies stock prices can rise or plummet
based on the perception of panic or confidence by investors when looking at financial news
reports. Similarly, whether a news report is overtly skeptical of financial reports provided by
companies is based on if the public will lose interest in stories. In comparison to other topics
covered by journalists, the composition of financial information, more specifically its ability to
change, likewise, presents a particular challenge to reporting it. This challenge is extremely
relevant to the 2008 Financial Crisis because while the public relies on this information to know
about potential dangers to their financial stability, any change of such information can alter
outcomes in the market and the speed at which such changes take place can create barriers in the
communication channel. Such barriers could potentially have contributed to what led to the
Financial Crisis of 2008.
2.3 Communicating Financial Information to the Public
This section seeks to review the literature on communicating financial information from
the financial sector to the public. As seen in previous sections, complexity is a consistent thread
that provides challenges in understanding and disseminating such information. The importance
of this information to public confidence in the economic system is evidenced by the widespread
effects of two major economic downturns in the history of the United States: The Great
Depression and the Financial Crisis of 2008 (Geithner 2014). The financial system has grown
exponentially in size and complexity since the Great Depression and the Financial Crisis of 2008
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serves to magnify the effects of those changes in terms of how information is communicated to
the public.
Communicating financial information to the public is reviewed from the following
perspectives: 1) what is owed to the public and the related challenges (Carstens and
Vandlindingham 2015; Fertakis 1969; Zadorozhynyi, Ometsinska, and Moravshy 2021)) and 2)
duty to report by the press (Behr 2002; Doyle 2006; Schifferes and Coulter 2012).
2.3.1 What is Owed to the Public and Related Challenges
A publicly held corporation is a corporation that sells its securities (stocks) to the general
public (Kimmel, Weygandt, and Kieso 2019, 3). These securities are traded on public markets
such as the New York Stock Exchange or NASDAQ and the company is obligated to disclose
“financial information regularly to the public” (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 2018,
par. 2). Financial reports are published by corporations and are available through the Securities
and Exchange Commission’s EDGAR database (Needles and Powers 2014, 663). Even though
this information can be accessed through various sources, the literature shows that there are
significant challenges in the communication of such financial information to the public.
Carstens and Vandlindingham (2015) address the public’s right to know and to have
access to financial information. The authors show that such financial information is difficult for
the public to understand because of the “sheer volume of these records and their highly technical
nature” (Carstens and Vandlandingham 2015, 38). Other challenges to communication include
the ability to search the information, the readability of the information, important disclosures in
footnotes of financial statements, and in general, the public’s ability to use the data.
Zadorozhynyi, Ometsinska, and Moravshy (2021) argue that there are several barriers to
communicating financial information, which are related to the understanding of accounting
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information. The authors describe financial reporting as a communication channel for
transferring accounting information to interested users, with particular focus on financial
statements. Accounting is used to process and communicate financial information through
financial statements. The first barrier is unclear financial reporting indicators because of different
interpretations for accounting concepts. Second, in considering both the communicator and the
recipient of the information, there is insufficient level of knowledge for the communication
process to work. Third, financial reporting can be inaccurate because of intentional or
unintentional actions by the producers of the information. Other barriers include an
oversaturation of information, and the inefficiency of the communication process.
Financial Statements are the primary means of communicating accounting information
among all users (Needles, Anderson, and Caldwell 1993; Zadorozhynyi, Ometsinska, and
Moravshy 2021). While Carstens and Vandlindingham (2015) refer to the high reading level that
makes it difficult for the public to understand, Zadorozhynyi, Ometsinska, and Moravshy (2021)
drill down on the element that makes the information hard to read: the accounting system that
provides information using complicated terminology. “Accounting methodology and techniques
often depend on many objective and subjective factors that create significant barriers to
information users’ communication” (Zadorozhynyi, Ometsinska, and Moravshy 2012, 75).
Zadorozhynyi, Ometsinska, and Moravshy (2021) take a multi-variable perspective to
assess what hinders transparency of financial information and the inefficiency of the
communication channel. While acknowledging the role of users’ ability to understand financial
information, the work presented by the authors call for a comprehensive overhaul of barriers to
communication. They argue that deterioration in communication channels will continue because
of several key factors. The most relevant one to this study is the assertion that the difference in
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knowledge base exists between those communicating financial information and those who
receive such information. They write, “This barrier could lead to the formation of poor quality
accounting information (insufficient level of knowledge of the communicator) and making
wrong decisions (lack of necessary knowledge of the recipient, which causes misunderstanding
of accounting information and inability to operate with accounting data” (Zadorozhynyi,
Ometsinska, and Moravshy 2021, 79).
Fertakis’ (1969) perspective on the communication process of accounting reports
includes ways of meeting the different needs of users. One way is by widening the scope of
accounting reports to include additional data that would expand the usefulness of financial
reports. He argues for the need to carefully analyze the content of financial reporting as well as
the process of communicating this information. He looks at the information-communication
process, specifically how information is communicated in a complex society. The arguments
articulated by Fertakis (1969) are relevant to the changes and challenges in financial reporting
and the communication of this information to the user in today’s business environment.
Similar to Zadorozhynyi, Ometsinska, and Moravshy (2021), Fertakis (1969) also
identifies the content of the accounting process as a barrier to the communication process: “A
possible solution is providing nonfinancial information in addition to more financial data …”
(Fertakis 1969, 283) This is because investors lack the base knowledge to understand financial
statements and yet this understanding is important in making decisions about their investments.
The author describes this as limitations of users that influence their ability to make rational
decisions based on financial information.
This is a scenario of the severity of the gap between the experts and laymen beyond
investors to the general public. If this information cannot be useful and meaningful to investors
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in their decision-making, then it is essentially useless to the public. In addition, what becomes
obvious from Ba’s (2013) discussion of complex interdependencies, (see Section 2.1), is that the
activities summarized in financial reports are consequential to not only investors, but to the
everyday lives of people around the world. Hence the importance of its clear communication to
the public cannot be overstated.
2.3.2 Duty to Report by the Press
The role of the media in financial reporting has been well documented by scholars in
journalism and communication studies (Galbraith 2009; Jensen 1987; Tunstall 1971). Most
specifically, Doyle (2006) assesses the parameters and conditions by which reporters select,
interpret, and disseminate financial information to the public. News reporters are often seen as
observers who document potential lack of transparency that can lead to crisis (Doyle 2006).
What is implied in news reporting is an assumption by the public that the press asks questions to
get “the truth.” But as Doyle (2006) notes, with respect to financial information, while reporters
believe the truth is important, they also believe that making the truth accessible is not their
responsibility. The Great Depression established a historical benchmark for which transparency
and accountability were emphasized in financial statements and in information shared with the
public (Needles, Anderson, and Caldwell 1993, 300). Seventy-five years after the Great
Depression, the Financial Crisis of 2008 called into question various aspects of financial
reporting from corporations, and business news reporting from the press.
Doyle (2006) provides an examination of news reporters’ relationship to the public and
more specifically, their role in reporting financial information. She writes, “More generally, this
article aims to consider the nature of the contribution to public knowledge made by financial
journalism” (Doyle 2006, 434). Drawing attention to the accounting scandals of the early 2000s

58

including the collapse of Enron, the author shows that it is unlikely that news reporters would be
in a position to uncover financial irregularities in company records. However, questions persist
as to why the massive failure of Enron surprised financial journalists. These questions would be
repeated after the Financial Crisis of 2008.
Examining the duty to report relies on an understanding of the process, sources, and ways
in which stories are selected. As discussed in Section 2.1, financial information is complex in
nature (Ba 2021; Blundell-Wignall 2017; Sau 2013). The public’s ability to comprehend
financial information has influenced the kinds of stories reported (Doyle 2006). Because of the
assumption made that the public will not have the ability to understand the information being
presented and thus lose interest in articles, reporters at times conflate their obligation to the
public with entertaining the public, instead of presenting factually relevant material (Doyle
2006). Doyle (2006, 448) writes: “it is difficult to be sure whether what is being offered is
financial news in the guise of entertainment or vice versa.” She adds that this can create an
incentive to write stories with a purpose other than reporting financial information: “Financial
news selection decisions within mainstream media are strongly determined by the need not to
lose the interest of lay audiences” (Doyle 2006, 448). This allows for a judgment on what is
considered newsworthy.
Behr (2002) also reflects on the role of the media by looking back at the collapse of the
energy giant, Enron. In 2001, Enron was the largest bankruptcy filing in the history of the United
States, erasing accumulated stock market wealth of $60 billion (Behr 2002). There were no
glaring signs of trouble in Enron’s quarterly and annual financial statements filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission. But as Behr’s (2002) analysis shows, the complexity of
the company’s reporting helped to conceal their fraudulent activities and instead show high
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earnings forecasts. The author notes that business news reporters are not given access to the inner
workings of corporations. Behr (2002, 8) also lists some examples of reporters asking questions
such as “How does Enron make its money?” and “Was Enron’s stock overpriced?” However,
because of the company’s size and influence, the few questions that challenged the company’s
financial performance went unanswered.
Taken together, the assumption of the public’s inability to understand important financial
information, and shifting the content and tone of what newspapers report, provide a critical
context to understand the role the media may have played in communicating financial
information to the public during the 2008 Financial Crisis. The evolving ways in which reporters
select and obtain stories interrupt traditional processes that held transparency and accessibility to
the public as essential in maintaining public trust and confidence.
Do reporters see their role and relationship to the public differently than the belief
traditionally held by the public about the work of the press? Doyle (2006, 450) notes, “A burning
desire to facilitate an improved grasp on the part of the general public over business and
economic issues does not appear to factor highly in the conscious understanding that financial
journalists in the commercial sector have of what purposes their professional activities serve.”
She clarifies that this does not mean that the reporting done by the press is for self-interest.
Rather, the press does not feel a sense of responsibility to inform the public “as to the meaning
and significance of business and economic events” (Doyle 2006, 450).
Further, Doyle (2006) emphasizes that analysts rather than journalists hold a monopoly
on expertise with respect to financial information. Such a distinction serves to underscore the
belief that journalists will not pick up financial warning signs (Doyle, 2006). Similarly, Behr
(2002) is critical of business analysts who failed to accurately assess the financial position of the
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company and Enron’s board of directors whose role is to protect the interests of shareholders. In
other words, the complexity of financial information is mirrored in the complexity of how such
information is reported.
Schifferes and Coulter (2012) examine news coverage from the Financial Crisis of 2008
using data from the BBC website. Describing journalists as gatekeepers for the public, they
acknowledge that financial journalists came under criticism for news coverage that appeared
superficial and for pandering to special interests in the buildup to the crisis. Public confidence in
financial journalists was heavily damaged: “During the crisis, the financial media was accused of
failing to warn the public about potential risks, and therefore abdicating its public
responsibilities” (Schifferes and Coulter 2012, 229). Another criticism that financial journalists
faced referred to media coverage creating panic in the public and thereby worsening the crisis.
The authors note that journalists were challenged during this time to make decisions under
pressure and their coverage reflected the information that was available to them. As previously
noted by Doyle (2006), there were other factors that may have influenced how journalists
covered financial news on the crisis such as pressures to make news coverage more appealing for
the public.
In response to the criticism leveled at journalists for failing to explain the developments
of the crisis, and for creating headlines that caused public panic, Schifferes and Coulter (2012,
245) write: “Journalists were not so much stoking panic as reflecting real market conditions, and
they were trying to judge fast-breaking stories with limited resources that were available to them
at the time.” Other findings from data collected from the BBC show that during the critical phase
of the crisis, there was increased interest in crisis-related business news and that the tone of
reporting was not predominantly negative. Journalists focused on government leaders and other
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elected officials, central banks, chief executive officers of banks, and stories related to policy
responses to the crisis. President Obama, President Bush, and Ben Bernanke, Chairman of the
Federal Reserve (2006 to 2014), were frequently featured in business news. There was an
increased demand for news on market data tracking the movements of shares prices.
Whether the information is complex or not, the duty to report remains a principle that
underlies any intermediary institution like the press. The literature surrounding the duty to report
and the relationship between journalists and the public shows how complexity and the changing
nature of financial systems have subsequently resulted in newspapers responding to changing
interests when reporting this kind of information. The rise in public relation firms and the
pressure applied to the media to report narratives that emphasize positive stories for companies
creates an alternative reporting framework where journalists may be observing and interpreting
data while simultaneously relying on analysts to provide clarity for such complex information. In
many ways, the duty of reporting with respect to financial information has shifted out of the
hands of journalists and into the hands of public relations firms and analysts (Doyle 2006).
In shifting who the media relies on for interpretation of data, there is also a shifting in the
intended audience. Using Enron’s bankruptcy filing as an example (Behr 2002), there are
questions on whether financial information was manipulated through systems of communication
to convey a narrative that is beneficial to those who have the ability to control such information.
“What readers and viewers want from us is a way to see the bottom line with clarity and not
confusing unfinished calculations” (Behr 2001, 8).
2.4 Relationship to the Proposed Study
In asking whether the channel of communication functioned correctly between financial
experts and the public during the critical period leading up to the Financial Crisis of 2008, the
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above review provides an entry point as to the importance, urgency, and relevance of the
proposed research. Major economic downturns do not only affect Wall Street and financial
investors. Rather, the effects trickle down in a chain reaction to the public as well. Even though
many people may not be investors, many employees have retirement plans. When the market
crashes, it takes down retirement earnings too as seen in the widespread effects of the Financial
Crisis of 2008.
The review of duty to report and what is owed to the public is interconnected -- how
reporters choose and shape stories can be dependent on how they perceive its reception from the
public. Experts, however, assume that lack of comprehension of financial information equates to
not needing such information, which creates a dangerous precedent that led to The Great
Depression and the accounting scandals, such as Enron, in the early 2000s. Ultimately, this study
intends to engage with a similar evaluation: what gaps in financial information existed in the
period preceding the crisis in 2008? This research specifically plans to examine the importance
of communication channels that serve to inform the public about financial information related to
their everyday lives and the consequences of failing to do so.
The relationship between the public and experts is of particular interest to this project.
Financial information is unique in that it is information that requires financial knowledge to
interpret and use. Financial information is dependent on an expert to produce, deliver, and
explain what such information means. In general, the role the public plays in the process of
obtaining financial information and making decisions is tied to stability (Geithner 2014, 7;
Bernanke, Geithner, and Paulson Jr. 2019, 15). Crisis, even crisis outside the purview of finance
and economics, generally emerge when there is a lack of public trust and confidence. A financial
crisis is “a crisis of confidence throughout the system. People get scared and want their money
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back ….” (Bernanke, Geithner, and Paulson Jr. 2019, 15). Lack of public trust and confidence is
directly tied to the extent to which information that belongs to the public is shrouded by those
who have the ability to control such information. Thus, the aim of this research is to examine the
process of communicating financial information to the public by exploring gaps in this process
during the Financial Crisis of 2008.
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Chapter 3: Methodology
The Financial Crisis of 2008 marked a time of severe economic downturn in the United
States. The magnitude of the crisis is often compared to that of the Great Depression. The Great
Depression is a point of reference for comparing the events that precipitated the Financial Crisis
of 2008. More specifically, the lack of information provided to the public was evident after the
stock market crashed in 1929. In addition, the failure of the banking industry was a common
factor in both crises.
The events that unfolded in 2008 that signaled the start of the Financial Crisis and
subsequent collapse of the financial system were documented on a daily basis through media
reports. There are two crucial reasons for focusing specifically on the Financial Crisis of 2008.
First, the experts who have written on the Financial Crisis of 2008 reference it as the worst
economic crisis in history, including the Great Depression (Bernanke, Geithner, Paulson Jr.
2019). Second, the aftermath of the crisis showed the collapse of business organizations (for
example, Lehman Brothers, AIG, and Bear Stearns) that were deemed “too- big-to-fail.” These
were corporations that were highly visible because of their size and fast-growing financial
success during the early 2000s. How then was it possible that they would be the first to fall in the
early days of the crisis?
This study intends to concentrate on publicly held corporations that, by definition, must
share information with the public so that they can make financial decisions. In essence, the
importance of considering what the Financial Crisis of 2008 represents for communicating
financial information from publicly held corporations to the public cannot be ignored. The
ramifications of this crisis did not just impact the U.S., but the global community at large (Ba
2021). Examining the research questions presented below will allow the current researcher to
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assess breaches in the flow of information from publicly traded corporations to the public in the
period of time leading up to one of the worst recorded financial crises in history.
3.1 Research Objective
The objective of this research is to examine the process of communicating timely and
accurate financial information from publicly held corporations to the public through the channel
of media by exploring gaps in that communication process as well as identifying ways to prevent
the same outcome from happening again in the future.
3.2 Research Questions and Operational Definitions
In developing the research questions for this study, an assumption can be made, based on
the literature review, that there were gaps in communicating financial information to the public
during the Financial Crisis of 2008. This is evidenced by discussions on topics such as the toobig-to-fail banks by Blundell-Wignall (2017), the development of opaque financial products by
Paulson Jr. (2010), and analysis of media coverage during the Financial Crisis of 2008 by
Schifferes and Coulter (2012). Based on these observations and the afore-stated research
problem in Section 3.1, this study seeks to answer the following three research questions (RQ):
•

RQ 1: What gaps exist in communicating financial information to the public via the
media?

•

RQ 2: What causes the gaps in communicating financial information to the public?

•

RQ 3: What measures can be taken to close the gaps in communicating financial
information to the public?

The first research question is important in identifying what gaps there are in the communication
process, and this is followed by the second research question that drills down on the causes of the
gaps. The third research question, based on the findings from RQ 1 and RQ 2 attempts to suggest
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what is needed for the communication channel to function as it is supposed to. Namely, publicly
held corporations report on their financial position in an accurate and timely manner, and this
information is then communicated to the public in a similar manner via the media. By addressing
the intersection of financial information and communication, the three research questions will
help in achieving the research objective stated in Section 3.1. Taken together, what is being
described in the research questions is specifically what characterizes the gaps that exist, what
causes the gaps, and what potential solutions can be constructed to breach the divide and prevent
recurrence in the future.
Of the three research questions, the following variables need to be defined operationally:
•

Gaps -- Gaps in this study describe breaches in the process of communicating financial
information. Qualities such as accuracy, timeliness, and the omission of significant data
are considered when measuring this variable by comparing what was reported before the
Financial Crisis of 2008 to what was revealed after the crisis.

•

Financial information – Financial information is information obtained from financial
reports. Financial reports consist mainly of financial statements, news releases by the
business entity, management’s forecasts, and reports filed by corporations with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (Keiso, Weygandt, and Warfield 2019, 1-3). Of
these, financial statements are the primary source for information on the financial
performance of the company and is grounded in the principles of financial accounting
(Wild, Chaw, and Chiapetta 2013, 20).

•

The public – The public, for the purpose of this research, refers to anyone outside of
financial experts or, anyone who does not have academic knowledge, experiential
knowledge, or formal training in the field of finance, accounting, or economics.
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•

The media – The media in this study references newspapers, published books written by
financial experts, and congressional hearings that were broadcast to the public. The
newspapers that will serve as data sources are The Wall Street Journal and The New York
Times.

3.3 Methodology Chosen
The methodology chosen for this research is content analysis. Content analysis has its
origins in the fields of journalism and mass communication and is widely used to analyze
newspaper articles and messages in all forms of media reports (Krippendorff 2013, 11-12).
White and Marsh (2006, 22) also note that content analysis as a research methodology “has its
roots in the study of mass communication.” It is suitable for analyzing textual data from sources
such as archival records, newspaper articles, and congressional documents: “the researcher
obtains copies of the communications produced (when available) and asks questions about these
records. The content of the communication serves as the basis for making inferences” (FrankfortNachmias, Nachmias, and DeWaard 2015, 275).
Content analysis is selected to enable the current researcher to answer the research
questions formulated in this study – that is to illuminate details in terms of information gaps and
the causes of such gaps in the Financial Crisis of 2008, as well as measures to close those gaps in
the future. Content analysis is a particularly useful tool in extracting content from large sums of
textual data (i.e., news reports, books, and congressional hearings). As such, content analysis can
help to identify and quantify the frequency for which certain elements related to the variables
(for example, gaps and causes of such gaps) in the research questions are raised in this study.
Since content analysis explores texts, this is particularly useful for analyzing financial
information reported in different time periods by newspapers.
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This research uses content analysis as a method for both data collection and data analysis.
Chu (2021, 2) notes that content analysis can be used for the purpose of data collection, “because
researchers would analyze the content in texts qualitatively in order to gather data.” Data so
gathered are already analyzed as a result of the research process. Therefore, data collection and
data analysis in this study use content analysis as an integrated process.
Additionally, content analysis is usually categorized into two types: manifest content
analysis and latent content analysis. Manifest content analysis describes what can be observed
and measured directly while latent content analysis describes subtle meanings in messages that
can be measured through indicators (Neuendorf (2017, 31). Chu (2021, 4-5) differentiates
between manifest content analysis and latent content analysis as follows: manifest content
analysis refers to the process of identifying whether terms that are observable and countable are
present in the text, whereas latent content analysis implies the more challenging process of going
beyond identifying and measuring the presence of visible and countable terms. Latent content
analysis seeks to uncover underlying or conceptual meanings and messages that are unobservable
and uncountable. Thus, content analysis chosen in this study belongs to the latent category
because it is the most compatible tool for investigating the research questions for this proposed
study.
This research seeks to investigate the kinds of gaps existing and the causes of such gaps
in communicating financial information to the public as well as measures to close the gaps.
Specifically, gaps in communicating financial information to the public via media is dynamic,
illusive, and not easily observable. Unlike measuring a standard variable that is clearly visible
and countable, gaps and causes of such gaps in communicating financial information are multilayered due to the complexity of financial information as well as the ways in which the data can
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be interpreted. Therefore, latent content analysis is the category that is primarily suited for
gathering and analyzing data because it allows the current researcher to investigate below the
surface of what is presented in the data.
3.4 Data Sources
The following three kinds of sources will be used for collecting data to answer the
previously stated research questions: newspapers, books written by financial experts who have
since evaluated what they were observing in real time, and congressional documents from
hearings that produced an evaluation on the Financial Crisis of 2008. This study looks at what
has been documented in these data sources and reports what has been found.
3.4.1 Newspapers
The newspapers selected for this study as data sources are The Wall Street Journal and
The New York Times. The Wall Street Journal has been continuously published for 132 years and
The New York Times for 170 years. The Wall Street Journal has been cited as a leading source
for financial news and it is considered “the most complete financial newspaper in the United
States and is published every business day” (Needles and Powers 2014, 663). The New York
Times is described as one of the leading newspapers that emphasize business and financial
coverage (Nelson 1990). In 1978, The New York Times became the first newspaper to start a
separate section for business and financial reporting with expanded coverage (Nelson 1990, 24).
Kitch (2007, 24) writes: “The New York Times is among the most prestigious of many news
organizations that have recast themselves as public historians ….” Both newspapers will help to
minimize confirmation bias or the probability that the newspapers were misreporting because of
personal affiliations. Newspaper articles from both The Wall Street Journal and The New York
Times are important to this study because the events that unfolded before and after the Financial
Crisis of 2008 were documented through media reports. These events include the collapse of
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Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and AIG, the three giant corporations that were highly visible
because of their financial success before the crisis as well as the effects of their failure on the
entire financial system.
3.4.2 Books
Books selected for this research as data sources are written by two categories of financial
experts: 1) those who held positions in the government at the time leading up to and during the
crash and 2) financial journalists. The utilization of such sources helps to detect the kinds of gaps
in communication that exist between publicly held corporations and the general public. The
following books are selected for this study:
•

Firefighting: The Financial Crisis and Its Lessons by Ben Bernanke, Timothy Geithner,
and Henry Paulson Jr. (2019).

•

Too Big to Fail by Andrew Ross Sorkin (2009)

Firefighting: The Financial Crisis and Its Lessons by Ben Bernanke, Timothy Geithner, and
Henry Paulson Jr. (2019) provides the unique vantage point from each of the experts in the
government at the time of the crisis. In other words, the heads of each of the largest oversight
committees in the U.S. share what they were seeing with respect to reporting in real time. Ben
Bernanke was the Chair of the Federal Reserve from 2006 to 2014. Timothy Geithner was the
Secretary of the Treasury from 2009 to 2013. Geithner was also President of the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York from 2003 to 2009. Henry Paulson Jr. was the Secretary of the Treasury from
2006 to 2009 and prior to that, he was the Chief Executive Officer of Goldman Sachs. Andrew
Sorkin’s (2009) book, Too Big to Fail, adds a separate dimension of what was being observed
and reported by newspapers. Sorkin is an award-winning journalist for The New York Times. In
addition, Sorkin (2009) provides a comprehensive analysis of the Financial Crisis of 2008.
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3.4.3 Congressional Hearings
The third and last type of data sources for this study is the congressional hearings following
the Financial Crisis of 2008 and collapse of Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and AIG. The
following congressional hearings are used in this study:
•

Public Hearing on the Shadow Banking System

•

Public Hearing on the Role of Derivatives in the Financial Crisis

•

Published Conclusions of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission

The Public Hearing on the Shadow Banking System includes financial activities of Bear Stearns.
The Public Hearing on the Role of Derivatives in the Financial Crisis includes financial activities
of AIG. The published conclusions summarize the findings of the Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission.
Congressional documents are also an invaluable tool in answering the research questions
of this study on the kinds of gaps, the causes of the gaps, and measures taken to close the gaps in
the process of communicating financial information to the public. Congressional testimonies will
help triangulate with data to be collected from two newspapers and the related books written by
financial experts.
3.5 Research Scope and Limitations
According to the research objective of the current study and in consideration of the time
factor, the current researcher will only examine the following data sources as outlined in Section
3.4, using the content analysis method: two newspapers (i.e., The Wall Street Journal and The
New York Times) published from 2006 to 2009 along with books written by financial experts as
well as congressional hearings and testimonies.
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The time period selected for newspaper articles from The Wall Street Journal and The
New York Times used in this study is from 2006 to 2009. This period is selected because: 1) 2006
and 2007 were the two years leading up to the Financial Crisis of 2008; 2) 2008 was the year
when the crash occurred; and 3) 2009 was one year after the crash.
As outlined in Section 3.4.2, books written by financial experts and congressional
hearings and testimonies are the two other types of data sources chosen for this study. The book
written by Ben Bernanke, Timothy Geithner, and Henry Paulson Jr. (2019), Firefighting: The
Financial Crisis and Its Lessons, was selected because the authors are considered experts in
financial information and held positions in the government at the time of the crash. The book
written by Andrew Ross Sorkin (2009), Too Big to Fail, was chosen because Sorkin is
recognized for his expertise in financial journalism and chronicled the collapse of the “too-bigto-fail” corporations. Congressional hearings and testimonies held in 2010 produced an
evaluation on the Financial Crisis of 2008 and provide a high level of reliability in the data
obtained.
In assessing the scope of this study, a particular challenge arises that is specific to
financial information: how can a study be both general and yet specific to a complex system that
regulates the global economy? The answer depends on two crucial points. First, while this study
acknowledges and has expressed in Chapter 2 why financial information is an example of a
complex system, the case chosen is specific to a particular historical event, the Financial Crisis
of 2008, that threatened the stability of the entire system. Thus, it provides an individualized
window into the relationship between information and the precipitation of a crisis. Second,
while the 2008 Financial Crisis is a specific case, it is generalizable in that it is reflective of
constants necessary in the quality of information: accuracy, timeliness, and reliability in helping
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the market function with relative stability. This study narrows down the possibility of what is
being evaluated by looking specifically at the flow of information from publicly held
corporations to the general public through the channel of media.
3.6 Data Collection and Analysis
Content analysis as a research method is unique in that it can be used for both data
collection and data analysis (Chu 2021, 1). Thus, data collection and data analysis are
inseparable during the process of content analysis research, and as such, they are discussed
together in this section. Data will be collected from a combination of newspapers, books written
by financial experts, and congressional documents depicted in Section 3.5. Data so gathered will
be analyzed simultaneously with the content analysis technique to answer the research questions
for this study.
For newspapers, collection of data was done by filtering a search on both The Wall Street
Journal and The New York Times using Long Island University’s ProQuest databases. First, each
digital newspaper’s database was searched for locating articles about Lehman Brothers, AIG, and
Bear Stearns from 2006 to 2009. The search terms used were the term “financial*” along with
the name of each corporation. As stated in Section 3.5, this period is selected because 2006 to
2007 were the years leading up to the Financial Crisis, 2008 was the year when the crisis
occurred, and 2009 was one year after the crisis.
The three giant corporations, Lehman Brothers, AIG, and Bear Stearns, were chosen for
this research because of their representation of corporations that were highly visible, well-known
for their influence, and were examples of corporations where large sums of money were
implicated. Searches for newspaper articles for Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and AIG were
performed in November 2021 and yielded a total of 457 news articles.

74

Table 3.1 News Articles by Company (years 2006 – 2009)
Company

WSJ

NYT

Totals

Bear Stearns

63

81

144

Lehman Brothers

90

86

176

AIG (American International Group)

60

77

137

Total

213

244

457

As Chu (2021, 12) emphasizes, coding is one of the major techniques for content analysis
but there are also other analytical techniques associated with it. This is because coding requires
the simultaneous use of comparison, abstraction, induction, and other analytical techniques in the
data collection and analysis process.
In defining the unit of analysis during the process of content analysis, Wildemuth (2009,
310) writes: “The unit of analysis refers to the basic unit of text to be classified during content
analysis … Qualitative content analysis usually uses individual themes as the unit for analysis,
rather than the physical linguistic units (e.g., word, sentence, or paragraph) ….” As Wildemuth
(2009, 310-311) explains, when looking for expressions of ideas, a code can be assigned to “a
text chunk of any size, as long as that chunk represents a single theme or issue of relevance to
your research question(s).” As such, for the coding procedure in this study, the unit of analysis is
coding by excerpt.
Research Question 1 in this study aims to investigate gaps in communicating financial
information from publicly held corporations to the public via the media. As such, “gaps” is a
variable that will be coded. Research Question 2 intends to investigate what specifically causes
gaps in the communication process. Thus, “causes of the gaps” will be an additional variable
coded. Finally, Research Question 3 looks to identify ways to close the gaps of communicating
financial information from publicly held corporations to the public. “Measures taken to close
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gaps” is also a variable that will be coded. The values for these variables will become the codes
that make up a coding scheme for the study.
3.7 Coding and Coding Schema Development
“Coding is the process of reducing the entire content of the messages in your sample into
quantitatively analyzable data describing only the variables in which you are interested”
(Wildemuth 2009, 300). Coding requires a very close reading as to the context within which each
term is used. As indicated in Section 3.6, coding carries the complexity of simultaneously using
abstraction, induction, and other analytical techniques in the data collection and analysis process.
The coding scheme is an important component in content analysis. Based on the research
questions presented in Section 3.2, a two-level coding scheme was created for this research.
The first level of the coding scheme consists of three broad categories, namely, types of
gaps, causes of gaps, and measures for closing the gaps. The second level of codes lists the
individual values for each of the three first level categories. Each of the second-tier coding was
developed by identifying persistent patterns in the data sources that were reflective of the three
categories, i.e., re-emerging trends repeated in the documents.
In addition, efforts will be made to ensure that the codes developed for each variable in
the coding scheme will be collectively exhaustive and mutually exclusive. As noted by
Krippendorff (2019, 162), “The individual values of a variable must be mutually exclusive
relative to each other” and “the values of a variable must provide an exhaustive account of all
units, which means that the partition of the sample should leave nothing unaccounted for.”
One of the challenges of developing the codes for this study flows from the interrelated
nature inherent in financial information. In other words, this interconnectivity leads to linkages
from one subsection of the financial system to many other subsections of the system. An
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example of this is separating the following terms that are prevalent and discussed together in the
source data: subprime mortgages, securitization, and shadow banking. Subprime mortgages are
faulty loans made to high-risk borrowers with disregard for the knowledge that the borrowers
were unable to repay those loans. Securitization is the process of bundling such loans with other
loans and reselling them to investors as securities. Shadow banking allowed for corporations to
engage in bank-like risk without banking regulations. Even though these terms are referenced in
conjunction with one another in the source data, they are not synonyms of each other and are
viewed as separate causes of gaps as seen in Section 3.10.2 later in this chapter. The following
excerpt from Commissioner Holtz-Eakin during the Congressional Hearing encapsulates this
challenge:
“Obviously the failure within the shadow banking system are in fact the financial
crisis. The decline of Bear Stearns, Lehman, AIG, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, the
freezing of a variety of markets, commercial paper, auction rate securities, lots of
securitized vehicles are what transformed a subprime mortgage and housing crisis
into a broad full-blown financial crisis in the United States” (Congressional Hearing
2010, 67).
Though referenced together because of their interconnectivity, contexts of further coded
examples help show that each code is in fact distinct from the others. The example of subprime
mortgages, securitization, and shadow banking reflects similar challenges in developing other
codes as well.
3.8 Pilot Study
A pilot study of the research was conducted in order to demonstrate the viability of the
methodology chosen. Content analysis for the pilot study was applied to a small subset of the
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total data collected for this study (i.e., 40 newspaper articles, one book written by financial
experts, and one congressional hearing) with the aim to develop an initial coding scheme.
Specifically, forty newspaper articles were selected using systematic sampling, twenty
each from The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal retrieved datasets. Titles for the
newspaper articles in the dataset used in the pilot study are presented in Appendix 6B. Using the
simple sampling technique, the following book and congressional hearing were selected:
•

Firefighting: The Financial Crisis and Its Lessons (Bernanke, Geithner, and Paulson Jr.
2019)

•

The Public Hearing on the Shadow Banking System on May 5, 2010

The initial coding scheme developed during the pilot study was done in accordance with the
three research questions. This draft coding scheme was revised and finalized before being used
in coding the entire dataset for this study.
3.9 Intercoder Reliability
Intercoder reliability, also referred to as intercoder consistency or intercoder agreement, is
essential to any study adopting the content analysis method. Allan Howell acted as the partner
for the intercoder reliability test. Allan Howell (MBA, MPA) is currently the Director of
Procurement Services for the Wildlife Conservation Society, Bronx, New York. Prior to this,
Allan was the Director of Procurement and Sourcing for Long Island University, Westbury, New
York. Of the 40 newspaper articles selected for the pilot study, 12.5% were randomly selected
from the dataset for the intercoder reliability test. For each article, codes were identified, and the
frequency of each code was tabulated for both coders to calculate the percentage of agreement
between the coders. The coders are represented as Coder A and Coder B. The result for the test is
91.38%. The worksheet for the intercoder reliability test can be found in Appendix A.
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3.10 Content Analysis of the Full Dataset
In this section, content analysis is used on the total data collected for this study. The full
dataset consists of 457 newspaper articles with all non-essential articles and duplicates removed
from the dataset, two books written by financial experts, and two congressional hearings. The
initial coding scheme from the pilot study was revised and finalized for the content analysis
applied to the full dataset. In addition, codes were revised based on theoretical definitions
obtained from the following sources:
•

Securities and Exchange Commission: Reports and Publications

•

Accounting textbooks: Financial Statement: Analysis & Valuation 6th Edition by Peter D.
Easton, Mary Lea McAnally, and Gregory A. Sommers (2021); Financial & Managerial
Accounting for MBAs 6th Edition by Peter D. Easton, Robert F. Halsey, and Mary Lea
McAnally (2021); Financial Accounting: Tools for Business Decision Making 9th Edition
by Paul D. Kimmel, Jerry J. Weygandt, and Donald E. Kieso (2019); Financial
Accounting: Tools for Business Decision Making 10th Edition by Paul D. Kimmel, Jerry J.
Weygandt, and Jill E. Mitchell (2022); Auditing: An Integrated Approach 7th Edition by
Alvin A. Arens and James K. Loebbecke (1997).

•

Economics textbooks: The Economics of Money, Banking, and Financial Markets 12th
Edition by Frederic S. Mishkin (2019).

•

Books written by financial experts: First Responders edited by Ben Bernanke, Timothy
Geithner, Paulson Jr., J. Nellie Liang (2020); On the Brink: Inside the Race to Stop the
Collapse of the Global Financial System by Henry M. Paulson Jr. (2013)

•

The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2010)
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The following table lists the first level of the coding scheme with three broad categories: types of
gaps, causes of gaps, and measures to close gaps. The table also lists the second level of codes
for the full dataset.
Table 3.2 Coding Scheme for the Dataset
Types of Gaps

Causes of Gaps

Measures Taken

Misleading Financial Information

Subprime Mortgages

Strengthen Transparency

Interconnectedness

Securitization

Strengthen Regulation

Unreliable Valuation

Derivatives

Decrease Leverage

Weakness in Transparency

Financial Leverage

Other Measures

Weakness in Regulation

Fraud

Red Flags

Shadow Banking

Other Types

Other Causes

3.10.1 Types of Gaps
Types of gaps reference kinds of gaps that exist or what categorizes and describes the
gaps in communicating financial information from publicly held companies to the public via the
media. Therefore, the codes for this category are descriptive of each type of breach found in the
dataset. Seven codes stem from the source data: misleading financial information,
interconnectedness, unreliable valuation, weakness in transparency, weakness in regulation, red
flags, and “other” types of gaps.
3.10.1.1 Misleading financial information
Misleading financial information references a type of gap that exists in communicating
financial information to the public when information that describes the financial position of a
company lacks the fundamental quality of faithful representation. Faithful representation means
the information reported is accurate, important information has not been omitted, and the
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information is not biased (Kimmel, Weygandt, and Kieso 2019, 2-17). The following excerpts
were coded as misleading financial information:
•

Only last Monday, for example, Bear put out a press release saying, “there is
absolutely no truth to the rumors of liquidity problems that circulated today in the
market.” The next day, Christopher Cox, the Chairman of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, said he was comfortable that the major Wall Street firms
were resting on satisfactory “capital cushions.”
Three days later, it was bailout time for Bear (Morgenson 2008, March 16, 2008,
The New York Times).

•

Unfortunately, Lehman is in a similar position to the boy who cried wolf, except that is
Lehman’s repeated denials of danger that have damaged its credibility.
Its track record in market forecasting is almost as bad as its record in anticipating its own
capital needs.
After Wednesday’s conference call was over, I went back and read some previous call
transcripts. The effort showed that Lehman had consistently underestimated the problems
it faced.
“Our liquidity position is stronger than ever,” said Christopher O’Meara, then the chief
financial officer, just a year ago. “Looking forward, our outlook is cautiously optimistic
and our stance is constructive and opportunistic. Looking at past credit corrections, the
capital markets have proven to be resilient with previous dislocations lasting three
months on average.” (Norris 2008, September 11, 2008, The New York Times).

•

Richard S. Fuld Jr., the chief executive of Lehman Brothers, offered a spirited defense of
his stewardship of the embattled investment bank on Monday, saying he was confident
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that Lehman was sound even as the bank posted a second-quarter loss of $2.8 billion
(Story 2008, June 17, 2008, The New York Times).
3.10.1.2 Interconnectedness
Interconnectedness references a type of gap that exists in communicating financial
information to the public with respect to the size and complex interrelationships in the financial
system. Interconnectedness captures one of the significant ways the financial system has
evolved. The size of the system with its many interrelated parts does not allow for the ability to
view and understand the implications of transactions system wide. This interconnectivity is seen
among financial entities through business transactions as interconnectedness also describes gaps
in information in terms of the number of transactions, the size of contracts, and the number of
parties involved (Girardi, Lewis, and Getmansky 2014; U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission). The following excerpts were coded as interconnectedness:
•

The overarching goal of the weekend talks was to prevent a quick liquidation of Lehman,
a bank that is so big and so interconnected with others that its abrupt failure would send
shock waves through the financial world.
Of deep concern is what impact a Lehman failure would have on other securities firms,
insurance companies and banks, notably Merrill Lynch and the American International
Group, both of which have come under mounting pressure in the markets. (Anderson,
Merced, Story, and White 2008, September 13, 2008, The New York Times).

•

“For the equilibrium of the world financial system, this was a genuine error,” Christine
Lagarde, France’s finance minister, said recently. Frederic Oudea, chief executive of
Societe Generale, one of France’s biggest banks, called the failure of Lehman “a trigger”
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for events leading to the global crash (Schwartz and Labaton 2008, October 22, 2008,
The New York Times)
•

But the turmoil has spread since to almost every corner of the credit markets. “The
realization that mortgages might not be paid off led lenders to realize that other loans
might not be paid off,” said Douglas Elmendorft, a former Fed economist.
The pervasiveness of the financial problems and the risks to the economy became
increasingly apparent at the beginning of the year. With each firm intricately intertwined
with the others in a maze of loans, credit lines, derivatives and swaps, the Fed and
Treasury agreed that letting Bear Stearns collapse was a risk not worth taking, because
the consequences were simply unknowable (Kelly, Ip, and Sidel 2008, March 15, 2008,
The Wall Street Journal).

3.10.1.3 Unreliable Valuation
Unreliable valuation references a type of gap that exists in communicating financial
information to the public when there is a difference between what assets (securities) are believed
to be worth by the corporation and what assets (securities) are actually worth. The accounting
standard for valuation is “balance sheets only include items that can be reliably measured. If a
company cannot value an asset with relative certainty, it does not recognize an asset on the
balance sheet” (Easton, Halsey, McAnally 2021, 2-5). Unreliable valuation occurred because
prices for the related assets were not established in the market and unreliable prices were
reported by the corporations (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2010, 54). The following
excerpts were coded as unreliable valuation:
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•

One area of concern involves the lack of accurate pricing in the CDO market. There
isn't an active market for CDOs, and any valuation of these vehicles involves
managers making estimates, which can be overly optimistic. Prices quoted by
dealers don't always reflect the value a CDO would fetch if it were actually sold in
the market (Scannell, Hughes, and Reilly 2007, June 27, 2007, The Wall Street
Journal).

•

But scores of questions remain unanswered. No one knows the real value of the
assets formerly owned by Bear Stearns that the Fed agreed to take as collateral. Fed
officials have said they greatly discounted the value of those assets before agreeing
to the $29 billion loan, but they offered no detail of what those assets actually look
like (Andrews 2008, March 27, 2008; The New York Times).

•

So how can investors readjust brokerage firms’ stated net worth to sketch out a
scenario where these stocks are a buy? One way is to focus on the most illiquid
portion of brokers’ assets, those which no longer trade in active markets and so
have to be valued using internally generated models.
Brokers break out the amount of these assets that are on their balance sheet. While
the firms are marking these assets to their best estimate of current market values,
by its very nature this is more art than science (Eavis and Reilly, March 18, 2008;
The Wall Street Journal).

•

The principal issue, according to officials, was how much insurance the Fed was
willing to provide to JP Morgan Chase in exchange for taking over Bear Stearns
and its hard-to-quantify assets (Andrews 2008, March 17, 2008; The New York
Times).
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3.10.1.4 Weakness in Transparency
Weakness in transparency references a type of gap that exists in communicating financial
information to the public when financial statements do not meet the standards of transparent
financial reporting. “If a company lacks transparency, its financial reports do not adequately
inform investors of critical information that is needed to make investment decisions” (Kimmel,
Weygandt, and Mitchell 2022, 47). According to the Securities and Exchange Commission,
financial transparency means “timely, meaningful, and reliable disclosures about a company’s
financial performance (Glassman 2002). Transparent financial reporting “conveys a complete
and understandable picture of a company’s financial position … financial institutions with offbalance sheet arrangements are required to provide certain disclosures regarding those
arrangements if those arrangements are reasonably likely to have a future effect on the
company’s financial condition …” (White and Kroeker 2008, SEC). The following excerpts were
coded as weakness in transparency:
•

Investors have long complained about the lack of transparency when it comes to huge
financial firms, whose balance sheets are so big that they can easily mask multimilliondollar gains or losses. Analysts and investors currently cite several potential factors that
could help hide subprime wounds (Reilly and Richardson 2007, August 2, 2007, The
Wall Street Journal).

•

Both of these problems [on derivatives] could have been significantly mitigated by
requiring OTC derivatives to clear through a central counterparty with novation and daily
margin. This would have created transparency and precluded the systemic risk inherent in
a marketplace … (Public Hearing on the Role of Derivatives 2010, 24).
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•

The Fed has been active, innovative and aggressive, but there are questions about its
[Bear] transparency,” said Lawrence H. Meyer, an economist and former Fed governor.
Its actions, he said, “go against a longstanding principle of the Fed not taking on such an
explicit credit risk” (Weisman 2008, April 2, 2008, The New York Times).

3.10.1.5 Weakness in Regulation
Weakness in regulation references a type of gap that exists in communicating financial
information to the public when there is a lack of oversight and enforcement of the rules and laws
by regulatory agencies as well as insufficient policies in place. This can allow for the evasion of
rules in financial activities and reliable financial reporting. Regulators include the Securities and
Exchange Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, the Federal Reserve Bank, and tax
agencies (Easton, Halsey, and McAnally 2021, 1-6). The following excerpts were coded as
weakness in regulation:
•

Standalone securities firms such as Lehman, Merrill and the now-defunct Bear
Stearns Cos took no deposits and were lightly regulated, freeing them to take big
risks and make fat profits at the cost of occasional losses. (Mollenkamp and
Whitehouse 2008, September 16, 2008, The Wall Street Journal).

•

Whether or not that happens, the government may have to revise its regulatory
system, which, as Mr. Geithner noted, has “evolved into a very complex and uneven
framework, with substantial opportunities for arbitrage, large gaps in coverage,
significant inefficiencies and large differences in the degree of oversight and
restraint upon institutions that engage in very similar economic activities”
(Norris2008, March 15, 2008, The New York Times).
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•

Mr. Paulson said he has dealt with matters as best he could, and blamed the turmoil
on factors including "government action and mistaken actions, outdated U.S. and
global financial regulatory systems, and . . . the excessive risk-taking of financial
institutions." (Solomon 2008, November 21, 2008, The Wall Street Journal).

•

The expanded reach of the Fed comes amid criticism aimed at the Securities and
Exchange Commission and its oversight of Bear Stearns Cos. before its collapse.
The SEC traditionally has been the regulator of Wall Street firms (Scannell and
Reddy 2008, April 3, 2008, The Wall Street Journal).

3.10.1.6 Red Flags
Red flags reference a type of gap that exists in communicating financial information to
the public when there are early warning signs that were ignored or discounted. By the time such
information was communicated, it was not relevant to the decision-making process. Red flags
were based on active assessments of companies’ viability; these warnings signs were not
communicated to the public in a timely manner (Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2010, xvii).
The following excerpts were coded as red flags:
•

In a sign of what a confirmation hearing could look like, Sen. Jim Bunning (R., Ky.), one
of the fiercest critics of the Fed, earlier this year accused Mr. Geithner and other officials
of missing "an awful lot of red flags" during the past decade (Reddy 2008, November 18,
2008, The Wall Street Journal).

•

Witness Kotz: In addition, the audit found that prior to Bear Stearns collapse, the SEC
became aware of potential red flags regarding Bear Stearns concentration of mortgage
securities, high leverage shortcomings of risk management and mortgage-backed
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securities, and the lack of compliance with the spirit of international standards, but did
not take action to limit these risk factors (Public Hearing on the Shadow Banking System
2010, 240).
•

Vice Chairman Thomas: In this instance, there were the reddest of red flags. In 1994,
Orange County, California, goes bankrupt in a derivatives deal gone bad. In 1998, LongTerm Capital Management causes a near financial crisis. And in 2001. Enron, knee deep
in derivatives, explodes causing what at the time the largest bankruptcy in U.S. history.
It’s not as if no one warned us (Public Hearing on the Role if Derivatives 2010, 6-7).

3.10.1.7 Other types of Gaps
“Other” types of gaps reference any additional type of gaps that were present in the
dataset but not in significant quantity to classify as a separate code. Therefore, these additional
gaps were grouped together into the code “other.”
•

You don't seem to acknowledge you did anything wrong and that is troubling to me," said
Rep. Henry Waxman, a California Democrat who leads the panel. The internal
documents, Mr. Waxman said, "portray a company in which there was no accountability
for failure" (Craig 2008, October 7, 2008, The Wall Street Journal).

•

When the credit markets were booming, many firms bought these instruments from AIG,
believing the insurance giant’s strong credit ratings and large balance sheet could provide
a shield against bond and loan defaults (Hilsenrath, Ng, and Paletta 2008, Sept 18, 2008,
The Wall Street Journal).
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•

Unfortunately – as has been the case in past speculative booms and busts – we witness an
erosion of standards of responsibility and ethics that exacerbated the financial crisis
(Financial Crisis Inquiry Report 2010, xxii).

3.10.2 Causes of Gaps
Causes of gaps refer to activities related to financial transactions that financial experts
engage in – such activities led to the creation of gaps or expansion of gaps that exist in
communicating financial information to the public. The codes for this category are defined and
explanations are provided below on how such activities cause gaps in information. Seven codes
stem from the source data: subprime mortgages, securitization, derivatives, financial leverage,
fraud, shadow banking, and “other” causes of gaps.
3.10.2.1 Subprime Mortgages
Subprime mortgages describe loans made to higher risk borrowers where the party
making the loans offers low rates initially, followed by much higher variable rates after a few
years (Hurst, Fitzgibbon, and Nurse 2020, 32). As the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission
(2011, xxiii) explains: “Many mortgage lenders set the bar so low that lenders simply took eager
borrowers’ qualifications on faith, often with a willful disregard for a borrower’s ability to pay.”
Subprime mortgages caused gaps in information because as the Commission explains: “Lenders
made loans that they knew borrowers could not afford and that could cause massive losses to
investors in mortgage securities” and “The Commission’s review of many prospectuses provided
to investors found that this critical information was not disclosed (Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission 2010, xxii).
The following excerpts were coded as subprime mortgages:
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•

The market for subprime loans, those made to borrowers with weak credit histories, has
been devastated by payment defaults and bankruptcies among lenders. Lehman also
makes home loans and finances other companies in the business. Mr. O’Meara said that
about 25% of loans it originated are to subprime borrowers (Kelly and Horowitz 2007,
March 15, 2007, The Wall Street Journal).

•

Although Bear Stearns announced on Friday that it would shore up one of its two
faltering hedge funds that are heavily exposed to the subprime mortgage mess, the move
did little to instill confidence in an already fearful market (Morgenson 2007, June 24,
2007, The New York Times).

•

The events have kept Wall Street riveted for two weeks because a lot of firms are deeply
invested in the subprime sector – which caters to borrowers with weak credit, and which
has suffered in the housing downturn as delinquent loans have spiked (Kelly 2007, June
23, 2007, The Wall Street Journal).

•

That profile hurt Bear when the subprime-mortgage problems developed last spring. Two
of Bear’s mortgage-related hedge funds collapsed in July, costing investors more than $1
billion and worsening the credit crunch then developing (Kelly, Ip, and Sidel 2008,
March 15, 2008; The Wall Street Journal).

3.10.2.2 Securitization
Securitization is described as “the process of bundling small and otherwise illiquid
financial assets (such as residential mortgages, auto loans, and credit card receivables) … into
marketable capital market securities” (Mishkin 2019, 243). Additionally, it is an asset
transformation process that involves “a number of different financial institutions working

90

together (Mishkin 2019, 244). The cause of the gaps in information comes from the bundling
process that blurs information on the underlying financial assets of such securities.
The following examples were coded as securitization:
•

Though most every Street firm trades mortgages, Bear has so far been singled out by the
Goldman analyst and others because it is a major player in mortgage securitization -- or
packaging of mortgages so they can be sold to big investors – and the issuance of new
mortgages (Kelly 2007, May 25, 2007, The Wall Street Journal).

•

Let’s not forget that Bear Stearns lost billions for its clients last summer, when two hedge
funds investing heavily in mortgage securities collapsed. And the firm tried to dump toxic
mortgage securities it held in its own vaults onto the public last summer in an initial
public offering of a financial company called Everquest Financial. Thankfully, that deal
never got done.
As of last Nov. 30, Bear Stearns had on its books approximately $46 billion of
mortgages, mortgage-backed and asset-backed securities. Jettisoning such a portfolio
onto a mortgage market that is not operative would, it is plain to see, be a disaster
(Morgenson 2008, March 16, 2008, The New York Times).

•

On Wall Street, rumors about a possible collapse of Bear Stearns, which had been a
leader in packaging mortgage-backed securities, gained gale-force strength (Andrews
2008, March 17, 2008, The New York Times).

3.10.2.3 Derivatives
A derivative is a “financial contract whose price is determined (derived) from the value
of an underlying asset, rate, index or event” (Financial Crisis Inquiry Report 2011, 452). These
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financial contracts include “futures, forward contracts, options, swaps and other derivative
securities” (Easton, Halsey, and McAnally 2021, 4-17). Derivatives are used to transfer risk,
called hedging, or to “speculate on changes in prices, rates, indices or even on events such as the
potential default on debts” (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2010, xxiv). For derivatives,
the cause of the gaps in information stems from information that is not known and not reported
as can be seen from the findings of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2010, xxv): “the
existence of millions of derivatives contracts of all types between systemically important
financial institutions – unseen and unknown ….”
The following examples were coded as derivatives:
•

Vice Chairman Thomas: “And so today we will look at derivatives and the financial
crisis of two companies: Goldman Sachs and AIG. The two were linked through
derivatives, as indeed was all of Wall Street … We will ask how it came to be that
AIG, a once-respected company that Americans looked to for traditional insurance
needs, found itself on the losing side of many derivatives transactions with
Goldman and other companies and had to be bailed out with a commitment of $182
billion in taxpayers’ assistance” (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2010, 7).

•

American International Group fell 1.17, or 2.7%, to 42.48. Morgan Stanley cut its
rating on the insurance company to “equal-weight” from “overweight,” saying
losses from credit default swaps may exceed management’s forecast and could
reach $3 billion. These swaps are credit derivatives that pay out in the event of a
default on the underlying bonds (Philbin 2008, May 14, 2008, The Wall Street
Journal).
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•

Bear has been particularly active in one type of popular derivative, known as an
interest-rate swap. The notional amount of these contracts is estimated to be in the
hundreds of billions of dollars, according to Swap Financial Group, a South Orange,
N.J., advisory firm that specializes in derivatives.
Some of the investors engaged in these swaps with Bear are better positioned than
others. Bear created two subsidiary companies, known as special-purpose vehicles,
with a separate legal status intended to make their obligations secure even if the
parent company goes bankrupt. These SPVs are triple-A rates, and their
management would be assumed by another brokerage firm if Bear collapsed (Ng
2007, March 15, 2007, The Wall Street Journal).

3.10.2.4 Financial Leverage
Financial leverage “measures the degree to which the company finances its assets with
debt versus equity” (Easton, Halsey, and McAnally 2021, 4-5). The degree to which a company
is leveraged is reflective of the level of risk the company engages in. Financial leverage causes
gaps in communicating information as seen in the Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2010, xx):
“the leverage was often hidden … in off-balance-sheet entities, and through “window-dressing”
of financial reports available to the investing public.” Paulson Jr. (2013, 440) writes: “Much of
the leverage was embedded in largely opaque and highly complex financial products.” High
leverage is associated with high risk in which the public learns of the outcomes in the aftermath.
The following excerpts were coded as financial leverage:
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•

The Bear Stearns funds, like many others, borrowed big to invest in subprime loans.
Investing with borrowed money juices returns in hot markets and magnifies losses
in down markets, making losers out of lenders as well as equity investors.
One of the Bear Stearns funds borrowed some $6 billion, from Merrill Lynch,
Goldman Sachs, Bank of America and other powerhouses. For the other fund, Bear
Stearns reportedly put up $3.2 billion to help liquidate holdings. That’s 32 cents on
the dollar for assets once valued at $10 billion (The New York Times Online 2007,
June 28, 2007, The New York Times).

•

But since the crisis broke in June, he had been pushing to find answers, accepting
responsibility internally and telling people that Bear never should have introduced
such a highly leveraged fund that carried so much risk, one of which would go on
to lose all investor assets (Thomas Jr. 2007, August 6, 2007, The New York Times).

•

Managers of hedge funds and mutual funds say the problems at Bear confirmed
their worst fears about the brokerages -- that they relied too much on leverage and
have done a poor job managing the risks they took on during the boom (Bajaj,
Anderson, and Weisman 2008, March 17, 2008, The New York Times).

3.10.2.5 Fraud
“Fraud occurs when a misstatement is made and there is both the knowledge of its falsity
and the intent to deceive” (Arens and Loebbecke 1997, 110). Fraud is characterized by the
manipulation of records, falsified transactions, and misapplication of accounting principles
resulting in fraudulent financial reporting (Needles, Anderson, and Caldwell 1993, 303). Fraud is
usually committed by management and also includes manipulating stock prices. Fraud causes
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gaps in information because of deception and attempts “to conceal the fraud” (Arens and
Loebbecke 1997, 144).
The following excerpts were coded as fraud:
•

In the year before the fund imploded and as suspicions grew among executives inside
Bear Stearns that Mr. Berger was providing fake account statements to investors, he
transferred $141.4 million to the fund’s account at Bear Stearns to meet increased margin
requirements and continue selling stocks short, betting that they would decline in value,
court filings state. That $141.4 million was used to cover all the positions in the market
for which Bear Stearns would have been liable (Creswell 2007, February 16, 2007, The
New York Times).

•

New York – A federal grand jury in Brooklyn, N.Y., indicted two former Bear Stearns
Cos. Hedge-fund managers, alleging they misled investors when their fund was in peril,
lied about their financial interest in the portfolios and destroyed evidence in the
investigation.
The high-profile criminal case, along with a parallel civil securities-fraud action by the
Securities and Exchange Commission, marks the first criminal securities-fraud charges
stemming from the mortgage-market crisis. The 27-page indictment paints a picture of
the scramble by the managers, Ralph Cioffi and Matthew Tannin, to keep their hedge
funds alive (Kelly 2008, June 20, 2008, The Wall Street Journal).

•

Nine of the defendants have been arrested, and four have pleaded guilty to charges
ranging from securities fraud, conspiracy to commit securities fraud and bribery. The
investigation, conducted by the S.E.C., the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the office
of the United States attorney in Manhattan, has been under way for more than a year and
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is continuing [3 employees from Bear Stearns] (Anderson and Merced 2007, March 2,
2007, The New York Times).

3.10.2.6 Shadow Banking
Shadow banking references an alternative way of banking to traditional banking. In
shadow banking, loans made by traditional banks and funded by deposits were replaced by loans
through securities markets (Mishkin 2019, 239). This allowed companies to engage in bank-like
activities but without the exposure to banking regulations (Geithner 2014, 81). The gaps caused
here stem from the “shadowy” or secretive financial activities related to the shadow banking
system that were not communicated by the corporations so it was not reported to the public.
The following excerpts were coded as shadow banking:
•

Commissioner Born: As the chair has said, in parallel with our commercial banking
system an enormous shadow banking system grew composed of financial institutions
with significantly less regulation than commercial banks, including investment banks like
Bear Stearns. By the time of the financial crisis, a great deal of financial activity was
taking place outside the regulated banks and in the shadow system (Public Hearing on the
Shadow Banking System 2010, 51-52).

•

The way that firms like a JP Morgan or a Lehman Brothers now operated bore little
resemblance to the way banks had traditionally done business. No longer would a bank
simply make a loan and keep it on its books (Sorkin 2009, 89).

•

Vice Chairman Thomas: Because we were all aware of the contests that went on as the
traditional banking system saw a significant shift from them to the so-called shadow
banking or investment banks because of the ability to create more modern instruments, or
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more creative, or more bespoke for what they wanted (Public Hearing on the Shadow
Banking System 2010, 368).

3.10.2.7 Other causes of gaps:
“Other” causes of gaps reference any additional causes of gaps that were present in the
dataset but not in significant quantity to classify as a separate code. Therefore, these additional
gaps were grouped together into the code “other.”
•

Between 1999 to 2008, the financial sector expended $ 2.7 billion in reported federal
lobbying expenses; individuals and political action committees in the sector made more
than $1 billion in campaign contributions (Financial Crisis Inquiry Report 2010, xviii).

•

Now the demise of both firms is rekindling debate over whether so-called mark-to-market
accounting has fanned the flames of the credit crisis (Reilly 2008, September 19, 2008,
The Wall Street Journal).

•

The division which admitted to engaging in transactions that violated accounting rules,
entered into a deferred-prosecution agreement with the Justice Department; which in
effect means it had to be on its best behavior to avoid charges (Smith, Efrati, and Pleven
2008, June 13, 2008, The Wall Street Journal).

3.10.3 Measures Taken to Close Gaps
Measures taken to close gaps reference steps, policy proposals, and suggestions to
prevent such gaps in the process of communicating financial information from recurring in the
future. Measures for closing gaps can be viewed as corresponding to types of gaps and causes of
gaps identified. In the dataset, measures to close gaps were presented and discussed in three
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major ways: addressing the need to reduce excessive borrowing; addressing the need for clear,
complete, and understandable reporting; and addressing the need for increased oversight and
regulation. The substance of the discussions for measures to close the gaps is represented in this
category in terms of what needs to be done and not about how it is going to be done. Four codes
stem from the source data: strengthen transparency, strengthen regulations, decrease leverage,
other measures taken.
3.10.3.1 Strengthen transparency
Strengthen transparency references steps, policy proposals, and suggestions to meet the
standards of transparency in financial reporting, that is “timely, meaningful, and reliable
disclosures about a company's financial performance” (Glassman 2002). In addition, strengthen
transparency references steps, policy proposals, and suggestions taken to meet financial reporting
standards of “a complete and understandable picture of a company’s financial position …”
(White and Kroeker 2008, SEC).
The following excerpts were coded as strengthen transparency:
•

Cox focused on modernizing the SEC and corporate disclosure. He made it easier for
investors to read and understand mutual fund prospectuses, forced companies to disclose
their executives' compensation in a standard format and instilled rules to make it easier
for shareholders to communicate via the Internet (The New York Times Online, January 2,
2009).

•

Other regulators are demanding more transparency in credit default swaps from the
institutions they oversee. At the end of July, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.
proposed a new rule that would require troubled banks under its regulatory wing to
produce, on the agency’s demand, detailed records of swaps and other financial contracts,
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their current market values, collateral posted by counterparties, the identities of those
parties and copies of the agreements (Morgenson 2008, August 10, 2008, The New York
Times).
•

Meantime, some industry specialists are calling for reforms in the way securities firms
package mortgage securities.
Among them is making public the due-diligence reports provided by Clayton and its
rivals to both ratings firms and the public. "We need to . . . improve the due- diligence
process by standardizing it and by disclosing" the results to ratings agencies and
investors, said Rod Dubitsky, head of asset- backed securities research at Credit Suisse
Group. Another improvement, he said, would be hiring an independent party to "police"
or monitor the loan pool, ensuring that mortgages being packaged into new securities for
sale had the loan attributes that had been described (Kelly, Efrati, and Simon, 2008,
January 31, 2008, The Wall Street Journal).

3.10.3.2 Strengthen regulations
Strengthen regulations reference steps, policy proposals, and suggestions to increase
oversight and enforcement of the rules, regulations, and laws by regulatory agencies as well as
implementing new policies as needed. Regulators include the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, the Federal Reserve Bank, and tax agencies
(Easton, Halsey, and McAnally 2021, 1-6).
The following excerpts were coded as strengthen regulations:
•

Washington – For the first time in more than a decade, the Federal Reserve has set up
shop inside brokerages to monitor their financial condition, perhaps the beginning of an
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expanded role for the central bank and additional regulation for Wall Street. (Scannell
and Reddy 2008, April 3, 2008, The Wall Street Journal).
•

Mr. Geithner said the nation’s financial system needs “a stronger set of shock absorbers”
for capital and liquidity in the banks and large securities firms that are key to market
functioning. He called for stronger supervision of these institutions (Scannell and Reddy
2008, April 4, 2008, The Wall Street Journal).

•

“The role of the Fed as the systemic risk regulator was well on its way to being adopted,
and this will make it more likely,” says Robert Glauber, a former Undersecretary at the
Treasury Department for domestic finance.
Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson issued a blueprint for a regulatory revamp in March
that called for a bigger role for the Fed in guarding the overall health of the financial
system. Mr. Paulson said Monday that “major changes” need to be made, including
establishing a process to unwind investment banks akin to the orderly process in place for
unwinding commercial banks.
Future oversight is “going to have to be streamlined and more effective regulation,” he
said (Scannell 2008, September 16, 2008, The Wall Street Journal).

3.10.3.3 Decrease leverage
Decrease leverage references steps, policy proposals, and suggestions taken to reduce the
“degree to which the company finances its assets with debt versus equity” (Easton, Halsey, and
McAnally 2021, 4-5). “Financial firms took on too much risky leverage” Bernanke, Geithner,
and Paulson Jr. (2019, 12). Decreasing leverage means that the company is lowering its level of
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risk, thereby decreasing information that may be hidden or not properly disclosed in financial
reports.
The following excerpts were coded as decrease leverage:
•

Commissioner Hennessey: We’ve heard a lot of specific questions about the CSE
Program, and arguments that in fact the CSE Program needed to be legislatively
strengthened. I happen to believe that there should be leverage requirements that are
imposed (Public Hearing on the Shadow Banking System 2010, 342).

•

After the crisis, Ben [Bernanke]and Tim [Geithner] thought the most important
safeguards would be stricter limits on the risk firms could take with borrowed money.
That meant requiring them to hold more loss absorbing capital – Tim’s mantra was
“capital, capital, capital” – and take on less leverage, the flip side of capital” (Bernanke,
Geithner, and Paulson Jr. 2019, 112).

•

Erin Callan, Lehman's chief financial officer, said Monday that the bank had moved
aggressively to reduce its leverage, which some investors feared might undermine the
firm. Since April, Lehman has sold about $130 billion in assets, reducing its exposure to
mortgages and loans used to finance leveraged buyouts (Anderson and Story 2008, June
10, 2008, The New York Times).

3.10.3.4 Other measures
“Other” measures to close gaps reference any additional measures taken that were present
in the dataset but not in significant quantity to classify as a separate code. Therefore, these
additional measures taken to close gaps were grouped together into the code “other.”
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•

The House overwhelmingly passed a measure Thursday that would impose a bonus
surtax of 90% on large firms receiving federal bailout money. The senate is expected to
vote on a similar issue by the end of the week (Weisman and Fitzpatrick 2009, Mar 21,
2009, The Wall Street Journal).

•

The Fed, which is reviewing compensation practices at U.S. Banks has said it favors
reducing compensation risks through such moves as deferring pay or seizing pay later if a
bank’s financial performance suffers (Luchetti 2009, Nov. 23, 2009, The Wall Street
Journal).

•

Regulators and Congress face growing pressure to decide if the market’s turmoil has
gotten so bad that companies should be shielded from the mark-to market rules, even if
just temporarily (Reilly 2008, September 19, 2008, The Wall Street Journal).

The data obtained from the full dataset reveal that the types of gaps existing are
misleading financial information, interconnectedness, unreliable valuation [of assets], weakness
in transparency, weakness in regulation, red flags, and “other” types of gaps. The data links
subprime mortgages, securitization, derivatives, financial leverage, fraud, shadow banking and
“other” causes of gaps to the creation or expansion of gaps. Findings suggest that strengthening
transparency, strengthening regulations, decreasing leverage, and “other” measures to close gaps
can mitigate the potential for gaps in communicating financial information to emerge.
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Chapter 4: Results
This chapter presents the findings of the study. The results are organized in sections 4.1,
4.2, and 4.3 to answer each of the three research questions outlined in Section 3.2: What gaps
exist in communicating financial information to the public? What are the causes of such gaps?
And what measures can be taken to close the gaps? Section 4.4 presents the results for a subset
of the linkages among the codes. These findings convey what has been documented in the data
sources used in this study.
4.1 Coding Results for RQ 1: Types of Gaps
The data for types of gaps indicate a high presence in unreliable valuation,
interconnectedness, misleading financial information, and weakness in transparency. Among the
types of gaps, both weakness in regulation and red flags or early warning signs of impending
corporate failures had a low presence. The total frequency count for types of gaps in the three
data sources is 745. Of this total, unreliable valuation had the highest frequency with 32.88%
followed by interconnectedness with 22.28%, and misleading financial information with 18.12%.
Weakness in transparency was next with a frequency of 14.23% followed by weakness in
regulation of 7.92%, red flags with 3.09%, and other types of gaps with 1.48%.
Table 4.1 Coding Results for Types of Gaps
Codes

Frequency

Percentage

Unreliable Valuation

245

32.88%

Interconnectedness

166

22.28%

Misleading Financial Information

135

18.12%

Weakness in Transparency

106

14.23%

Weakness in Regulation

59

7.92%

Red Flags

23

3.09%

Other Types

11

1.48%
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Total

745

100%

Types of Gaps

245

166
135
106
59

23

11

Figure 4.1 Frequency Count for Types of Gaps

4.2 Coding Results for RQ 2: Causes of Gaps
The data for causes of gaps indicate a high presence of securitization, derivatives,
subprime mortgages, and financial leverage. Causes of gaps create an environment that could
potentially obscure the reporting of financial information leading to layers of gaps. The total
frequency count for causes of gaps in the three data sources is 696. Of this total, securitization
had the highest frequency with 27.01%, followed by derivatives with 23.42%, subprime
mortgages with 17.82%, and financial leverage with 15.52%. Fraud was next with a frequency of
8.91% followed by shadow banking with 6.03%, and other causes of gaps with 1.29%.

104

Table 4.2 Coding Results for Causes of Gaps
Codes

Frequency

Percentage

Securitization

188

27.01%

Derivatives

163

23.42%

Subprime Mortgages

124

17.82%

Financial Leverage

108

15.52%

Fraud

62

8.91%

Shadow Banking

42

6.03%

Other Causes

9

1.29%

696

100%

Total

Figure 4.2 Frequency Count for Causes of Gaps

4.3 Coding Results for RQ 3: Measures Taken
Finally, the data on measures taken indicate that strengthening regulation, strengthening
transparency, and decreasing leverage will help to close the gaps in information. If the potential
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causes of gaps in information as stated in the findings are, for example, securitization,
derivatives, financial leverage, subprime mortgages, and shadow banking, then it follows that
suggestions made would attempt to reduce, eliminate, or strengthen policies and oversight over
such activities. The total frequency count for measures to close gaps is 122. Of this total,
strengthen regulation had the highest frequency with 63.93%, followed by strengthen
transparency with 21.31%, decrease leverage with 9.02%, and other measures to close gaps with
5.74%.
Table 4.3 Coding Results for Measures Taken to Close Gaps
Codes

Frequency

Percentage

Strengthen Regulation

78

63.93%

Strengthen Transparency

26

21.31%

Decrease Leverage

11

9.02%

Other Measures

7

5.74%

122

100%

Total

Measures to Close Gaps
78

26

Strengthen Regulation Strenghten Transparency

11

7

Decrease Leverage

Other Measures

Figure 4.3 Frequency Count for Measures to Close Gaps

106

4.4 Linking the Data
Patterns emerge during the analysis of the dataset that contribute to the findings of the
study. This can be seen in linkages among the codes developed to identify types of gaps in
communicating financial information with the causes of such gaps, and measures to close the
gaps. A feature of financial information is the strong presence of interconnectivity in financial
transactions that can create multiple linkages at the same time. It is this aspect of the financial
system that leads to discussions of complexity in the system. A subset of the total linkages
among the codes is presented in this section. Based on the frequency in the appearance of
linkages, the following examples rank among the highest stemming from the dataset.
4.4.1 Unreliable Valuation and Causes of Gaps
For types of gaps, unreliable valuation with the highest frequency count in this category
was linked in the data with the following codes: securitization, subprime mortgages, derivatives,
and financial leverage. The total frequency count for the linking of unreliable valuation with
causes of gaps is 107. Of this total, securitization has the highest frequency of 41.12% followed
by subprime mortgages with 30.84%, derivatives with 26.17%, and leverage with 1.87%.

Table 4.4 Unreliable Valuation and Causes of Gaps
Unreliable Valuation

Frequency

Percentage

Securitization

44

41.12%

Subprime Mortgages

33

30.84%

Derivatives

28

26.17%

Financial Leverage

2

1.87%

107

100%

Total

107

Unreliable Valuation
44
33
28

2
Securitization

Subprime

Derivatives

Leverage

Figure 4.4 Frequency Count for Unreliable Valuation and Causes of Gaps

4.4.2 Misleading Financial Information and Causes of Gaps
Misleading financial information is a type of gap that is linked in the data to the
following codes: subprime mortgages, derivatives, securitization, and financial leverage. The
total frequency count is 35. Of this total, derivatives have the highest frequency of 42.68%
followed by subprime mortgages with 37.14%, financial leverage with 11.43%, and
securitization with 8.57%.
Table 4.5 Misleading Financial Information and Causes of Gaps
Misleading Financial Information

Frequency

Percentage

Derivatives

15

42.86%

Subprime Mortgages

13

37.14%

Financial Leverage

4

11.43%

Securitization

3

8.57%

Total

35

100%

108

Misleading Financial Information
15
13

4

Derivatives

Subprime Mortgages

3

Leverage

Securitization

Figure 4.5 Frequency Count for Misleading Financial Information and Causes of Gaps

4.4.3 Interconnectedness and Causes of Gaps
Interconnectedness is also a type of gap that is linked in the data to the following codes:
financial leverage, subprime mortgages, derivatives, and securitization. The total frequency
count is 27. Of this total, derivatives have the highest frequency with 48.16% followed by
subprime mortgages with 22.22%. Securitization and financial leverage are tied with 14.81%.
Table 4.6 Interconnectedness and Causes of Gaps
Interconnectedness

Frequency

Percentage

Derivatives

13

48.16%

Subprime Mortgages

6

22.22%

Securitization

4

14.81%

Financial Leverage

4

14.81%

Total

27

100%
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Interconnectedness
13

6

Derivatives

Subprime Mortgages

4

4

Securitization

Leverage

Figure 4.6 Frequency Count for Interconnectedness and Causes of Gaps

4.4.4 Weakness in Transparency and Causes of Gaps
Weakness in transparency is a type of gap that is linked in the data to the following
codes: subprime mortgage, securitization, derivatives, financial leverage, and fraud. The total
frequency count is 29. Of this total, derivatives have the highest frequency with 37.93%,
followed by subprime mortgage with 27.6% and securitization with 17.24%. Next is financial
leverage with 13.79% and fraud with 3.44%.
Table 4.7 Weakness in Transparency and Causes of Gaps
Weakness in Transparency

Frequency

Percentage

Derivatives

11

37.93%

Subprime Mortgages

8

27.6%

Securitization

5

17.24%

Financial Leverage

4

13.79%

Fraud

1

3.44%

Total

29

100%

110

Figure 4.7 Frequency Count for Weakness in Transparency and Causes of Gaps

4.4.5 Weakness in Regulation and Causes of Gaps
Weakness in regulation is a type of gap that is linked in the data to the following codes:
derivatives, subprime mortgages, financial leverage, shadow banking, and securitization. The
total frequency count is 24. Of this total, derivatives have the highest frequency with 37.5%.
Subprime mortgages and financial leverage are tied with 20.8% followed by shadow banking
with 16.7%, and securitization with 4.2%.
Table 4.8 Weakness in Regulation and Causes of Gaps
Weakness in Regulation

Frequency

Percentage

Derivatives

9

37.5%

Subprime Mortgages

5

20.8%

Financial Leverage

5

20.8%

Shadow Banking

4

16.7%

Securitization

1

4.2%

Total

24

100%
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Weakness in Regulation
9

5

5
4
1

Derivatives

Subprime
Mortgages

Financial Leverage

Shadow Banking

Securitization

Figure 4.8 Frequency Count for Weakness in Regulation and Causes of Gaps

4.4.6 Securitization and Types of Gaps
Securitization is a cause of gaps that is linked in the data to the following codes:
unreliable valuation, weakness in transparency, misleading financial information, and
interconnectedness. The total frequency count is 17. Of this total, unreliable valuation has the
highest frequency with 52.94%, followed by weakness in transparency with 35.3%. Misleading
financial information is tied with interconnectedness at 5.88%.
Table 4.9 Securitization and Types of Gaps
Securitization

Frequency

Percentage

Unreliable Valuation

9

52.94%

Weakness in Transparency

6

35.3%

Misleading Financial Information

1

5.88%

Interconnectedness

1

5.88%

Total

17

100%
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Figure 4.9 Frequency Count for Securitization and Types of Gaps

4.4.7 Derivatives, Types of Gaps, and Measures Taken
Derivatives is a cause of gaps that is linked in the data to the following codes: unreliable
valuation, interconnectedness, weakness in transparency, weakness in regulation, misleading
financial information, and strengthen regulation. The total frequency count is 46. Of this total,
unreliable valuation has the highest frequency with 47.82%, followed by weakness in regulation
with 30.43%, and interconnectedness with 8.71%. Next is weakness in transparency with 6.52%,
strengthen regulation with 4.35% and misleading financial information with 2.17%.
Table 4.10 Derivatives, Types of Gaps, and Measures Taken
Derivatives

Frequency

Percentage

Unreliable Valuation

22

47.82%

Weakness in Regulation

14

30.43%

Interconnectedness

4

8.71%

Weakness in Transparency

3

6.52%

Misleading financial information

1

2.17%
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Strengthen Regulation

2

4.35%

Total

46

100%

Figure 4.10 Frequency Count for Derivatives, Types of Gaps, Measures Taken

4.4.8 Strengthen Regulation, Types, and Causes of Gaps
Strengthen regulation is a measure taken to close gaps that is linked in the data to the
following codes: derivatives, financial leverage, subprime mortgage, securitization, and
unreliable valuation. The total frequency count is 27. Of this total, derivatives have the highest
frequency with 66.68%, followed by financial leverage with 14.81%, subprime mortgages with
11.11%. Securitization and unreliable valuation are tied at 3.7%.
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Table 4.11 Strengthen Regulation, Types, and Causes of Gaps
Strengthening Regulations

Frequency

Percentage

Derivatives

18

66.68%

Financial Leverage

4

14.81%

Subprime

3

11.11%

Securitization

1

3.7%

Unreliable Valuation

1

3.7%

Total

27

100%

Figure 4.11 Frequency Count for Strengthen Regulation, Causes, and Type of Gaps

The analysis of linkages among types of gaps and causes of gaps shows high frequency
counts for derivatives and subprime mortgages. When looking at linkages in the reverse direction
with causes of gaps and types of gaps, the data shows high frequency counts in unreliable
valuation, weaknesses in regulation, and transparency. For linkages when looking at measures to
close gaps, there is a strong link among strengthening regulations and derivatives.
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Chapter 5: Discussion
This discussion highlights components of the research that were most prominent in the
findings. Even though a high frequency count in the three categories of codes is meaningful, the
frequency count is a starting point in analyzing the findings of this study. Of the results that were
presented in Chapter 4, there are standout observations that can be drawn. As such, this
discussion is organized around the following themes that emerged from the findings: complexity,
high risk, and regulation.
5.1 Complexity
The significance of the valuation of assets is critically important to this discussion. “The
valuation issue is perhaps the most controversial issue in accounting. It focuses on assigning
monetary value to a business transaction” (Needles, Anderson, and Caldwell 1993, 48). For all
items on the balance sheet, the value assigned is the cost or the exchange price: “If a company
cannot value an asset with relative certainty, it does not recognize an asset on the balance sheet
(Easton, Halsey, and McAnally 2021, 2-5). This principle was not applied by the investment
banks in the years preceding the crisis, especially for items described as complex financial
instruments, many backed by subprime mortgages. Once uncovered, the valuation issue
describes such a huge gap, that as Geithner (2014, 7) writes: “People lose confidence that their
money is safe ….” The crisis that started in the financial markets in 2008 seeped into the rest of
the economy and the taxpayers became the lenders of last resort as the government used $700
billion to stabilize the banking system.
Unreliable valuation, with the highest frequency count, is the code that describes the type
of gap that exists because of discrepancies between what assets were believed to be worth by the
corporation and what the assets were actually worth. What was reported to the public was based
on the value that was assigned by the corporation. For the dataset used in this study, there were
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no valuation issues reported in 2006 or early 2007 in newspaper articles. By June 2007, The Wall
Street Journal reported that Bear Stearns’ $600 million high risk fund had tumbled in value
because of a surge in home mortgage defaults (Kelly and Ng 2007). By the end of June, The Wall
Street Journal reported: “One area of concern involves the lack of accurate pricing in the CDO
market … any valuation of these vehicles involves managers making estimates which can be
overly optimistic (Scannell, Hughes, and Reilly 2007, The Wall Street Journal, June 27, 2007).
The issue surrounding unreliable valuation of assets persisted throughout 2007 and into
2008. In November 2007, Bear Stearns had to write down its assets by $1.2 billion and reported
its first quarterly loss in its 84-year history (Levitz and Kelly 2007, The Wall Street Journal,
November 15, 2007). Similar reports were present for AIG and Lehman Brothers “Lehman’s
losses from both write-downs on assets … will top $2 billion (Craig 2008, The Wall Street
Journal, June 3, 2008); “Lehman once a leader … fears about the true value of its assets”
(Anderson 2008, The New York Times, July 11, 2008).
The valuation of assets was discussed in the congressional hearings in terms of “price
discovery.” The Public Hearing on the Role of Derivatives (2010) sheds some light on what is
described as a lack of price discovery that created the problem. Price discovery means that the
price or the cost of securities, such as stocks and bonds, are established by market forces, for
example, when securities trade on an exchange (like the NYSE). As Commissioner Born states:
“if this had been trading on an exchange, there would have been price discovery that showed
what the values were and what one party owe to another” (Public Hearing on the Role of
Derivatives 2010, 51-55).
How important was the valuation issue and what was previously unknown to the public?
The collapse of Bear Stearns was swift: On Tuesday March 11, 2008, Bear Stearns reported a
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capital base of $17 billion (Sidel et al. 2008, The Wall Street Journal, March 18, 2008). By
Thursday, March 13, their cash had reduced to $2 billion. The company planned to file for
bankruptcy on Friday March 14. But the Federal Reserve agreed to lend J.P. Morgan $30
billion to cover Bear’s toxic assets. By Sunday March 16, 2008, J.P. Morgan offered to
purchase Bear Stearns for $2. per share. As Sidel et al. (2008) note just two days later:
uncertain values of securities backed by home mortgages “helped sparked the current crisis”
(The Wall Street Journal, March 18, 2008).
Interconnectedness, is a type of gap with the second highest frequency. Based on the
dataset of newspaper articles used in this study, interconnectedness was not present in news
reports during 2006. Discussions on interconnectedness show up in June 2007 when valuation
issues grew with regards to Bear Stearns. The Wall Street Journal reports on June 23, 2007:
“Over the past decade or so, financial markets have grown substantially and have spread
globally, leading to sophisticated and complex ways to place bets, often with large amounts of
leverage” (Kelly 2007). The Public Hearing on the Role of Derivatives (2010, 24) uses similar
terms to describe interconnectedness: “…systemic risk inherent in a marketplace comprised of
opaque webs of interconnectedness and overleveraged counterparties.” Counterparties are tied
to “bets” in derivatives transactions and in both excerpts, leverage is associated with
interconnectedness and financial derivatives. Counterparties and bets will be explored in more
detail in the discussion on derivatives.
As Paulson, Jr. (2011, 68)), explains: “The market became opaque as structured products
grew increasingly complex and difficult to understand even for sophisticated investors.” In
addition, interconnectedness also gave rise to the term, “too-big-to-fail” used in reference to
banks during the Financial Crisis of 2008 that were a threat to the entire system.
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Interconnectedness had a high presence in newspaper articles throughout 2008 and discussed
frequently in the congressional hearings and books used in the dataset. As seen previously, it is
often described in the literature in terms of tangled webs of interconnections and is associated
with complex financial products (Financial Crisis Inquiry Report 2010; Bernanke, Geithner,
Paulson Jr. 2019).
In the Public Hearing on Shadow Banking (2010, 167), Commission Born refers to
interconnectedness in the same vein: “What about your interconnectedness? I mean you had
thousands and thousands of counterparties …” and “Do you think that the reason the Federal
Reserve was willing to step in and assist JP Morgan’s purchase of Bear Stearns was because of
concerns that essentially the institution was too large and/or interconnected to fail?”
Interconnectedness is an important gap because it is reflective of what is referred to as the
size and complexity of the system – the more challenging aspect being complexity. As
Paulson, Jr. (2011, 447) writes: “Complexity is the enemy of transparency …” and as
Schwarcz (2009, 213) notes: Complexity is “the greatest financial market challenge of the
future.”
5.2 High Risk
The discussion in this section includes the following codes assigned to causes of gaps:
subprime mortgages, securitization, derivatives, financial leverage, and shadow banking. It is
important to note that these codes are distinct from each other and are not interchangeable in
terms of their definitions, but analysis of the data shows that they interact with each other in
significant ways.
First, subprime mortgages are “loans made by creditors that specialize in lending to
borrowers with FICO scores generally below 620” (Barr et al. 2020, 320). Subprime mortgages
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are also described in the literature as “interest-only loans” and “low-or-no-documentation
requirements” loans (Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2010, xxiii). In the years before the
financial crisis, the underwriting standards for residential mortgages were drastically lowered to
facilitate what has been described as predatory lending and fraudulent practices among mortgage
originators (Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2010, xxiii). The gap created here stems from the
practices of mortgage-lenders and the lowered standards for underwriting these loans that were
not reported until mortgage borrowers started defaulting in large numbers.
Second, “securitization turns illiquid assets like mortgages, commercial loans, and other
receivables into marketable securities” (U.S Securities and Exchange Commission 2013, par.3).
In other words, along with mortgages, the bundling of these loans included consumer debt such
as student loans and credit card balances, making it even more difficult to identify individual
borrowers (Mollenkamp and Whitehouse 2008, The Wall Street Journal Sept 16, 2008). In this
way, securitization extends the gap created by subprime mortgages because it allows mortgagelenders to sell the loans and avoid the risk of default or delinquent payments. The gap is
extended because “additional risks were often difficult for investors to assess because the
securitization process does not just transfer ownership of the underlying loans, it bundles,
divides, and repackages them as well” (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 2013, par. 6).
The Wall Street Journal reported on June 17, 2008: “Lehman securitized more than $700 billion
in assets … About 85% of these, or about $600 billion were residential mortgages” (Reilly
2008).
Third, derivatives play a role in further extending the gap in information through credit
default swaps and counterparties. A derivative is a “financial contract whose price is determined
(derived) from the value of an underlying asset, rate, index, or event” (Financial Crisis Inquiry
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Report 2010, 450). A credit default swap is a type of credit derivative. It is not a security. The
credit default swap allows the buyer of the swap to transfer the risk of loan default to a seller of
the swap. In this transaction, “the seller agrees to pay the purchaser if a default event occurs. The
purchaser does not need to own the loan covered by the swap” (Financial Crisis Inquiry Report
2010, 452). A counterparty describes a party in this contract. An important aspect of credit
default swaps is that it allows for speculation, that is, investors can speculate on whether a
company will be able to repay their debts. The term used for this transaction with credit default
swaps is “betting.” The size of the derivatives market grew to $664 trillion by 2008 in an
unregulated market (Financial Crisis Inquiry Report 2010, 4). Lehman Brothers had more than
900,000 unregulated open derivatives contracts (Bernanke, Geithner, and Paulson Jr. 2019, 63).
The gaps that were caused by the credit-default-swaps stem from lack of information. The
New York Times reported that “the market for credit-default- swaps is not regulated or tracked
through any clearinghouse of data … No one knows who owes this money, how much each
counterparty owes …” (Walsh 2008, Oct. 11). Additionally, companies did not know if the
counterparties would be able to pay – in a market that was over $600 trillion.
What are the connections between subprime mortgages, securitization, derivatives, and
leverage? Faulty loans through subprime mortgages were issued and then bundled with other
loans into securities through the process of securitization. As Paulson, Jr. (2013, 68) explains,
investors often bought credit default swaps to offset the credit risk on these mortgage-backed
securities created through securitization. High levels of leverage became a large part of these
transactions.
Financial leverage is the code assigned to a cause of gaps. Financial leverage measures
the amount of debt a company uses in financing its assets (Easton, Halsey, and McAnally 2021,
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4-5). Financing with debt is risky because a corporation must repay its debt. Therefore, a high
amount of debt means a high amount of risk. The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2010, xix)
found that investment banks like Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and AIG engaged in excessive
borrowing in what they described as “extraordinarily thin capital.” The Report goes on to explain
what this means: “By one measure, their leverage ratios were as high as 40 to 1, meaning for
every $40 in assets, there was only $1 in capital to cover losses. Less than a 3% drop in asset
values could wipe out a firm” (Financial Crisis Inquiry Report 2010, xix).
For Bear Stearns, the data shows that at the end of 2007, the company reported $11.8
billion is equity with $383.6 billion in liabilities and Bear Stearns was borrowing about $70
billion in the overnight market (Financial Crisis Inquiry Report 2010, xx). This means that their
debt exceeded their capital by $371.8 billion. In the Public Hearing for the Shadow Banking
System (2010, 28), Chairman Angelides explains this with regards to Bear Stearns: “I mean, just
kind of in lay person’s terms, the way you guys were set up, it’s like a small business that had
$50,000 in cash, it borrows $2 million, and $300,000 is coming due every night. It just seems to
me that it’s ultimately not sustainable.”
The overnight market, also known as the repo market or the repurchase market is
described by Paulson, Jr. (2013, 98) as an obscure market, where many investment banks
borrowed money on an overnight basis: “Most of the money was lent overnight. That meant that
giant balance sheets filled with all kinds of complex, often illiquid assets were poised on the
back of funding that could be pulled at a moment’s notice.” The expansion of gaps caused by
financial leverage takes place because “the leverage was often hidden –in derivatives positions,
in off-balance sheet entities, and through “window-dressing” of financial reports available to the
investing public” (Financial Crisis Inquiry Report 2010, xx). As noted by Kimmel, Weygandt,

122

and Mitchell (2022, 24), “Off-balance-sheet financing is an intentional effort by a company to
structure financing arrangements so as to avoid showing liabilities on its balance sheet.”
Shadow banking is the code assigned to a cause of gaps. The importance of shadow
banking can be seen in the Public Hearing on the Shadow Banking System (2010) with
testimonies by former executives from Bear Stearns and the former chairman from the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission. Among the seven codes assigned to causes of gaps,
shadow banking ranks sixth with a frequency of 6.03%. Its low frequency count in the data bears
significance as the term “shadow banking” was not present in newspaper articles in the dataset.
This further leads to questions on how much was fully known or understood about the shadow
banking system -- questions that can be explored in greater detail in future research.
As the term indicates, the gaps caused by the shadow banking system stem from the
“shadowy” or secretive financial activities associated with shadow banking. The shadow banking
system “most often refers to borrowing and lending using nonmonetary instruments, as well as
money, outside of the traditional banking system” (Public Hearing on the Shadow Banking
System (2010, 248). The shadow banking system, an alternative way of banking to traditional
banking, was associated with investment banks such as Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and
insurance companies like AIG (Bernanke, Geithner, and Paulson, Jr. 2019, 22). As noted by
Bernanke, Geithner, and Paulson, Jr. (2019, 22), “Before the crisis, more than half the leverage
in U.S. finance had migrated to these ‘shadow banks’ or ‘nonbanks.’”
In 2006, newspaper articles used in this study show a small presence of subprime
mortgages and in terms of positive earnings reported. For example, in June 2006, it was reported
that Bear Stearns had a record increase in revenues of $1.17 billion “up 44% from a year earlier
…” in large part due to its mortgage business (Craig 2006, The New York Times, June 16, 2006).
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Securitization was present in the articles during 2006 from the beginning of the year – for Bear
Stearns, “the securitization binge appears to be continuing” (Anderson 2006, The New York
Times, January 6, 2006). Derivatives was also reported in a positive light in 2006 newspaper
articles: “Lehman Brothers Holdings and Bear Stearns Companies post record fourth-quarter
earnings helped by corporate bonds and derivatives … The companies cited rising sales of socalled credit products, which include credit-default swaps” (The New York Times Online,
December 15, 2006). Leverage had a very small presence in the data in 2006.
In 2007, there was a stronger presence in the data for subprime mortgages, and
securitization than in derivatives and leverage. By May 2007, the reports on subprime mortgages
were negative describing weaknesses in the subprime market and its effects on company
earnings. The Wall Street Journal reported on the near collapse of Bear Stearns’ hedge funds:
“Together the two Bear funds once commanded investments of more than $20 billion in complex
debt instruments, mostly backed by subprime mortgages, in addition, to billions more in wagers
that certain markets would fail” (Kelly 2007, June 23, 2007). For Lehman Brothers, reports show
that they were able to offset the weaknesses in the mortgage market by “hedging its bets” using
credit default swaps (Hadi 2007, The Wall Street Journal June 12, 2007). For AIG, the world’s
largest insurance company, concerns about subprime mortgages and their portfolio of mortgagebacked securities were reported toward the end of the year with a decline in earnings.
Taken together, the data shows the significance of how these variables interact with each
other. The discussion of causes of gaps that references subprime mortgages, securitization,
derivatives, financial leverage, and shadow banking shows the willingness of companies such as
Bear Stearns, AIG, and Lehman Brothers to engage in high-risk activities – possibly due to high
profits in the reporting periods before the onset of the crisis. As the data shows, Bear Stearns’
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earnings were in the billions in 2006 mainly due to the packaging and trading of mortgagebacked securities and derivatives. Bundling loans into securities and taking bets on the default
risk of those securities are described in the literature as very high-risk activities. Securitization
did not start with subprime mortgages, but the data shows there was increased growth of these
securities backed by subprime mortgages in the years preceding the crisis.
5.3 Regulation
The failure of Bear Stearns, according to Paulson Jr. (2013, 125), brought to light many
of the flaws in the regulatory structure in place for the U.S. financial system. This is due in large
part to the changes in the system over the two decades prior to the Financial Crisis of 2008. As
Paulson, Jr. (2013, 125) explains: “The products they designed and sold had become infinitely
more complex, and big financial institutions had become inextricably intertwined, stitched
tightly together by complex credit arrangements.” He argues that the regulations in place at the
time were designed for the world of the Great Depression with traditional businesses, and that
structure could not keep up with the growth of complex financial products.
Paulson, Jr.’s (2013) argument has some merits. Of the eight Acts passed by Congress
that govern the securities industry, three were in the 1930s and two were in 1940. SarbanesOxley was in 2002, and Dodd Frank, which has been partially repealed, was in 2010. The Glass
Steagall Act from the 1930s (not included among the eight) was repealed in 1999. The GlassSteagall Act was discussed several times in the Public Hearing on the Shadow Banking System
(2010) because of the blurring of the lines in banking activities.
Glass Steagall was enacted in 1933, during the years of the Great Depression. The main
purpose was to separate commercial and investment banking activities: “To provide for a safer
and more effective use of assets of banks, to regulate interbank control, to prevent the undue
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diversion of funds into speculative operations …” (Banking Act of 1933, 1). By the 1990s,
bankers, mostly from the largest banks, were voicing concerns about the Glass Steagall Act
(Irwin 2015, The New York Times Oct 14, 2015). Lawmakers and bankers argued the soundness
of using laws from the 1930s in a global economy. In 1999, Glass-Steagall was repealed by the
Gramm-Leach Bliley Act (also known as the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999).
The Financial Crisis of 2008 took place just nine years after the repeal of Glass-Steagall, once
again sparking debates on re-instating Glass Steagall because this was the first major crisis after
its repeal.
Observations made in the dataset for measures taken to close the gaps are relatively
smaller in quantity when compared to types of gaps and causes of gaps. Codes for measures
taken were not present in 2006. By June in 2007, measures taken were present in the articles and
had an even stronger presence in 2008 and 2009. Congress was under pressure to pass laws to
regulate the financial industry after the taxpayer bailout of failing banks and this was reflected in
the newspaper articles: “a split is forming over how to strengthen oversight of financial
institutions after decades of deregulation” and “given the philosophical differences about the
value of government regulations, some experts were skeptical that Congress and the Bush
administration would agree on more than cosmetic changes” (Andrews and Labaton 2008, The
New York Times March 23, 2008).
A critical part of this discussion includes transparency. As noted in The Wall Street
Journal on June12, 2008, “As things stand, firms create an information gap for investors … Ever
since the credit crisis began, investors have been hungering for as much detailed financial
information as they can get about the strength of Wall Street’s biggest banks” (Reilly 2008,). As
Reilly (2008) explains, companies release their earnings information and delay the release of the
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balance sheet for several weeks: “investors get only the financial red meat they seek when the
banks file actual quarterly results with the SEC -- weeks after earnings release.” Earnings were
reported regularly in the articles analyzed for this study, but with very little supporting details.
Reilly (2008) writes: “By the time, though, analysts’ one chance to publicly question executives
on the quarterly conference call has passed and markets have moved on to forecasting the next
quarter.” According to Reilly (2008), a recommendation has been made to the Securities and
Exchange Commission for companies to include financial statements (income statement, balance
sheet, and cash flow tables) with their earnings releases.
Strengthening regulations had a strong presence in the Public Hearings for Shadow
Banking and on the Role of Derivatives. Commissioner Born points out that “As a result of
pressures from a number of the country’s largest financial institutions … Congress passed a
statute in 2000 called The Commodity Futures Modernization Act that eliminated virtually all
regulations over the over-the-counter derivatives market” (Public Hearing on the Role of
Derivatives 2010, 51). In this way, the code for weakness in regulation is linked to the code for
derivatives, a cause of gaps, because this legislation allowed for the “bets” to be made through
credit default swaps. As the Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2010, xvi) states, there were
“widespread failures in financial regulation and supervision” and this included the Federal
Reserve and the Securities and Exchange Commission.
This discussion of the findings represents what was documented in the data sources used
in this study – that is documenting what others have said. The findings also present a
foundational piece of knowledge that establishes the groundwork needed for future research.
These results can be viewed as a starting point for researchers interested in conducting studies on
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information gaps from other perspectives not covered in this dissertation. The following section
presents some examples of interest for future research.

5.4 Future Research
It has been fourteen years since the Financial Crisis of 2008. Discussions of the crisis still
feature regularly in business news as it serves as a benchmark for current economic downturns.
Much has been written and debated over the years about the crisis and its causes. This study
takes a different approach by examining the communication of financial information during this
period to investigate gaps in this process. The findings in this study can be built upon for future
works. The following are some examples for future areas of interest:
•

Regulatory Reforms: An Analysis of the Glass-Steagall and Dodd Frank Acts: Debates
over the Glass-Steagall Act have persisted before its repeal and years after its repeal in
1999. There is still interest in taking a closer look at the provisions of Glass-Steagall, the
provisions in the Gramm-Leach Bliley Act that repealed Glass-Steagall, as well as the
Dodd Frank Act of 2010. Parts of Dodd Frank have also been repealed in 2018. Keeping
in mind the challenges in the rapidly changing financial environment as presented in the
data for this current study, recommendations can be made about the current regulatory
system in place after the Financial Crisis of 2008.

•

Comparative Analysis of the Communication of Financial Information: This future
research interest builds on the findings from the dissertation and continues the research
by examining the process of communicating financial information outside of the United
States in the same time frame. By using the coding scheme developed for this study to
analyze news articles from two leading foreign newspapers in the same time period, the
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findings can provide a broader perspective in terms of similarities and differences in gaps
in information.
•

The Use of Technology to Improve Transparency in Financial Reporting: This study can
be designed to trace the evolution of technology from the 1990s in the field of finance
and accounting that includes trends in emerging technologies to improve areas such as
transparency in financial reports. Research has shown interest in using blockchain
technology to increase faithful representation of accounting information.

•

Preparing Students in Finance and Accounting: This future research interest can use the
findings from this study as well as college and university curriculums to see how students
in today’s environment are being prepared for the complexity that is an intrinsic part of
the financial world.

5.5 Conclusion
This dissertation has examined gaps in the flow of information from publicly held
corporations to the public by looking at what has been documented in the selected data sources.
This study has identified several types of gaps that existed in Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers,
and AIG’s communication of financial information to the public. In addition, it has examined
variables responsible for such gaps. Finally, measures to close the gaps were presented as a
recommendation of how to move forward in transparency related to the communication of
financial information. A few crucial points must be addressed as to the implications of this
dissertation and future works that emanate from it: the first is related to the methodological and
social importance of newspapers as a communication tool; second, the significance of public
trust and confidence as tied to crises; third, the importance of regulation as tied to accounting
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principles; fourth, the question of what is owed to the public; and fifth, the present challenge
posed to accounting and information systems moving forward.
In evaluating different mediums of communicating financial information to the public, an
important trend emerged: newspapers are a crucial communication tool. This has implications
both methodologically and socially. Methodologically, newspapers serve as a reliable source that
give researchers a window as to how events transpired in real time. It also provides consistency
and stability for analysis of documents. This is because newspapers have been used across time
to communicate information to the public. With respect to Information Studies, newspapers
allow for a reliable metric of communication to be established. The use of newspapers in this
dissertation enabled the current researcher to answer the questions posed in this study related to
gaps in the flow of information. In other words, the ability to answer the research questions
around breaches in the communication process, through an analysis of newspapers, shows how
effective newspapers as a communication tool has historically been and continues to be.
The social significance of newspapers stems from its relationship as a communication
tool and the information it provides in decision-making processes to the public. This process of
communication establishes a link between experts and laypeople. Fundamentally, it creates a
precedent that such information is owed to the public because it impacts their everyday lives.
One example of the importance of delivering information owed to the public can be seen through
the public’s role as a lender of last resort. The taxpayers’ money was used to bailout banks who
engaged in excessive risk despite the taxpayers’ disengagement from such practices. An
informed public is able to use the information presented to them to make the best decisions
possible. The role of the newspaper in establishing information that is owed to the public can be
understood as underscoring the need for transparency in relaying financial information, or
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information that affects everyday life. For the purposes of this dissertation, the social value of
newspapers in bridging the gap that exists between experts and laypeople serves as a mechanism
or check to those responsible for delivering the information.
Related to the importance of newspapers both methodologically and socially, the
significance of public trust and confidence must also be discussed. Though the degree of
expertise needed to understand financial information is high, it is a system that impacts all
individuals. The interconnectedness of the system means that individuals cannot escape the
effects of the market or poor decisions that are made on behalf of the public without their
consent. Andrew Ross Sorkin (2009, 544) points to the detriment of what happens when public
trust is lost. Beyond the emergence of a financial crisis, a crisis in confidence and breach in
public trust can lead to a rejection of institutions in totality. This rejection is often coupled with
the replacement of established principles with inaccurate information that complicates
institutional arrangements further. The findings of this dissertation indicate that the taxpayer who
relies on transparent communication of information is simultaneously the lender of last resort.
Put another way, while there appeared to be a belief by experts in the government, Bear Stearns,
Lehman Brothers, and AIG that the primary agents information related to the company belonged
to were investors, the public still suffered for decisions they did not undertake. Taxpayers footed
the bill when companies were bailed out for their excessive engagement in risk while
simultaneously losing their 401Ks and retirement savings.
The breadth of the financial system as well as its interconnectedness means that the
system’s structure ties all individuals together. Small businesses in America are impacted by
supply chain shortages abroad which in turn impacts the prices companies set and the burden of
cost the consumer absorbs. A common analogy of a contagion both in the dataset and literature
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was used to describe the consequences of poor decisions in a highly interconnected system.
When a pathogen is introduced to the financial system, it has the ability to weaken the system in
totality. Though the taxpayer by and large is removed from the undertakings of Bear Stearns,
Lehman Brothers, and AIG, the decisions of the companies deemed “Too Big to Fail” impacted
retirement plans for the public that forced many Americans to work longer. When the public is a
lender of last resort for companies engaging in excessive risk, there is no safety net for the public
once the burden of bailout is placed on them.
Accounting principles enhance the ability for public trust to be established. This is
because accounting as a discipline was designed to implement stability by controlling the
vastness of the data associated with the system. Accounting reproduces data by communicating
what has already happened. In doing so, it gives interested parties the tools they need to make
financial decisions. Through the research undertaken in this dissertation, it was discovered that
two crucial accounting principles were violated. The first is related to transparency. The second
is tied to what is represented on the balance sheet. With respect to transparency, an analysis of
the dataset found words like “opaque,” “murky,” and “dark world” being used to describe the
financial activities of Bear Sterns, Lehman Brothers, and AIG. These descriptions are antithetical
to the foundations of accounting that were created to be transparent and reliable.
The balance sheet represents everything that a business owns and owes. Accounting
principles define how items on the balance sheet are measured. It is the foundation that
undergirds the business world because it is the communication tool that transmits critical
information used by other financial entities. In principle, what appears on the balance sheet must
only be reliable information. Thus, anything that is unclear or unreliable should not be reflected
on the balance sheet. In taking a frequency count of types of gaps that existed in the flow of
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information from publicly held corporations to the public, unreliable valuation of assets appears
most frequently. This means that assets that were “toxic” or not reliably valued were being used
to make decisions as if they could be trusted. Once this is implemented on a large scale, it
becomes impossible to distinguish what are “good” assets and what are “toxic” assets.
A discussion of the principles of accounting speaks to the need for regulation. What is at
stake is not a question of whether accounting principles are still viable. Rather, it points to the
necessity for regulations to insulate accounting principles from disruption. As the financial
system and markets grow, regulation must be implemented to allow for accounting principles to
adapt accordingly so it can be an effective tool used to document financial information. If the
system continues to grow and deregulation remains a bedrock principle of free market enterprise,
the interest of profit will drive decisions companies make as to what is reported on the balance
sheet and ultimately, what reaches the public. Therefore, it is important to present as “measures”
the suggestion of increasing regulation that enables accounting principles to address the growth
of the system with effective oversight.
While it has been previously discussed in Section 2.3.1 as to the assumptions made of
what is owed to the public, an additional point related to this must be made. The question of what
is owed to the public is a significant one because denying the public critical information that
impacts their lives, while simultaneously relying on them for bailouts, puts the general public at
significant risk. The taxpayer is consistently impacted by the system while not benefiting from
its current configuration. Transparency in reporting information and adhering to the belief that
expertise is not a prerequisite for delivering information holds those in power accountable for
their decisions. If companies adhere to communicating information in a transparent way because
it is owed to the public, it forces them to explain their choices and reckon with the consequences
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of poor decisions before a crisis occurs. This is because actions of public companies are held in
public debate and discourse.
Perhaps one of the most significant points of discussion that stem from the findings of
this dissertation is the current challenge for the discipline of accounting as it relates to the
financial system: the vastness of the system has made it difficult to control, regulate, and
monitor. The system has grown to an extent that makes the current ways of addressing
surveillance of the system challenging at best and near impossible at worst. It has been pointed
out by both Sorkin (2009) and the Public Hearing on the Role of Derivatives (2010) that failure
to regulate the system may continue to place the burden of bailing out companies with the
taxpayer as the lender of last resort.
Lastly, while this dissertation discussed the intersection of Accounting with Information
Studies, the work presented here has interdisciplinary implications. The findings can speak to the
legal profession in policy implementation and questions around the constitutional authority of the
government’s regulatory powers. It speaks to political theory in a discussion of what tends to fill
gaps in reliable information and how crisis in confidence not only can be tied to financial crises,
but the emergence of failed states. The discussion of hegemony bears heavily on sociology,
particularly a discussion of poverty and systemic inequality as well as a growing wealth gap in
America. It has implications for the significance of historical analysis in tracing the evolution of
social phenomena. It provides questions for economists as to the sustainability of the current
structure of the market.
This dissertation provides substantial data that can be used to assess how financial
systems intersect with other institutions and disciplines in ways that can determine the life
outcomes of everyone it encloses. If we are able to see the consequences to the integrity of
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institutions, the security of individuals, and the stability of society, we are able to glimpse why
addressing the challenge of identifying types of gaps in information, causes of such gaps, and
ways to mend the breach is the critical, nearly universal challenge of the 21st century.
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Appendix A Data for Intercoder Reliability
Articles

Article 1

Codes Identified

Interconnectedness
Derivatives
Weakness in Regulation

Total

Article 2
Total

Fraud

Article 3

Strengthen Regulation
Weakness in Regulation
Securitization
Fraud
Subprime Mortgage

Total

Article 4

Subprime Mortgage
Securitization
Financial Leverage
Unreliable Valuation

Total

Article 5
Total

Total Agreement

Derivatives

Coder A
Frequency

Coder B
Frequency

%
Agreement

3
2
1
6

3
2
1
6

100%

1
1

1
1

100%

8
2
1
1
1
13

6
1
1
1
1
10

76.92%

1
1
1
2
5

1
1
1
1
4

80%

2
2

2
2

100%

91.38%
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Appendix B Data for Pilot Study
The following tables lists the articles used in the Pilot Study from The Wall Street Journal and
The New York Times.
Date

Titles The Wall Street Journal

04/01/2005 *

Moving the Market: AIG’s Admission Puts the Spotlight on Auditor PWC

05/27/2005*

AIG Probes Bring First Charges; NY Suit Accuses Insurer, Greenberg …

06/16/2005*

Moving the Market: Wall Street Earnings Net Rises on Strength of Stock
Trading

07/11/2005*

Morgan Stanley Gets AIG Role

02/09/2006

AIG Agrees to $1.6 Billion Settlement; Big Insurer Is Set to Pay SEC

06/13/2006

Moving the Market: Lehman Reports 47% Surge in Profit; Investment
Banking Gives Results a Boost but Stock Drops in Market Worries

06/27/2007

SEC Probes CDOs and Bear Funds; Cox Testifies the Agency Has About
12 Inquiries; Accurate Pricing is an Issue

12/14/2007

Lehman Profit Falls but Beats Forecasts

03/15/2008

Fed Races to Rescue Bear Stearns In Bid to Steady Financial System;
Storied Firm Sees Stock Plunge 47%; J.P. Morgan Steps In

05/20/2008

Greenberg Role Seen in AIG Gen Re Case

05/20/2008

AIG’s Board was Right to Remove Hank Greenberg

08/20/2008

Lehman Slides 13%; Fannie Freddie Fall

09/16/2008

Surviving the Panic

09/17/2008

U.S. To Take Over AIG in $85 Billion Bailout; Central Banks Inject Cash
as Credit Dries Ip

09/19/2008

Crisis on Wall Street: In Crisis, Fingers Point at Mark-to-Market Rule

11/18/2008

U.S. News: For Fed’s Geithner, Rescue Ties Cut Both Ways

03/14/2009

Bear Stearns: A Year Later: From Fabled to Forgotten—Bear’s Name and
Culture Fade Away

03/27/2009

Top Risk Officers Remain at Insurer’s Helm

05/19/2009

USA Inc: Black Rock Wears Multiple Hats – In the Crisis, Fink’s Firm Is
Buyer, Seller, Adviser, “Our Clients Trust Us”

08/21/2009

Large Stock Focus: Talked Up By CEO, AIG Climbs by 21%
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Date

Titles The New York Times

04/01/2005*

Irish Financial Regulator Faces Its First Major Test

04/01/2005*

Obscure Offshore Entities Emerge to Trouble AIG

05.07/2005*

An Executive at Berkshire Faces Charges From SEC

05/12/2005*

U.S/ Attorney Subpoenas Chubb Over Its Use of Reinsurance

11/15/2005*

AIG Profit Declines on Hurricane Claims

12/14/2005*

Lehman Says Its Earnings Rose 41% in 4th Quarter

04/11/2006

Lawyer Leaves AIG

02/12/2008

Prosecutors Say Ex AIG Executives Created a Fraud

02/26/2008

Guilty Verdict for 5 in AIG Case

03/17/2008

Fears that Bear Stearns Downfall May Spread

03/21/2008

Lawmaker Urges New Financial Oversight

03/23/2008

Split is Forming Over Regulation of Wall Street

06/10/2008

As Losses Mount, the Fed and the White House Step Up Fortunes
Reverse for a Bank and Its Leader

06/17/2008

Shares are Mixed as Oil Price Declines

09/12/2008

Investors Turn Gaze to AIG

09/17/2008

Fed In an $85 Billion Rescue of an Insurer Near Failure

04/07/2009

Inspector to Audit AIG’s Counterparty Payouts

09/15/2009

Bear’s Ex-Chief on Being Too Big To Fail

10/14/2009

Pay Czar Talking on Bonuses at AIG

10/23/2009

In Bear Trial Prosecutor Seems to Falter

*Newspaper articles in 2005 used for the pilot study indicate that AIG had accounting
irregularities that are unrelated to the Financial Crisis of 2008. Reports in 2005 show that AIG
faced state and federal investigations because of the company’s attempts to mislead regulators
and investors by manipulating their financial statements in the early 2000s (Anderson 2005;
Browning 2005). The years selected for the full dataset used in this study are 2006 to 2009 to
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avoid conflating reports from this investigation with the events leading up to the Financial Crisis
of 2008. Therefore, newspaper articles from 2005 were eliminated from the full dataset.

Firefighting: The Financial Crisis and Its Lessons by Ben S. Bernanke, Timothy F.
Geithner and Henry M. Paulson Jr. (2019) is the book used in the pilot study. It describes their
joint efforts in working with Congress to approve legislation on the Troubled Asset Relief
Program. This account focuses on the period between 2007 and 2009 as they explain the roots of
the crisis and the complexity of financial innovations such as securitization, subprime mortgages,
hidden leverage, and shadow banking. Lehman Brothers, AIG, and Bear Stearns are also
discussed throughout this narrative.

Congressional Hearing for the Shadow Banking System Cover Page:
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, United States of America
FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION
4
5 Official Transcript
6 Hearing on "The Shadow Banking System"
7 Wednesday, May 5, 2010
8 Dirksen Senate Office Building, Room 538
9 Washington, D.C.
10 9:00 A.M.
11
12 COMMISSIONERS
13 PHIL ANGELIDES, Chairman
14 HON. BILL THOMAS, Vice Chairman
15 BROOKSLEY BORN, Commissioner
16 BYRON S. GEORGIOU, Commissioner
17 HON. BOB GRAHAM, Commissioner
18 KEITH HENNESSEY, Commissioner
19 DOUGLAS HOLTZ-EAKIN, Commissioner
20 HEATHER H. MURREN, Commissioner
21 JOHN W. THOMPSON, Commissioner
22 PETER J. WALLISON, Commissioner
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23
24 Reported by: JANE W. BEACH
25 PAGES 1 - 369
2
1 Session 1: Investment Banks and the Shadow Banking System:
2 PAUL FRIEDMAN, Former Chief Operating Officer of
3 Fixed Income, Bear Stearns
4 SAMUEL MOLINARO, JR., Former Chief Financial
5 Officer and Chief Operating Officer, Bear Stearns
6 WARREN SPECTOR, former President and
7 Co-Chief Operating Officer, Bear Stearns
8
9 Session 2: Investment Banks and the Shadow Banking System:
10 JAMES E. CAYNE, Former Chairman and
11 Chief Executive Officer, Bear Stearns
12 ALAN D. SCHWARTZ, Former Chief Executive Officer,
13 Bear Stearns

140

References
Ahmad, Kurshid, Jing Guang Han, Elaine Hutson, Colm Kearney, and Sha Lui. 201). “Media
expressed negative tone and firm-level stock returns.” Journal of Corporate Finance 37:
152-172.
Anand, Sanjay. 2007. Essentials of Sarbanes-Oxley. NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Anderson, Jenny. 2005. “AIG Posts 44% Earnings Rise Under New Leader.” The New York
Times. June 29, 2005. Retrieved from: www.nytimes.com.
Anderson, Jenny. 2006. “A Good Year, for the Record.” The New York Times. January 6, 2006.
Anderson, Jenny and Michael J. de la Merced. 2007. “13 Accused of Trading As Insiders.” The
New York Times. March 2, 2007.
Anderson, Jenny. 2008. “Shares of Lehman Take a Beating as Anxiety Builds in the Mortgage
Market.” The New York Times. July 11, 2008.
Anderson, Jenny, Michael J. de la Merced, Louise Story, and Ben White. 2008. “Lehman’s Fate
is in Doubt as Barclays Pulls Out of Talks.” The New York Times. September 13, 2008.
Anderson, Jenny and Louise Story. 2008. “As Losses Mount, the Fed and the White House Step
up Fortunes Reverse for a Bank and Its Leader.” The New York Times. June 10, 2008.
Andrews, Edmund L. 2008. “In Sweeping Move, Fed Backs Buyout and Wall St. Loans.” The
New York Times. March 17, 2008.
Andrews, Edmund L. 2008. “Senators Seek Details About Bear Stearns Deal.” The New York
Times. March 27, 2008.
Andrews, Edmund, L., Michael J. dela Merced, and Mary Williams Walsh. 2008. “Fed in an $85
Billion Rescue of an Insurer Near Failure.” The New York Times. September 17, 2008.
Andrews, Edmund, L. and Stephen Labaton. 2008. “Split Is Forming Over Regulation Of Wall
Street.” The New York Times. March 23, 2008.
Arens, Alvin A. and James K. Loebbecke. 1997. Auditing: An Integrated Approach. 7th ed. NJ:
Prentice Hall.
Arinaminpathy, Nimalan, Sujit Kapadia, and Robert M. May. 2012. “Size and complexity
in model financial systems.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Science of the
United States of America 109 no. 45: 18338-18343.
Arora, Sanjeev, Boaz Barak, Markus Brunnermeier and Ge Rong. 2011. “Computational
Complexity and Information Asymmetry in Financial Products.” Communications of
the ACM 54 no. 5: 101-107. DOI: 10.1145/1941487.1941511

141

Ba, Heather. 2021. “Hegemonic instability: Complex Interdependence and the Dynamics of
Financial Crisis in the Contemporary International System.” European Journal of
International Relations 27 no. 2: 369-402.
Bajaj, Vikas, Jenny Anderson, and Steven R. Weisman. 2008. “Fears that Bear Stearns’
Downfall May Spread.” The New York Times. March 17, 2008.
Banking Act of 1933, H.R. 5661 Public – No. 66, Chapter 89 of the 73rd Congress 1st Session.
June 16, 1933. Retrieved June 2022: COMPS-255.pdf (govinfo.gov)
Barr, Michael, Neel T. Kashkari, Andreas Lehnert, and Phillip Swagel. 2020. “Crisis-Era
Housing Programs” In First Responders, edited by Ben S. Bernanke, Timothy E.
Geithner, Henry M. Paulson, Jr. and J. Nellie Liang, 320 – 358. New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2020.
BBC News. 2018. Business: “Amazon 2017 Sales Jump by Nearly a Third. BBC News. February
1, 2018. Retrieved from: https://www.bbc.com/news/business-42911123
Beatty, Jeffery F., and Susan S. Samuelson. 2010. Introduction to business law. 3rd ed. Ohio:
South-Western Cengage Learning.
Behr, Peter. 2002. “Looking for Answers in the Enron Story.” Nieman Reports 56 no. 2: 8-9.
Bernanke, Ben S., Timothy F. Geithner, and Henry M. Paulson, Jr. 2019. Firefighting: The
Financial Crisis and Its Lessons. New York: Penguin Books.
Birz, Gene and John R. Lott Jr. 2011. “The effect of macroeconomic news on stock returns:
New evidence from newspaper coverage.” Journal of Banking & Finance 35: 27912800.
Blundell-Wignall, Adrian 2017. “Complexity and the financial system.” In Debate the Issues:
Complexity and Policy Making, OECD Insights, edited by Patrick Love and Julia
Stockdale-Otarola, 61-65. Paris: OECD Publishing, 2017.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264271531-en.

Briloff, Abraham. J. 1952. “Classification in Accounting.” New York Certified Public
Accountant 22 no. 7: 386.
Browning, Lynnley. 2005. “Obscure Offshore Entities Emerge to Trouble A.I.G.” The New York
Times. April 1, 2005. Retrieved from: www.nytimes.com.
Carsens, Deborah Sater and Gary Vandlandingham 2015. “Through a Glass, Darkly: The
Promise and Reality of State Transparency Websites.” Online Journal of Applied
Knowledge Management 3 no. 1: 37-50.

142

Chu, Heting. 2021. “Chapter 9 Content Analysis.” In “Research Methods and Design: From
Principles to Practice.” Unpublished book manuscript. New York: Taylor & Francis.
Craig, Susanne. 2006. “Moving the Market-Wall Street Earnings: Bear Stearns Profits Surges
81%, Driven by Bond and Stock Trading.” The Wall Street Journal. June 16, 2008.
Craig, Susanne. 2008. “Lehman Finds Itself In Center of a Storm.” The Wall Street Journal.
March 18, 2008.
Craig, Susanne. 2008. “Losses Push Lehman to Weigh Raising New Capital.” The Wall Street
Journal. June 3, 2008.
Craig, Susanne. 2008. “The Financial Crisis: Lawmakers Lay Into Lehman CEO; Field Testifies
That He Didn’t Deceive Investors Ahead of Firm’s Bankruptcy Filing. The Wall Street
Journal. October 7, 2008.
Creswell, Julie. 2007. “Bear Stearns Told to Pay $160 Million to Investors.” The New York
Times. February 16, 2007.
Doyle, Gillian (2006). “Financial news journalism: a post-Enron analysis of approaches towards
economic and financial news production in the UK.” Journalism: Theory, Practice and
Criticism 7 no. 4: 433-452.
Easton, Peter D., Mary Lea McAnally, and Gregory A. Sommers. 2021. Financial Statement:
Analysis & Valuation. 6th ed. IL: Cambridge Business Publishers.
Easton, Peter D., Robert F. Halsey, and Mary Lea McAnally. 2021. “Analyzing and Interpreting
Financial Statements,” In Financial & Managerial Accounting for MBAs. 6th ed. 1-61. IL:
Cambridge Business Publishers, 2020.
Easton, Peter D., Robert F. Halsey, and Mary Lea McAnally. 2021. Financial & Managerial
Accounting for MBAs. 6th ed. IL: Cambridge Business Publishers.
Eavis, Peter and David Reilly. 2008. “Bear’s Fall Sparks Soul Searching: At a Certain Point Wall
Street Firms Are ‘Buys’ but When?” The Wall Street Journal. March 18, 2008.
Egan, Matt. 2018. The stunning downfall of Bear Stearns and its bridge-playing CEO. CNN
Business. Retrieved from:
https://www.cnn.com/2018/09/30/investing/bear-stearns-2008-crisis-jimmycayne/index.html
Enrich, David, Carrick Mollenkamp, Damain Paletta, and Jon Hilsenrath. 2008. U. S. agrees to
rescue strugglingCitigroup. The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from
www.wsj.com/articles
Fertakis, John P. (1969). “On Communication, Understanding, and Relevance in Accounting
Reporting.” The Accounting Review 44 no. 4: 680-691.

143

Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission. 2010. Public Hearing on the Shadow Banking System,
Dirksen Senate Office Building. Washington DC: May 5, 2010. Accessed Dec 1, 2021.
https://fcic.law.stanford.edu/hearings/testimony/the-shadow-banking-system
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission. 2010. Public Hearing on the Role of Derivatives in the
Financial Crisis. Washington DC: June 30, 2010. Accessed Dec 1, 2021.
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission. 2011. The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report: Final Report
Of the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the
United States. New York: Public Affairs.
Frankfort-Nachmias, Chava, David Nachmias, and Jack DeWaard. 2015. Research Methods in
the Social Sciences. 8th ed. New York: Worth Publishers.
Galbraith, John Kenneth. (2009). The Economics of Innocent Fraud: Truth of Our Time. London:
Penguin.
Geithner, Timothy. F. 2014. Stress test: reflections on financial crises. New York: Broadway
Books.
Geraci, Marco Valerio. 2017. “Essays on Complexity in the Financial System.” Universite Libre
de Bruxelles, ULB Institutional Repository.
Giles, Matt. 2008. “Ten years ago, Wall Street collapsed.” The New York Times. September 15,
2008. Retrieved from: www.nytimes.com.
Girardi, Giulio, Craig Lewis, and Mila Getmansky. 2014. “Interconnectedness in the CDS
Market.” U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Retrieved June 2022:
https://www.sec.gov/dera/staff-papers/white-papers/28apr14_girardi_interconnectednessin-the.html
Glassman, Cynthia A. 2002. “Speech by SEC Commissioner: Opening Remarks before the
Symposium on Enhancing Financial Transparency.” U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission. Retrieved June 30, 2022.
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch565.htm
Gleeson-White, Jane. 2011. Double entry: How the Merchants of Venice Created Modern
Finance. New York: W. W. Norton & Co.
Hadi, Mohammed. 2007. “Profit Hopes Attract Activity in Brokerages.” The Wall Street Journal.
June 12, 2007.
Hilsenrath Jon, Serena Ng, and Damian Paletta. 2008. “Worst Crisis Since’30s With No End Yet
in Sight.” The Wall Street Journal. September 18, 2008. Retrieved from: www.wsj.com.

144

Horowitz, Jed, Gaston F. Ceron, Randall Smith. 2006. “Moving the Market: Lehman Net Jumps
but Disappoints; Bear Just Jumps.” The Wall Street Journal. December 16, 2008.
Hurst, Charles E., Heather M. Fitzgibbon, Anne M. Nurse. 2020. Social Inequality: Forms,
Causes, and Consequences. 10th ed. New York: Routledge.
H. R. 4173 – Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 111th Congress,
(2009 – 2010). Retrieved from: https://www.congress.gov/bill/111th-congress/housebill/4173/text
Irwin, Neil. 2015. “What is Glass-Steagall? The 82-year-old banking law that stirred the
Debate.” The New York Times. October 14, 2015 Retrieved from: www.nytimes.com.
Irwin, Neil. 2020. “Did America Learn Anything From the Last Economic Crisis?” The New
York Times. April 24, 2020. Retrieved from: www.nytimes.com.
Jackson, Michael C. 2003. Systems Thinking: Creative Holism for Managers. NJ: John Wiley &
Sons.
Jensen, Klaus Bruhn. (1987). “News as Ideology: Economic Statistics and Political Ritual in
Television Network News.” Journal of Communication 37 no.1: 8-27.
Kalogeropoulos, Antonis. (2018). “Economic News and Personal Economic Expectation.” Mass
Communication and Society 21, no. 2: 248-265.
Karnitschnig, Matthew, Deborah Solomon, Liam Pleven, and Jon Hilsenrath. 2008. “U.S. to take
over AIG in $85 billion bailout; central banks inject cash as credit dries up.” The Wall
Street Journal. September 16, 2008. Retrieved from:
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122156561931242905

Kelly, Kate. 2007. “Lifeline: Bear Stearns Bails Out Fund With Big Loan; Injection of $3.2
Billion Caps Day of Drama; Subprime Sector Fears. The Wall Street Journal. June 23,
2007.
Kelly, Kate. 2007. “Wall Street Gets Bearish about … Itself; Earnings downgrade made on Bear
Stearns may not be last.” The Wall Street Journal. May 25, 2007.
Kelly, Kate. 2008. “Two Ex-managers At Bear Indicted Over Hedge Funds.” The Wall Street
Journal. June 20, 2008.
Kelly, Kate, Amir Efrati, and Ruth Simon. 2008. “State Subprime Probe Takes a New Tack.”
The Wall Street Journal. January 31, 2008.
Kelly, Kate, Greg Ip, and Robin Sidel. 2008. “Fed Races to Rescue Bear Stearns In Bid to Steady
Financial System; Storied Firm Sees Stock Plunge 47%; J.P. Morgan Steps in.” The Wall
Street Journal. March 15, 2008.
Kelly, Kate, and Jed Horowitz. 2007. “Earnings Digest – Financial Services: Lehman Net Resists
Loan Troubles; Business Mix, Hedging Lift Profit to a Record Despite Subprime Fears.”
The Wall Street Journal. March 15, 2007.

145

Kelly, Kate and Serena Ng. 2007. “Subprime Woes Pinch Bear’s Mortgage Star; Risky Funds
Big Loss Forces a Bond Auction; Goldman Profit Diverges.” The Wall Street Journal.
June 15, 2008.
Kenton, Will. 2019. Annual report. Investopedia. May 24, 2019. Retrieved from:
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/annualreport.asp
Keiso, Donald E., Jerry J. Weygandt, and Terry D. Warfield. 2019. Intermediate Accounting.
17th ed. NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Kimmel, Paul D., Jerry J. Weygandt, and Donald E. Kieso. 2019. “Chapter 11 Reporting and
Analyzing Stockholders’ Equity.” In Financial Accounting: Tools for Business Decision
Making. 9th ed., 1-56. NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Kimmel, Paul D., Jerry J. Weygandt, and Jill E. Mitchell. 2022. “Chapter 2 A Further Look at
Financial Statements.” In Financial Accounting: Tools for Business Decision Making.
10th ed., 1-47. NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Kimmel, Paul D., Jerry J. Weygandt, and Jill E. Mitchell. 2022. “Chapter 10 Reporting and
Analyzing Liabilities.” In Financial Accounting: Tools for Business Decision Making.
10th ed., 1-60. NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Kitch, Carolyn. 2007. “Selling the ‘Authentic Past’: The New York Times and the Branding of
History.” Westminster Papers in Communication & Culture 4, no. 4: 24-41.
Krippendorff, Klaus. 2013. Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology. 3rd ed. Los
Angeles: Sage.
Krippendorff, Klaus. 2019. Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology. 4th ed. Los
Angeles: Sage.
Larsen, Sven. 2015. “The Great Recession could happen again soon, and this time it could be
worse for U.S. The Street. Retrieved from: www.thestreet.com.
Laudon, Kenneth, C., and Jane P. Laudon. 2007. Management Information Systems: Managing
the Digital Firm. 9th ed. New York: Pearson Education, Inc.
Levitz, Jennifer and Kate Kelly. 2007. “Bear Faces First Loss, Fraud Complaint.” The Wall
Street Journal. November 15, 2007.
Lioudis, Nick. 2019. The collapse of Lehman Brothers: a case study. Investopedia.
Retrieved from:
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/economics/09/lehman-brothers-collapse.asp
Luccetti, Aaron. 2009. “Big Paydays for Lehman, Bear.” The Wall Street Journal. November 23,
2009.
Malkiel, Burton, G. (2003). “The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Its Critics.” Journal of

146

Economic Perspectives 17, no.1: 59-82.
Marden, Ronald. E., Randall K. Edwards, and William D. Stout. 2006. The CEO/CFO
Certification Requirements. The CPA Journal. Retrieved from:
http://archives.cpajournal.com/2003/0703/features/f073603.htm
Mayer-Schonberber, Viktor and David Lazer. 2007. Governance and information technology.
London: The MIT Press.
McCallig, John, Alastair Robb, and Fiona Rohde. (2019). “Establishing the representational
Faithfulness of financial accounting using multiparty security, network analysis, and a
Blockchain.” International Journal of Accounting Information Systems 33: 47-58.
McConnell, Campbell R., and Stanley L. Brue. 1996. Economics. 13th ed. New York: McGrawHill, Inc.
McGee, Robert W., and Danielle N. Igoe. 2009. The Timeliness of Financial Reporting. A
Comparative Study of Selected EU and Transition Economy Countries. Corporate
governance in transition economies. Boston: Springer Science.
Miller, Roger, L., and Frank B. Cross. 2013. Business law. 12th ed. Ohio: South-Western
Cengage Learning.
Minsky, Hyman, P. 1992. “The Financial Instability Hypothesis.” The Jerome Levy Economics
Institute of Bard College.
Mishkin, Frederic S. 2019. The Economics of Money, Banking, and Financial Markets. 12th ed.
New York: Pearson.
Mohammed, Hadi. 2007. “Profit Hopes Attract Activity in Brokerages.” The Wall Street Journal.
June 12, 2007.
Mollenkamp, Carrick, Susanne Craig, Serena Ng, and Aaron Lucchetti. 2008. “Lehman Files for
Bankruptcy, Merrill sols, AIG Seeks Cash.” The Wall Street Journal. September 16,
2008. Retrieved from: https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122145492097035549
Mollenkamp, Carrick and Mark Whitehouse. 2008. “Old-School Banks Emerge Atop New
World Finance.” The Wall Street Journal. September 16, 2008.
Morgenson, Gretchen. 2007. “When Models Misbehave.” The New York Times. June 24, 2007.
Morgenson, Gretchen. 2008. “Credit Default Swap Market Under Scrutiny.” The New York
Times. August 10, 2008.
Morgenson, Gretchen. 2008. “Rescue Me: A Fed Bailout Crosses a Line.” The New York Times.
March 16, 2008.

147

Na’im, Ainun. (2006). “Special Purpose Vehicle Institutions: Their Business Natures and
Accounting Implications.” Gadjah Mada International Journal of Business 8, no.1: 1-19.
Needles, Belverd, Henry R. Anderson, and James C. Caldwell. 1993. Principles of accounting.
5th ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.
Needles, Belverd. E., Marian Powers, and Susan V. Crosson. 2014. Principles of Accounting.
12th ed. Mason: South-Western Cengage Learning.
Nelson, Dean. 1990. “Business Day & the New York Times: New life for an old priority.”
Newspaper Research Journal 11, no. 4: 24-37.
Neuendorf, Kimberly A. 2017. The Content Analysis Guidebook. 2nd ed. Los Angeles: Sage.
Ng, Serena. 2007. “Wall Street Ponders Extent of the Woes At Other Firms.” The Wall Street
Journal. March 15, 2007.
Norris, Floyd. 1999. Looking Back at the Crash of 29. The New York Times. Retrieved from:
www.nytimes.com.
Norris, Floyd. 2008. “F.D.R’s Safety Net Gets a Big Stretch.” The New York Times. March 15,
2008.
Norris, Floyd. 2008. “Lehman’s Assurances Ring Hollow.” The New York Times. September 11,
2008.
Osterland, Andrew. (2020). “Here are key ways the Coronavirus crisis differs from the Great
Recession.” CNBC. May 27, 2020. Retrieved from: https://www.cnbc.com
Paulson Jr., Henry M. (2010). On the Brink: Inside the Race to Stop the Collapse of the Global
Financial System. New York: Business Plus.
Pena-Martel, Devora, Jeronimo Perez-Aleman, and Domingo Javier Santana-Martin. (2018).
“The role of media in creating earnings informativeness: Evidence from Spain.” Business
Research Quarterly 21, no. 3: 168-179.
Philbin, Brett. 2008. “Boeing Rides Higher But Bear Struggles; S&P Report Lifts Mood of
Investors; Fannie, Freddie Up.” The Wall Street Journal. March 14, 2008.
Pleven, Liam and Randall Smith. “Dow’s 360-92 Point Shudder; AIG, Morgan Stanley Show
Subprime Losses Aren’t Quite Over Yet.” The Wall Street Journal. November 18, 2007.
Reddy, Sudeep. 2008. “U.S. News: For Fed’s Geithner, Rescue Ties Cut Both Ways.” The Wall
Street Journal. November 18, 2008.
Reilly, David. 2008. “Assets Get Harder to Shake; Balance Sheets Can Swell Again Under
Proposal.” The Wall Street Journal. June 17, 2008.

148

Reilly, David. 2008. “Crisis on Wall Street: In Crisis, Fingers Point At Mark-to-Mark Rule.” The
Wall Street Journal. September 19, 2008.
Reilly, David. 2008. “Devil Is in Lack of Details; Earnings Releases From Big Banks Skip
Balance Sheets.” The Wall Street Journal. June 12, 2008.
Reilly, David and Karen Richardson. 2007. “Subprime Detectives Search In Dark for Next
Victim; Wall Street Can Bury Mistakes.” The Wall Street Journal. August 2, 2007.
Rich, Robert. 2013. The Great Recession. Federal Reserve History. Retrieved from:
https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/great_recession_of_200709
Romney, Marshall. B., and Paul J. Steinbart. 2018. Accounting Information Systems. 14th ed.
Esses: Pearson Education Limited.
Roush, Chris. 2008. “Unheeded Warnings.” American Journalism Review 30, no. 6 34-39
Sarbanes-Oxley Act 0f 2002, Public Law 107-24 107th Congress (2002). Retrieved from:
www.sec.gov.
Sau, Lino. 2013. “Instability and Crisis in Financial Complex Systems.” Review of Political
Economy 25, no. 3: 496-511. https://doi.org/10.1080/09538259.2013.807674.
Scannell, Kara, Siobhan Hughes, and David Reilly. 2007. “SEC Probes CDOs and Bear Funds;
Cox Testifies the Agency Has ‘About 12’ Inquiries; Accurate Pricing Is an Issue.” The
Wall Street Journal. June 27, 2007.
Scannell, Kara. 2008. “The Financial Crisis: Scope of Regulating Revamp is Likely to Widen;
Derivatives Market Could Get Oversight As Fed Expands Role.” The Wall Street
Journal. September 16, 2008.
Scannell, Kara and Sudeep Reddy. 2008. “The Fed Hits the Street; Brokerage Firms Get Cash –
and On-site Scrutiny.” The Wall Street Journal. April 3, 2008.
Scannell, Kara and Sudeep Reddy. 2008. “Officials Say They Sought to Avoid Bear Bailout.”
The Wall Street Journal. April 4, 2008.
Schwartz, Nelson and Stephen Labaton. 2008. “Struggling to Keep Up as the Crisis Raced On.”
The New York Times. October 22, 2008.
Schifferes, Steve and Stephen Coulter. 2012. “Downloading disaster: BBC news online coverage
of the global financial crisis.” Journalism 14, no. 2: 228-252.
Sidel, Robin, Greg Ip, Michael M. Phillips, and Kate Kelly. 2008. “The Week That Shook Wall
Street, Inside the Demise of Bear Stearns.” The Wall Street Journal. March 18, 2008.

149

Smith, Randall, Amir Efrati, and Liam Pleven. 2008. “AIG Group Tied to Swaps Draws Focus of
Probes.” The Wall Street Journal. June 13, 2008.
Solomon, Deborah. 2008. “U.S. News: Paulson Defends Moves, Questions Wall Street Pay.”
The Wall Street Journal. November 21, 2008.
Sorkin, Andrew Ross. 2009. Too Big to Fail. New York: Penguin Books.
Sorkin, Andrew Ross. 2020. “This Is the Only Way to End the Coronavirus Financial Panic.”
The New York Times. March 18, 2020. Retrieved from: www.nytimes.com.
Sraders, Anne. 2018. “The Lehman Brothers Collapse and How it’s Changes the Economy
Today. The Street. September 12, 2018. Retrieved from:
https://www.thestreet.com/markets/bankruptcy/lehman-brothers-collapse-14703153
Starbucks Investor Relations. 2017. Press Releases: Starbucks Reports Q4 and Full Year Fiscal
Results. Starbucks Corporation. Retrieved from:
https://investor.starbucks.com/press-releases/financial-releases/press-releasedetails/2017/Starbucks-Reports-Q4-and-Full-Year-Fiscal-2017-Results/default.aspx
Story, Louise. 2008. “At Lehman, Chief Excludes Confidence.” The New York Times. June 17,
2008.
Strycharz, Joanna, Nadine Strauss, and Damian Trilling. (2018). The Role of Media Coverage
In Explaining Stock Market Fluctuations: Insights for Strategic Financial
Communication.” International Journal of Strategic Communication 12, no. 1: 67-85.
The Organization for Economic Development. 2005. OECD: Financial System: Compilation
Guide on Financial Soundness Indicators, IMF. Washington DC (par .2). Retrieved July
3, 2022: OECD Glossary of Statistical Terms - Financial system Definition
The New York Times Online. 2006. “Debt Trading Aids Earnings of Two Firms Of Wall Street.”
The New York Times. December 15, 2006.
The New York Time Online. 2006. “Today in Business.” The New York Times. December 15,
2006.
The New York Times Online. 2007. “Housing and Hedge Funds.” The New York Times. June 28,
2007.
The New York Times Online. 2009. “Cox leaves mixed legacy at SEC.” The New York Times.
January 2, 2009.
The New York Time Online. 2009. “How Lehman Brothers Got Its Real Estate Fix.” The New
York Times. May 2, 2009.

150

The Wall Street Journal Online. 2008. “Surviving the Panic.” The Wall Street Journal.
September 16, 2008.
Thomas Jr., Landon. 2007. “A Top Official at Bear Stearns Ousted Over Funds Implosion.” The
New York Times. August 6, 2007.
Tunstall, Jeremy. (1971). Journalists at Work: Specialist Correspondents. London: Constable
U.S Securities and Exchange Commission: the laws that govern the securities industry.
United States Securities and Exchange Commission: Retrieved from:
https://www.sec.gov/answers/about-lawsshtml.html#secact1933
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. 2013. “The Need for Effective Regulation of the
Asset-Backed Securities Market.” August 28, 2013. Retrieved June 20, 2022:
SEC.gov | The Need for Effective Regulation of the Asset-Backed Securities Market

U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. 2014. Interconnectedness in the CDS Market
https://www.sec.gov/dera/staff-papers/white-papers/28apr14_girardi_interconnectednessin-the.html
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. (2014). Investor Publications: Beginners’ Guide to
Financial Statements.
https://www.sec.gov/oiea/reportspubs/investor-publications/beginners-guide-to-financialstatements.html#:~:text=Assets%20are%20things%20that%20a,%2C%20trucks%2C%20
equipment%20and%20inventory.
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. (2015). Investor Bulletin: An Introduction to the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission – Rulemaking and Laws.
https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-bulletins/ib_rulemaking.html
U. S. Securities and Exchange Commission: EDGAR Full-text Search. United States Securities
And Exchange Commission. Retrieved from: https://www.sec.gov/edgar/search/
U. S. Securities and Exchange Commission. 2021. EDGAR search and access. United States
Securities and Exchange Commission. Retrieved from:
https://www.sec.gov/edgar/search-and-access
U. S. Securities and Exchange Commission: Exchange Act Reporting Registration. United
States Securities and Exchange Commission. Retrieved from:
https://www.sec.gov/smallbusiness/goingpublic/exchangeactreporting#:~:text=SEC%20r
ules%20require%20your%20company,statement%20for%20a%20public%20offering.
U. S. Securities and Exchange Commission: Form 10-K. United States Securities and Exchange
Commission. Retrieved from:
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/320193/000119312513416534/d590790d10k.ht

151

U. S. Securities and Exchange Commission. 2012. Historical EDGAR documents. United
States Securities and Exchange Commission. Retrieved from:
https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/srch-edgar
U. S. Securities and Exchange Commission: Investor publications – All About Auditors: What
Investors Need to Know. United States Securities and Exchange Commission.
Retrieved from:
https://www.sec.gov/reportspubs/investorpublications/investorpubsaboutauditorshtm.html#:~:text=Who%20Prepares%20a%20Co
mpany's%20Financial,and%20disclosures%20to%20an%20audit.
U.S Securities and Exchange Commission. 2007. Investor Publications: Beginner’s Guide to
Financial Statements. United States Securities and Exchange Commission. Retrieved
from https://www.sec.gov/reportspubs/investorpublications/investorpubsbegfinstmtguidehtm.html.
U. S. Securities and Exchange Commission. n.d. “Public Companies.” Accessed Oct 17, 2021.
https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/investing-basics/how-stock-marketswork/public-companies
U. S. Securities and Exchange Commission. 2008. “SEC Advisory Committee Makes
Recommendations to Improve Financial Reporting for Investors.” U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission: https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-166.htm
Walsh, Mary Williams. 2008. “Insurance on Lehman Debt Is the Industry’s Next Test.” The New
York Times. October 11, 2008.
Wang, Shaojie, Shaobo He, Amin Yousefpour, Hadi Jahanshahi, Robert Repnik, and Matjaz
Perc. (2019). “Chaos and complexity in a fractional-order financial system with time
delays.” Elsevier Ltd 131: 1-9.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chaos.2019.10952

Warren, Carl S., James M. Reeve, and Jonathan E. Duchac. 2012. Accounting. 22 ed. Mason:
South-Western Cengage Learning.
Warren, Carl S., James M. Reeve, and Jonathan E. Duchac. 2016 Corporate Financial
Accounting. 14th ed. Boston: Cengage Learning.
Warren, Carl S., and Jefferson P. Jones. 2019. Corporate Financial Accounting. 15th ed. Boston:
Cengage Learning.
Wen, Chunhui and Jinhai Yang. 2019. “Complexity Evolution of Chaotic Financial Systems
based in Fractional Calculus.” Elsevier Ltd 128: 242-251.
Weisman, Steven R. 2008. “Bernanke to Face Bear Stearns Questions.” The New York Times.
April 2, 2008.

152

Weisman, Jonathan and Dan Fitzpatrick. 2009. “The AIG Controversy: Obama Seeks to Soften
the Punitive Legislation.” The Wall Street Journal. March 21, 2009.
Wessel, David. (2009). In Fed We Trust: Ben Bernanke’s War On The Great Panic. New York:
Three Rivers Press.
Westbrook, Lynn. 1994. “Qualitative Research Methods: A Review of Major Stages, Data
Analysis Techniques. And Quality Controls.” Library & Information Science Research
16: 241-254.
Weygandt, Jerry J., Paul D. Kimmel, Donald E. Keiso. 2020. Financial Accounting. 11th ed.
Whalen, Charles, J. (2001). “Integrating Schumpeter and Keynes: Hyman Minsky’s Theory of
Capitalist Development. Journal of Economic Issues 35, no. 4: 805-819.
White, John D. and James L. Kroeker. 2008. “Testimony Concerning Transparency in
Accounting, Proposed Changes to Accounting for Off-Balance Sheet Entities.” U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission. Retrieved June 30, 2022.
https://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2008/ts091808jww-jlk.htm
White, Marilyn, D., and Emily E. Marsh. 2006. “Content Analysis: A Flexible Methodology.”
Library Trends 55, no. 1: 22-45.
White, Stephanie, M. (2012). “Using Cybernetics with Soft Systems Methodology in Complex
System Development.” Paper presented at IEEE International Systems Conference
SysCon 2012: 1-6.
https://doi.org/10.1109/SysCon.2012.6189458
Wild, John J., Ken W. Shaw, and Barbara Chiapetta. 2013. Fundamental Accounting Principles.
21st ed. New York: McGraw Hill.
Wild, John. J., Ken W. Shaw. Barbara Chiappetta. 2017. Fundamental Accounting Principles.
23rd ed. New York: McGraw Hill.
Wildemuth, B. 2009. Application of Social Research Methods to Questions in Information and
Library Science. Westport, CT: Libraries Unlimited.
Wolf, Martin. 2014. The Shifts and the Shocks: What We’ve Learned – and Have Still to Learn –
from the Financial Crisis. New York: Penguin Books.
Zadorozhnyi, Zenovii-Mykhaylo, Iryna Ometsinska, and Volodymyr Muravskyi. (2021).
“Determinants of Firm’s Innovation: Increasing the Transparency of Financial
Statements.” Marketing and Management of Innovations 2: 74-86.

153

.

